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ABSTRACT 
Contemporary policy developments have signalled a shift in emphasis for Local Authorities 
from service delivery to service commissioning. The Every Child Matters policy agenda 
identified joint commissioning as an important mechanism for delivering integrated services 
and better outcomes for children.   
Taking a case study approach and drawing on literature from the fields of policy 
implementation and evidence-based policy making this thesis explores the implementation 
of joint commissioning in one local authority. It examines how different policy actors 
conceptualise and practice commissioning within a particular organisational and political 
context.  
In so doing it illustrates that policy is interpreted and reformulated at a local level, existing as 
the outcome of a complex set of interactions and ‘negotiated settlements’ between actors 
that are in part contingent upon the local political and organisational context and in part 
upon actors’ value systems, epistemological positions and goal interests.  
Different ways in which commissioning is understood or ‘framed’ are orientated around 
alternative value systems with respect to accountability and its perceived acceptability as a 
mechanism of governance for public services. This in turn means that policy actors assign 
different roles to the forms of evidence with which they identify and construct responses to 
policy problems. Hence evidence for upwards accountability, principally framed as 
managerial targets and outputs, prefigures in the priority setting and evaluative ‘stages’ of 
the commissioning ‘cycle’, whilst appeal to a values base and experiential knowledge take 
centre stage in formulating local responses to identified priorities.  Achieving the rhetorical 
ideal of evidence-based commissioning is thus compromised not only by the political and 
institutional context in which this takes place but also by the conceptual challenges this 
presents to differently situated policy actors.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Children’s services commissioning  
Under the former Labour government the adoption of an outcome-based commissioning 
approach to coordinating the delivery of children’s services was presented as the optimal 
institutional arrangement for securing more effective and cost-efficient provision (DfES/DH 
2005; HM Government 2006). This reflected New Labour’s broader policy drive to redefine 
the role of Local Authorities from service providers to ‘place shapers’ (CLG 2006), expected 
to employ the techniques of market development, performance management and better 
procurement to commission more innovative and cost-effective services.  
The New Labour (NL) government set out a radical programme for the reform of children’s 
services most significantly through the green paper Every Child Matters (ECM) (DfES 2003). 
Later referred to as the ‘Change for Children’ policy agenda this was intended to improve 
outcomes through the reconfiguration and integration of governance arrangements, 
strategic planning and front line services. ECM also established a universal set of priority 
outcomes that spoke to five broad policy areas:  health; safety; enjoyment and achievement; 
economic well-being and contribution to society.  Joint commissioning,  identified as sitting 
‘at the heart of improving outcomes’ and achieving this ‘whole system change’, was  
described as the process of: ‘developing an overall picture of children’s needs within an area, 
and developing provision through public, private, voluntary and community providers to 
respond to those needs’ (DfES, 2003: 72). 
The green paper established children’s trusts (CTs) as the strategic partnership arrangements 
for joint planning and commissioning with the subsequent Children Act 2004 (DfES 2004a) 
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providing  the legislative framework for securing systematic and formalised partnership 
working between key agencies, although notably this excluded schools and GPs. The Act also 
made CTs responsible for the production of a single, overarching ‘Children and Young 
People's Plan’ (CYPP) intended to provide coherence to strategic planning and 
commissioning by identifying  a set of agreed targets and priorities, and describing the 
contribution of different agencies to their achievement. Horizontal collaboration and 
mandated partnership were championed on the basis that fragmentation and poor 
communication were responsible for previous failures in children’s services (DH 2003a) but 
were also central characteristics of NL’s ‘third way’ political project (Blair 1998; Giddens 
1998) expected to deliver more  ‘joined up’ responses to complex policy problems.  
The development of a commissioning role for CTs was supported by a ‘Joint Planning and 
Commissioning Framework for Children, Young People and Maternity Services’ (HM 
Government, 2006).   This presented joint commissioning as a rational, sequential, approach 
to strategic decision-making. It described a nine-stage commissioning ‘cycle’ involving the 
processes of  needs assessment and priority setting,  the development of local markets to 
improve supply choices,  contracting and service procurement and performance 
management. Since the publication of the guidance variants of this cyclical staged model 
have been widely adopted with different agencies setting out their frameworks for 
commissioning along similar lines (e.g. CSIP 2007; DH 2009). 
The joint planning and commissioning framework asked CT partners to target services by 
consideration to the ‘priority outcomes’ identified by ECM and measured through a set of 
nationally defined performance indicators and targets. The focus on outcomes was intended 
3 
 
to re-orientate traditional thinking on performance management away from inputs, 
processes and outputs towards a form of results-based accountability with providers 
expected to demonstrate evidence of the effectiveness of their services.  
The guidance also reflected a second central theme of the NL policy environment, that of 
‘evidence-based’ policy and practice. Evidence from multiple sources, including service 
mapping, quantitative and administrative data, and qualitative data from service users and 
providers was expected to play a central role in the various processes associated with 
commissioning.  In addition, CT partnerships were expected to weigh up evidence of ‘what 
works’ in designing the profile of services most likely to ‘secure priority outcomes’ taking 
account of both national and local research  and with an increased focus on ‘prevention and 
early intervention’ (HM Government, 2006: 14).  The twin emphases on outcome-based 
accountability and evidence-based decision-making together brought significant changes to 
data collection requirements.   
Under NL the appeal to evidence-based policy making also provided a rhetorical justification 
for an extended role for markets based on the argument that it was ‘what worked’ not who 
provided that mattered most (Blunkett 2000). This reflected an ideological preference for 
market style reforms and a commitment to promote market mechanisms as a way of 
securing service improvements and efficiency gains.  The joint commissioning framework, as 
well as later guidance (DCSF 2007a), highlighted the role of commissioning partnerships in 
encouraging the development of provider diversity in the interests of competition and 
market contestability. A series of reports were commissioned by the DfES/DCSF to 
4 
 
investigate the existing state of a number of children’s services markets and their potential 
for expansion (PWC 2004; PWC, 2006; PWC 2007a; PWC 2007b).  
The goal of promoting an expanded market for children’s services also embraced that of 
extending the role of the third sector (TS) as an alternative provider base to the state or 
private sectors (Alcock 2010). Active government support was given for an enhanced role for 
the TS in delivering a range of children’s services (CYPU 2001; DfES 2007; DCSF 2009), and CT 
boards and commissioning partnerships were expected to encourage TS involvement (DfES 
2007; DH 2003b). In 2006 the National Programme for Third Sector Commissioning was 
launched by the Office of the Third Sector establishing commissioning as the key mode of 
organising and coordinating TS delivery of public services. 
In short, children’s services commissioning was presented as a process concerned with both 
improving the rationality of local decision making and planning by taking an evidence-based 
approach to need assessment and priority setting, and delivering greater efficiency and 
control of delivery through encouraging provider diversity and competition coupled with 
performance management through outcome based contracting. 
1.2 Implementing commissioning  
Collaborative commissioning on the basis of outcomes has been held up as a self-evident 
virtue with the   claim that it will lead to needs-led provision, better outcomes, more choice 
and greater efficiency (CSCI 2006; DCSF 2007a; Cozens et al 2007; Smyth 2007; DH/DCSF 
2009; Commissioning Support Programme 2009). Not only has commissioning been 
endowed with the potential to improve outcomes and deliver cost savings, but also to 
‘transform people’s lives through better services’ (CSCI 2006).  By incorporating partnership 
5 
 
with evidence-based decision-making and outcome-based accountability joint 
commissioning has been presented as a key mechanism for enhancing the project of 
rational, consensual and ‘non-political’ policy making at the local level.  Underpinning these 
claims is a set of assumptions about the capacity of a joint approach, based on formalised 
partnership, to deliver more coherent responses to complex policy problems; the ability of 
market-type mechanisms to drive improvement and efficiency; and the possibility of a 
rationally driven, evidence-based local policy process. Evidence, however, suggests that 
implementing commissioning has proved far from straightforward with problems related to 
each of these three themes.   
Intended to serve as fore-runners to CTs the strategic partnerships established through the 
Children’s Fund experienced a number of difficulties in the effective development and 
functioning of commissioning structures and processes (Edwards, et al. 2006). Since then 
joint commissioning has been slow to develop through CTs with problems in realising 
collective decision making and reluctance to pool budgets and resources (Audit Commission 
2008).   Where commissioning has been accomplished its scope has been narrowly defined 
tending to focus on specialised targeted services rather than universal or preventative 
provision (Audit Commission 2008; Bachmann et al 2006, 2009; UEA/NCB 2007). 
Furthermore the tardy development of integrated strategic and front-line working in 
children’s services has highlighted enduring tensions between hierarchical central-local 
governance structures and mechanisms for performance management and the goals of 
network governance and integrated delivery (Bachmann et al 2009; UEA/NCB 2007).  The 
engagement of TS organisations in strategic commissioning groups has also proved 
problematic suggesting not only problems of capacity but tensions between the twin 
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imperatives of collaboration and competition and a persisting imbalance of power between 
the sectors (Audit Commission 2008; Gill et al 2011; Shared Intelligence 2008;9).  
The policy of market expansion in children’s services was based on the assertion that the 
application of private sector principles and practices would deliver better outcomes for 
children. However there is a lack of empirical evidence giving strong or  equivocal support 
for the former DCSF claim that a more diverse children’s services market would lead to 
‘better outcomes’, ‘higher quality’, ‘lower cost’, and more innovative services that ‘offer 
consumers a greater choice’ (DCSF 2007a: 4).  Evidence suggests that the principles of 
contestability and competition have not been extensively applied in children’s services 
(Grace et al 2007). However, even in areas of provision that have been subject to market-
style reforms for some time (e.g. residential care, adoption and fostering services), there is 
little evidence that these have delivered better outcomes or achieved cost-savings (Kirton et 
al 2007;Sellick and Connolly 2002).   
Research shows that Local Authorities (LAs) have varied experiences of and success in 
applying the principles of competition and contestability with some showing a reluctance to 
externalise (Grace et al 2007). Explanations offered by government-funded reviews and 
inspection reports highlight problems with contractual and commissioning competence and 
capacity but also acknowledge a range of managerial concerns including supply-side 
problems, ‘principal-agent’ difficulties and the economic and political transactional costs 
associated with outsourcing (Audit Commission, 2003, 2007a, 2008; PWC 2004; Grace et al 
2007). However, LA officers also articulate a number of ethical and political arguments 
against the appropriateness or desirability of extending market approaches and 
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externalisation. These include tensions between working in partnership with communities 
whilst pursuing efficiency objectives, ethical barriers to externalising more sensitive service 
areas such as child protection, and the desire to maintain control of the delivery of public 
services alongside protecting organisational ‘core competencies’ (Entwhistle and Martin 
2005; Grace et al 2007; PWC 2004).  
Research also highlights a number of complexities, difficulties and challenges associated with 
implementing evidenced, outcome-based approaches (Hughes and Fielding 2006; SHM 
2009). The shift from commissioning against needs to outcome-based planning has posed a 
challenge to local strategic partnerships, with many expressing difficulties in defining 
‘outcomes’ as opposed to outputs or needs, particularly in the context of preventative 
services or complex problems requiring in interagency approach (Hansen and Plewis, 2004; 
Hughes and Fielding 2006; SHM 2009). Furthermore, the complexities of risk factor analysis 
in targeting interventions at those most likely to experience negative outcomes have been 
subject to considerable debate (Armstrong 2006; France 2008; France and Utting 2005; 
Hughes and Fielding, 2006). In short, attempts to determine specific risk factors are 
extremely difficult due to the complex relationships between the numerous inter-related 
factors that might give rise to negative outcomes.  Exploring the interactions and 
relationships between these factors requires substantial expertise in statistical modelling 
and multilevel analysis that is likely to be lacking at local level (Hughes and Fielding, 2006). 
In other words, designing outcome measures that can steer service planning sufficiently 
accurately so as to produce outcome improvement is a far from straight forward process. 
The implementation of local strategies indicates a gap between understandings of the 
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identified problem and the design of interventions capable of delivering desired outcome 
objectives (Chamberlain, et al 2010; Edwards, et al., 2006). 
These findings are subsumed within a broader set of problems associated with realising an 
evidence-based approach to decision making and policy making (Davies et al 2000). 
Evidence-based planning and practice became a policy imperative under NL but this was 
underpinned by a set of assumptions about the nature of evidence and the context in which 
that evidence would be employed. While the processes of implementing an evidence-based 
approach have tended to be over-looked by policy makers they have been subject to 
considerable attention by scholars. Empirical studies highlight the selective take-up of 
evidence and its adaptation to local circumstance (Coote et al 2004; Spicer and Smith 2006) 
whilst academics from a constructionist perspective suggest that knowledge is situated, 
derives from multiple sources, and is open to interpretation (Freeman 2007).   
In the face of this complex set of challenges and tensions the process of putting joint 
outcome-based commissioning into practice presents an interesting case for a study of 
implementation. Existing literature on developing children’s commissioning has largely been 
generated from government departments (e.g. DCSF 2007a), agencies and consultancies 
(e.g. Audit Commission 2008; Cozens 2007; IdEA 2009; PWC 2004; SHM 2009) or been 
‘technocratically’ orientated in the form of commissioning guidance and frameworks (e.g. 
DH 2007a 2007b 2007c; HM Government 2006; Utting et al 2008). In the main this literature 
has tended to reflect an ‘implementation deficit’ (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984) approach, 
identifying a lack of commissioning competence and capacity (Audit Commission 2008; PWC  
2004, 2006), confused statutory guidance and obstructive partnership working (Audit 
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Commission 2008) as barriers to the development of effective commissioning structures and 
processes. However it also hints at the complexity of local policy implementation. For 
example, one former DCSF commissioned report highlights the importance of understanding 
local organisational and political factors as constraints on developing integrated 
commissioning and includes discussion of the conceptual problems of developing an 
outcome approach (SHM 2009).  
What is lacking however is a more theoretically orientated research based literature aimed 
at developing understandings of both the importance of this contextual detail on the way in 
which commissioning is interpreted and developed locally, and of the experiences of 
commissioning partnerships  in dealing with the challenges presented by the requirement to 
take an evidenced, outcome-based approach to planning services.  
1.3 The research  
 
The aim of this thesis is to fill a gap in the existing literature through examining the 
implementation of joint outcome- based commissioning at the micro-level.  The research 
presented is based on a case study analysis of commissioning structures, processes and 
decisions in one LA. Concern is with what happens to a policy directive at the point of 
implementation with an emphasis on the role played by knowledge, ideas and interpretation 
in shaping policy action, and the relationship between these and the organisational, strategic 
and resource interests of policy implementers.  
The thesis is concerned with developing understanding of the various ways in which 
differently situated stakeholders interpret and relate to formal policy. Commissioning as 
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policy is understood as a set of directives concerned with process or policy means, rather 
than a set of objectives defined in relation to concrete programmes of service delivery. The 
main focus of analysis is on policy implementation at a layer once removed from front-line 
service delivery.  This is the point of practice where policy is translated by strategic planners, 
service managers, commissioners and partnerships; an intermediate layer between the 
‘street-level’ (Lipsky 1980, 2010) where policy is developed in practice and the macro level 
from where policy is formally directed.   
The primary research question that the thesis seeks to answer is: How is joint commissioning 
being conceptualised and developed as a process for identifying and delivering priority 
outcomes for children?   
Subsequent questions are grouped under two analytical themes: the first speaks to the 
political and organisational context in which, commissioning is evolved and decision making 
takes place and the second to the ways in which evidence is gathered, understood and used 
and by strategic decision makers and service providers.  
In reference to the first theme the emphasis is on both the context in which commissioning 
is being implemented and the meaning that commissioning has for differently situated policy 
actors. The overarching question for this theme is:  
1. What are the key organizational and policy factors influencing the local interpretation 
and development of joint commissioning?  
With the following four sub-questions:   
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1.1 What are the organisational/institutional barriers and facilitators to implementing 
joint commissioning   
1.2 How do past histories of service provision and partnership working impact on the 
implementation of joint commissioning arrangements?  
1.3 How do different stakeholders understand the role commissioning might, or might 
not play in delivering better outcomes for children?  
1.4 What discourses and arguments do different stakeholders draw on to make the case 
for, or against commissioning? 
The focus of the second theme is the interpretation and application of evidence in practice. 
The overarching question for this theme is:  
2. What are the conceptual and methodological challenges presented by the 
requirement to take an evidenced, outcome-based approach to planning and 
commissioning services?   
With the following three sub-questions:  
2.1 How are national policy objectives, with an emphasis on centrally determined 
targets, evidence-based policy and practice translated into local policy and service 
development?  
2.2 What role do different forms of evidence play in the processes of ‘priority outcome’ 
setting, need assessment, targeting and subsequent commissioning strategies and 
processes?  
12 
 
2.3 How do commissioners and providers identify and evidence effective strategies and 
interventions understood to lead to the successful achievement of desired 
outcomes?  
1.4 Structure of thesis  
The thesis is structured into nine chapters. The following chapter provides an overview of 
two broadly distinctive approaches to the study of policy implementation focusing primarily 
on that which has been referred to as ‘post-positivist’ (Fischer 2003). From this perspective 
policy is understood as social construct: the product of a set of context-specific 
interpretations and negotiations shaped by the various experiences, interests and values of 
multiple actors at different levels of the policy process (Barrett and Fudge 1981; Hill and 
Hupe 2002, 2009).  The suggestion is that the implications of any policy directive are 
revealed in practice and that implementation is therefore of central rather than peripheral 
analytical importance. 
The chapter  explores the role of negotiation, discretion and subversion in shaping policy 
outcomes examining Lipsky’s (1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy and Barrett and 
Fudge’s (1981) idea of a ‘policy-action’ continuum. It then goes on to relate the study of 
implementation to contemporary transformations of the public sector with particular 
reference to the changing nature of governance implied by managerialism and the shift from 
bureaucratic hierarchies to markets and networks. Chapter 2 thereby frames the specific 
example of policy implementation with which this study is concerned, the context of which is 
unpacked in the following two chapters.  
13 
 
Chapter 3 speaks to the first analytical theme being concerned with the political and 
organisational implications of commissioning as a form of contemporary governance.  As 
such commissioning is understood to provide   a tool for the co-ordination and management 
of service delivery in the context of a reduced role for the statutory sector in direct 
provision. It is understood as representing  a confluence of some of the central tenants of 
the former Labour government’s ‘modernisation’ of welfare:  partnership and an enhanced 
role for the TS alongside  the expansion of welfare ‘markets’ with contestability and choice 
functioning as key drivers for reform.  
Chapter 4 addresses the second analytical theme exploring commissioning in the context of 
evidence based policy making and outcome based accountability. It discusses some of the 
conceptual and methodological challenges presented by these approaches and reflects on 
the underlying assumptions made relating to the nature of evidence and the ways in which 
that evidence might be applied in practice.  
Chapter 5 describes the interpretive approach and case study methods adopted. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with 23 strategic stakeholders and service providers 
chosen to reflect the range of organisations and sectors planning and delivering children’s 
services. These were supplemented by documentary analysis of a range of strategic and 
operational documents to build a picture of how commissioning was received, interpreted, 
and negotiated in practice.  
The case study analysis is presented in Chapters 6-8.  Chapter 6 is concerned with the first of 
the two analytical themes described above. It explores the events and circumstances that 
provided the historical and political context for implementing commissioning in the case 
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study LA with particular reference to the contextual factors acting as barriers or facilitators 
of commissioning processes.  Chapter 7 builds on this exploring the different ways in which 
variously situated stakeholders constructed and reworked understandings of commissioning 
drawing on different policy discourses of accountability and governance to justify their 
positions and actions with regard to commissioning and comparing these with experiences 
of commissioning in practice. Chapter 8 is concerned with the second analytical theme, 
exploring how strategic decision-makers and providers collated, interpreted and applied 
different forms of evidence to make policy at a local level. Chapter 9 provides a discussion of 
research findings in reference to the literature in chapters 2-4.  
  
15 
 
CHAPTER TWO: POLICY IMPLEMENTATION  
2.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to locate the research questions within a body of existing 
theoretical and empirical literature that has contributed to understandings of policy 
implementation and to identify themes that will be later drawn upon to develop the analysis 
of the case study.  
It begins with an exploration of what have emerged as two approaches to implementation 
analysis, broadly distinct in terms of their theoretical assumptions, foci of analysis and 
methodological approach (Hill and Hupe 2009). The chapter focuses primarily on that which 
has been termed ‘post-positivist’ (Fischer 2003), viewing policy as the mediated outcome of 
the actions and interpretations of a diversity of actors at different levels of the process (Hill 
and Hupe 2003). It considers the enduring significance of Lipsky’s seminal thesis on street-
level bureaucracy (Lipsky 1980, 2010) and the scope for discretionary and subversive action 
(Prior and Barnes 2009) in shaping policy at the point of implementation. It then moves on 
to consider implementation in the context of complex and overlapping ‘regimes’ of 
governance that imply  the need to look behind the ‘front-line’ and consider the 
opportunities for discretionary action for a broader range of implementing actors in a 
‘dispersed field of agency and power’ (Newman 2004: 20).  
2.2 Theorising implementation  
The field of implementation studies has grown in scope and complexity since the 1970s, 
incorporating theoretical knowledge from a range of disciplines including political science, 
public administration and organisational sociology (Hill and Hupe 2009). Whilst this 
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complexity reflects a lack of theoretical consensus what unifies these different approaches is 
the observation that governments  often appear unable to put policy into effect as originally 
intended   or that policy directives may have unanticipated outcomes (Barrett and Fudge 
1981).  
From what has been labelled a ‘top-down’ perspective (Hill 2005; Parsons 1995) this is 
perceived as problematic and attention is focused on both achieving compliance and 
improving policy design. A ‘top-down’ perspective typically implies a rational approach to 
policy formulation and implementation, and assumes a clear distinction between the latter 
and the former as separate stages in a ‘policy cycle’ (Hill 2005). Such a perspective is 
predicated on an assumption that policy works to a set of clearly prescribed goals and that 
where these goals are not achieved ‘policy failure’ is due to an ‘implementation deficit’ 
(Pressman and Wildavsky 1984).    
In contrast, alternative approaches highlight the failure of the top down school to 
adequately consider issues related to power relations, conflicts of interest, differing value 
systems and the significance of human agency in shaping policy outcomes. From this second 
perspective, referred to by some scholars as ‘post-positivist’ (Fischer 1998), the production 
of outcomes that differ from original intention are not seen as ‘policy failures’. Instead, 
policy is understood as  social construct;  the cumulative outcome of a complex set of 
individual and collective interpretations and behaviours that are contingent upon, and 
constrained by, a range of personal, institutional, and resource factors (e.g. Barnes and Prior 
2009; Barrett and Fudge 1981; Lipsky 1980, 2010).   
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These two approaches imply not only distinct sets of assumptions about how policy 
outcomes are produced, but also different objects of analysis and methodological 
approaches (Hill and Hupe 2009). The alternative or ‘post-positivist’ (Fischer 1998) approach 
is the one taken in this thesis. This chapter thus also lays the foundations for an interpretive 
approach to the study of policy implementation that is subsequently built upon in chapter 5.  
 2.3 Implementing policy: the ‘top-down’ perspective    
In what has been described as a ‘stagist’ or ‘text book’ (Nakamura 1987) approach to policy 
analysis the policy process is viewed as a series of discrete,  successive steps whereby 
agenda setting or problem definition is followed by the identification of alternative solutions 
and subsequent detailed formulation of a policy response (e.g. Hogwood and Gunn 1984; 
Simon 1976). This policy formulation stage is followed by implementation and finally 
evaluation, the latter being instrumental, feeding back up to formulation level to inform 
possible dissolution, continuation or adaption of the original policy option (e.g. Dror 1989).  
 ‘Top down’ approaches to policy analysis have been most closely associated with this 
‘stagist’ model (Hill 2005; Parsons 1995). Policy action is understood as goal orientated, 
purposive action, that pursues clear objectives based on considered assessment of different 
possible ways of achieving them.  From this ‘instrumentally rational’ perspective (Stone 
2002) there is an implied assumption that it is possible to identify relatively clear cut and 
‘apolitical’ solutions to social problems (Schwandt 1997).  
The rational model of policy analysis has been described by Fischer (2003) as a form of 
‘technocratic governance’, concerned with improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
administrative means through which policy goals are realised. A technocratic approach he 
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argues, is underwritten by a positivist epistemology that translates complex social problems 
as ‘technically defined ends’ and locates their solutions in the ‘objective collection of data’ 
and the application of rational decision making (Fischer 2003: 5). As Nutley and Webb 
suggest (2000: 25), it resonates well with the idea of evidence-based policy making whereby 
a rational input of evidence of ‘what works’ is understood as key to better policy decision 
making.  It is also closely mirrored by the staged approach to commissioning described in the 
previous chapter.  
These latter points are pursued in more detail in chapter 4, where the role that different 
forms of evidence might play in the processes of decision making is explored.  The following 
sections explore, in greater depth, the assumption that policy involves a clearly defined set 
of goals and that ‘failure’ to achieve these is due to faults or deficits in implementation, 
understood as a discrete ‘stage’ in the policy process.  
With some notable exceptions (e.g. Blau 1955) policy analysis,  until the 1970s, was more 
concerned with policy making than implementation with consequently less attention 
focused on the role of local bureaucracies and service providers in determining the evolution 
of policy (Parsons 1995). Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) are generally heralded as being 
most influential in drawing attention to the problems of policy implementation.  In their oft-
cited study of an Economic Development Agency in Oakland, California, they demonstrate 
that what happens when policy is implemented may bear little resemblance to how that 
policy was conceived at national level. Their study introduced the notion of ‘implementation 
deficit’ arguing that successful policy action depends on a high degree of cooperation 
between actors in the policy implementation ‘chain’. Where small deficits occur these have a 
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cumulative effect contributing to policy ‘failure’. Their research concluded that there was a 
need to ensure greater central control of policy implementation through clearer definition of 
policy goals and the development of systems that ensured effective control of individuals 
and organisations charged with delivery.  
From an ‘implementation deficit’ approach the failure to meet policy goals is classically 
understood as a function of poor or faulty implementation, ‘disobedience’ on behalf of 
implementers, or a lack of judgement on behalf of policy makers (Dunsire 1990; Hood 1976). 
Policy analysis becomes a question of identifying what has gone wrong in implementation 
with a tendency to become prescriptive. The quest to discover what ‘perfect 
implementation’ (Hogwood and Gunn 1984) might entail was pursued by policy analysts 
including Hood (1976), Hogwood and Gunn (1984), Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) and 
Dunsire (1990). Between them they provided various sets of recommendations on how to 
foster conditions for success, most significantly by establishing clear policy goals and keeping 
hierarchical control by limiting the number of organisations and actors involved in 
implementation. Hill and Hupe (2009) note that the implementation deficit approach is 
historically located in the 1970s in the context of a more social democratic policy agenda 
coupled with high expectations and disappointing results.  Nevertheless, in reviewing the 
implementation literature they suggest there has been a sustained tendency for both 
academic studies and government commissioned reports to focus on deficits. 
The 1970s were an era characterised by predominantly bureaucratic modes of coordination, 
an expansive agenda for state intervention and concomitant high public expenditure 
(Skelcher 2000). A top-down approach was thus traditionally concerned with vertical 
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relationships between single government offices and their related organisations making the 
case for an effective hierarchical chain of command (Exworthy and Powell 2004). Hence 
Hood (1976) argues that not only is ideal implementation best achieved by single 
organisations with clear lines of authority, but that the involvement of multiple 
organisations can lead to ‘sub-optimisation’ as each attempts to pursue its own separate 
objectives at the expense of collective goals.  
2.3.1 Managerial control of the policy process  
In complex contemporary contexts with their associated move away from hierarchies 
towards market and ‘networked governance’ (Newman 2001; Rhodes 1997) approaches to 
the ‘problems’ of implementation have moved from a bureaucratic to a public management 
perspective to consider the importance of horizontal linkages, and  in particular, managerial 
strategies for securing intended policy goals. In an attempt to control policy outcomes 
political functionaries have been increasingly involved in determining not only policy 
objectives but also the organisational arrangements through which they are realised.  
In the post war period bureaucratic public service administration was valued and praised for 
its unbiased rationality, efficiency and fairness.  However, from the 1970s the value of 
bureaucracy as the principle mode of service delivery was increasingly called into question 
by commentators from a range of political perspectives (Sanderson 1996). Most significant 
was the neo-liberal New Right’s (1979-1997) pejorative reinterpretation of bureaucracy as 
inefficient, wasteful and outdated. The New Right (NR) project of ‘rolling back the state’ was 
characterised by a shift from bureaucratic hierarchies to contractual relationships and 
market forms of governance. The fragmentation of delivery caused by contracting out was 
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accompanied by a series of managerial reforms of the public sector collectively referred to as 
New Public Management (NPM) (Hood 1991; Pollitt 1990, 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000), 
described by Clarke et al (2000: 5) as the process of subjecting the control of public services 
to ‘the principles, powers and practices of managerial control’.  
As services were contracted out away from state providers, internal, hierarchical forms of 
scrutiny and control were made difficult and new forms of accountability introduced. The 
rise of NPM challenged traditional bureaucratic ways of delivering public services whilst 
paradoxically reasserting a top-down approach through new forms of state centralisation 
and scrutiny. This entailed the introduction of managerial techniques, including the use of 
target setting to measure achievement of centrally defined goals and inspection and audit, 
both designed to minimise discretion and maximise administrative efficiency (Clarke et al 
2000; Clarke and Newman 1997; Pollitt 2003).    
In the UK context NPM has had a strong top-down ethos with the autonomy granted to LAs 
to deliver against their own priorities highly circumscribed and accompanied by strict 
financial and budgetary controls (Wilson and Game 2006). At the same time the extension of 
market modes of governance and a move from LA provision to  ‘place shaping’ (CLG 2006)  
mean there has been a concomitant shift of resources from state institutions to a range of 
public agencies, private  and TS organisations. Both these sets of reforms imply changes in 
power relations between different actors in the policy process. In the former case, the 
increase in managerial over professional power whilst in the latter, a movement of resources 
away from LAs to the private and third sectors (Clarke and Newman 1997; Clarke et al 2000).   
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During their thirteen years in office the twin concerns of policy effectiveness and policy 
efficiency emerged as central to the NL modernisation project (Bochel and Duncan 2007). 
This involved, on the one hand, a raft of initiatives to ensure that policy be ‘better’ designed 
or ‘evidence based’, and on the other, a concern to improve administrative efficiency and 
the skills of both central and local policy makers (Cabinet Office 1999a, 1999b). In the 
domain of child and family policy this was reflected in the directives towards outcome based 
accountability and ‘evidence-based commissioning’ alongside extensive programme 
evaluation and the prescription of specific ‘evidence-based’ programmes of intervention. 
Understood as strategies to solve the problems of implementation these are central themes 
of this thesis and are returned to in greater detail in subsequent chapters.  
In summary, a rational approach to policy analysis is predicated on the assumption that 
policy design involves the setting of clear goals the achievement of which can be measured 
and evaluated. It portrays the policy process as hierarchically ordered with decisions made 
at the centre and implemented by relatively powerless administrators. Policy analysis is 
oriented towards evaluating whether or not a particular desired outcome has been 
achieved. As such it is concerned with finding an optimal set of implementing conditions that 
minimise conflict, and ensure compliance in order to meet original policy intentions. In 
recent years problems of implementation ‘failure’ have been approached from a public 
management   perspective in the context of a shift from a bureaucracies towards markets as 
a mechanism for organising welfare delivery.  
Rational-prescriptive approaches to implementation have provoked criticism from 
researchers working from alternative theoretical and methodological perspectives. Critics 
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have included those who argue policy implementation should be studied from the ‘bottom-
up’, most notably Michael Lipsky (1976, 1980, 2010), and those who have sought to 
synthesise elements of both the former and latter approaches in recognition of the 
complexity of implementation (e.g. Elmore 1978; Sabatier 1988).    
 
2.4 Implementing policy: alternative approaches  
The ‘technocratic’ approach has been criticised for focusing too much attention on the role 
of policy ‘makers’ at the centre and too little on implementing agents, regarding the latter as 
‘basically impediments’ (Sabatier 1986: 30) to policy success. From an alternative 
perspective the roles that implementing actors, conflicts of interest, differing value systems 
and power relations play in determining policy outcomes are afforded greater analytic 
attention. Concern is with the micro-political processes that occur within and between 
organisations (Barrett 2004). Understanding is orientated towards a number of interacting 
factors including the role ideas and understandings play in shaping policy action and their 
relationship to the strategic and other interests of implementers (Fischer 2003).    
Explanations of unintended policy outcomes are sought not in terms of an ‘implementation 
deficit’ but in understanding the nature of these tensions and conflicts and the manner in 
which they are played out (Barrett and Fudge 1981). From a ‘post-positivist’, interpretive 
perspective this requires the policy analyst to try to ‘get inside the heads of the particular 
players’ in order to ‘figure out the thinking behind actions at issue’ (Fischer 2003: 143).  
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2.5 Interpreting policy  
Critiques of the top-down approach centre, in part, on the question of what constitutes 
policy identified as a problematic concept. Barrett and Fudge (1981) consider this 
fundamental, questioning whether policy is best understood as a political intention, a formal 
decision or a set of detailed frameworks and directives.  
From a rational-hierarchical perspective policy action is understood as orientated towards 
the pursuit of clear goals, presupposing that those charged with implementation are in 
agreement over what these might be. However, this is problematic given the complexity and 
sometimes imprecise nature of policy directives and the opportunities this gives rise to for 
multiple and conflicting interpretations. Barrett and Fudge (1981) suggest policy be viewed 
as ‘property’ with different actors making different claims as to its true features. Hill (2005) 
argues that policy is a ‘slippery concept’ identifying two different approaches to defining 
policy: policy that represents a general ‘stance’ and policy that is conceived of in more 
concrete terms;  both are complex and it is  difficult to identify simple policy goals within 
them. Furthermore, as Edelman (1977; 1988) suggests, not only are policies complex but 
they may even be made deliberately obscure or ambiguous, or even take on a symbolic 
aspect with no intention of achieving implementation.  
Allied to the  issue of what constitutes a policy goal is the subsequent problem of drawing a 
clear distinction between ‘policy making’ and ‘policy implementation’ as separate stages in a 
process. Where there is difficulty in establishing clear and consistent policy directives at the 
top, policy may involve discretionary elements   with the effect that some policy decisions 
will be made at implementation (Barrett 1981; Hill 2005). This renders a theoretical 
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distinction between policy ‘making’ and ‘implementation’ inappropriate and suggests 
difficulties in considering implementation as a discrete field of study.  
The complexity of what constitutes ‘policy’ poses a   problem for the study of 
implementation in terms of identifying the nature of what is being implemented. From a 
post-positivist perspective, social problems are understood as discursive construction and 
public policy understood ‘to take shape through socially interpreted understandings’ (Fischer 
2003: 13). Fischer and other post-positivist policy scholars argue that the analysis of public 
policy should therefore involve exploration of the way in which policy discourses provide the 
conceptual frameworks within which problems and political agendas are constructed. 
Fischer (2003) draws on the work of Foucault (1972, 1973, and 1980) and Habermas (1970, 
1973, and 1987) to explore the role of language or ‘discourse’ in framing policy problems. He 
argues that the struggle for power is articulated as a struggle for establishing the dominant 
discourse within which a policy problem is ‘framed’ and understood.  Those discourses that 
are constructed around an authoritative claim to knowledge and expertise achieve 
hegemonic status by legitimating certain representations and excluding others. For example, 
recourse to statistical measures and causal explanations for defining social problems 
represent a powerful way to influence the policy agenda as they serve to naturalise 
identified priorities for social action as ‘common-sense’ (Neylan 2008).  
A lack of consensus about policy objectives may well influence the process of 
implementation.  Yanow (2000) argues that different ‘frames’ highlight some issues whilst 
excluding others giving rise to ‘frame conflict’. According to Gussfield (1981) when different 
groups focus on and value different elements of a policy issue ‘frame conflict’ occurs. 
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Hoffman (1995) explores the policy consequences of hidden frames, what she terms ‘implicit 
theories’. She suggests that the conflicting assumptions and  understandings,  or ‘implicit 
theories’ held by different groups of actors in the policy process can create mutual 
misunderstandings that act as hidden barriers to effective implementation.   
Policy analysis from a post-positivist perspective thus begins with a different set of questions 
to that of a more traditional top-down orientation. Rather than seeking to determine policy 
cost benefits or how to technically secure ‘perfect implementation’ (Hood 1976) the 
analytical focus is on determining the meanings policy has for differently situated actors. 
Policy directives, rather than being explicit, transparent and uncontested are understood as 
open to multiple interpretations,  contingent upon the different ‘assumptive worlds’ (Taylor-
Gooby 2008a) of various ‘policy relevant publics’ (Yanow 2000:8). These include amongst 
others, policy implementers as well as legislators and policy makers.   
2.6 Implementing agents  
A shift away from a top–down perspective implies a move from prescriptive to more agent-
centred accounts of the policy process. Alternative approaches have been concerned to 
address issues of ‘front-line’ agency in implementation, exploring the different goal interests 
of implementing actors and contingent contextual factors. This section explores the 
contribution of Lipsky’s (1980) thesis on street level bureaucracy and Barrett and Fudge’s 
(1981) concept of a policy-action continuum. By giving centre stage to ‘what is done’, these 
studies have accorded particular significance to the actions and interactions of implementing 
agents, theorising the role of agency in determining policy outcomes. The starting point for 
analysis is individual and collective action understood as a response to problems and issues 
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and contingent upon the beliefs, interests, experiences and values of policy actors and the 
wider organisational and political contexts in which they work.   
2.6.1 Discretion and street-level bureaucracy  
In developing his influential theory of ‘street-level bureaucracy’, Lipsky (1980, 2010), 
identifies discretion, and, to a lesser extent, subversion, as important concepts in 
understanding the actions of policy implementers. He presents the public officials engaged 
in front line delivery as reflexive adaptive agents rather than institutionalised automatons or 
rational actors motivated by self-interest, arguing that ‘when taken together the individual 
decisions these workers make become, or add up to, agency policy’ (Lipsky 1980:3).  
Lipsky’s ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (SLB), who include a range of front-line public sector 
workers such as social workers, teachers, and the police,  make policy in two ways: through 
discretionary decision making; and through the cumulative effect of their individual actions. 
Lipsky’s thesis is that public officials are required to engage in discretionary operational 
decision making based on their interpretation of the particular contexts in which they work. 
These interpretations are contingent upon their subjective and professional understandings, 
values and experiences but are not wholly autonomous being shaped by institutional and 
structural factors such as resource constraints and organisational norms and rules.    
Lipsky’s workers are understood to formulate logical responses and coping mechanisms to 
organisational, legal and other constraints based around the use of discretion. He suggests 
that discretion is both facilitated and required by the ambiguous nature of policy goals which 
renders them open to interpretation. He argues that public policy goals are confusing and 
even conflicting on a conceptual and practical level, making them difficult to collapse down 
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into a set of organisational rules. One point of conflict is where ‘client-centred goals’ conflict 
with ‘social engineering goals’. Public service goals, he suggests also have an idealised 
dimension that makes them difficult to realise and opens up space for policy actors to make, 
what Prior (2009: 21)  has since termed ‘situated judgements’, about what they mean.  
Lipsky identifies a number of sources of goal ambiguity including the uncertainties inherent 
in ‘social service technologies’. Here he is referring to  the lack of conclusive evidence about 
‘what works’ or what constitutes effective practice  in many areas of public service 
intervention suggesting  that this may mean a greater tolerance of and room for admitting a 
variety of practice responses and approaches.  
Whilst SLBs may be perceived as generally cooperative, Lipsky suggests that they might not 
always accept the legitimacy of stated policy or organisational objectives. What he suggests 
is that unintended policy outcomes are not the result of bad behaviour, communication or 
skill deficit but of differences of interest and differential access to resources to pursue those 
interests. Where this is the case, he argues, discrepancies between policy intent and actual 
outcome should be expected and explanations should be sought, not in communication 
breakdown, but in the structure of the working environment that produces ‘antagonistic’ 
interests.  
What Lipsky does therefore is to locate the ‘problems’ of implementation at both a material 
and ideational level. Whilst the actions of SLBs are shaped by their subjective concerns and 
interpretations, they are also constrained by a set of institutionalised and resource factors. 
Although Lipsky did not explicitly set out a theory of agency, his street-level bureaucrats 
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emerge as, what Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2006) have since termed, ‘situated agents’, whose 
autonomy is bounded by the material context in which they are situated.  
2.6.2 Policy action continuum  
In developing their theory of a ‘policy action continuum’ Barrett and Fudge (1981) similarly 
endeavour to construct a theoretical account of implementation that takes account of both 
agency and structure. They draw on Strauss’s  (1978) notion of ‘negotiated order’ to  argue 
that implementation is better understood as a process of iterative bargaining and 
compromise between those in control of resources and those with responsibility for policy 
delivery.  The concept of ‘negotiated order’ implies a dialectical relationship between actors 
and the framework of rules and norms within which they act. For Strauss social order is 
understood as constantly evolving so that it exists as a set of temporally unstable 
settlements in which negotiation between semi-autonomous actors pursuing their own and 
organisational interests play an important part.  For Barrett and Fudge (1981: 12-13) policy is 
understood as the mediated outcome of local-central struggles so that it is important to look 
at implementation:  
‘not solely in terms of putting policy into effect, but also in terms of observing 
what actually happens or gets done and seeking to ask how and why …from this 
perspective implementation (or action) may be regarded as a series of responses: 
to ideological commitment, to environmental pressures, or to pressures from 
other agencies (groups) seeking to influence or control action.  
 
The dialectical relationship between policy and practice suggests that policy as formulated 
imposes both constraints and opportunities on implementing agents whose actions in turn 
accomplish but also test the viability of that policy. Policy design and policy implementation 
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are thus understood not as separate stages but, as Anderson (1975: 79) suggests, ‘policy is 
made as it is being administered and administered as it is being made’.   
In common with Strauss and Lipsky, Barrett and Fudge show concern with context and the 
limits that institutionalised structures and rules place on the agentic actions of policy actors. 
They argue that it is the process by which individuals and groups establish values, rules and 
norms and embed institutional structures that results in distinctive organisational culture 
and a tendency to promote certain interests over others. Whilst order is produced through a 
continual process of remaking, structure is also important in that it establishes the positions 
from which actors are able to engage in this process of negotiation. They therefore identify 
two themes as important foci for study:  the ‘scope for action’ that includes structural 
factors such as conferred statutory power and access to resources; and the use both of these 
are put to by ‘semi-autonomous’ agents. The latter involves examining how different 
attitudes, values and experiences combine and shape actors approach to problem definition 
and response.  
Like Lipsky, Barrett and Fudge (1981: 251) argue that where policy directives are loosely 
defined or guidance ambiguous considerable space for discretionary decision making 
emerges.  Goal ambiguity leaves policy open to different but equally valid interpretations. 
These interpretations are continuously negotiated so that:  
  ‘…policy cannot be seen as a constant. It is mediated by actors who may be 
operating with different assumptive worlds from those formulating the policy and 
inevitably it undergoes interpretation and modification and in some cases 
subversion’  
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This implies a move away from a perspective that concerns itself with a control on discretion 
in the interests of rational management, towards an examination of the extent to which 
rules and discretionary powers may be manipulated or subverted by implementing agents.  
2.7 Implementation in the context of multi-level governance  
Both Lipsky’s and Barrett and Fudge’s work is based on empirical evidence dating from the 
1970s, a time when public services were organised more in line with a Weberian model of 
hierarchical bureaucracy (Weber 1991). Since this time there have been considerable 
changes in the structural and organisational arrangements for the delivery of welfare 
services that mean analysis needs to be concerned with the ‘multiple loci, layers and levels’ 
(Hill and Hupe 2009) at which implementation takes place, and a greater diversity of policy 
actors. These reforms include managerial and market reforms of the public sector,  new 
opportunities for the participation of ‘citizen-users’ (Newman 2005a) and, under New 
Labour, a shift towards neighbourhood governance (Lowndes and Sullivan 2008) and 
partnership working  between and across agencies.  
There are a number of analyses of implementation that contribute to an understanding of 
the exercise of discretionary and subversive power in the context of contemporary reforms 
(Barnes and Prior 2009; Durose 2009; Sullivan 2009).  
Prior (2009) explores how the exercise of power at the micro-level can produce policy 
outcomes that differ to those described by formal policy. His focus is on the repositioning of 
the public from passive recipients of services to active ‘co-producers’ or ‘customers’ 
identifying  three forms of ‘counter-agency’ whereby hegemonic policy discourses are 
resisted, subverted or reframed by reflexive ‘citizen-users’ and service providers. The first 
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form ‘revision’ occurs where judgements made by providers lead them to pursue alternative 
strategies to those set down in official policy so that outcomes are revised in line with their 
assessment of a situation. The second, stronger form, involves a rejection of policy 
objectives and prescribed strategies resulting in the production of substantially different 
outcomes, whilst the third entails passive resistance by ‘users’ representing  a deliberate 
choice to disengage.  His analysis provides an example of how values rather than evidence 
can underpin decision making and action when service providers act as client- advocates in 
seeking beneficial long-term outcomes over short-term prescribed goals.  
In their study of the implementation of Family Intervention Projects Parr and Nixon (2009) 
provide similar evidence of the ‘subversive’ revision of policy goals at the point of delivery. 
They show how providers of these services have resisted official discourses of ‘antisocial’ 
families, choosing to focus instead on the need to take action against the underlying causes 
of ‘problem’ behaviours including poverty and domestic violence.  
In the context of a shift towards neighbourhood governance Durose (2009) provides an 
alternative reading to the ways implementing actors engage in the re-interpretation of policy 
objectives to negotiate locally appropriate strategies.  She suggests that the basis and use of 
frontline discretion needs to be reappraised as a set of ‘responsive, entrepreneurial’ 
adaptive strategies to the conflicting demands of delivering centrally defined policy 
objectives whilst meeting locally identified community needs. She highlights the importance 
of contextual understandings in developing locally workable responses to centrally defined 
agendas.  
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These studies provide examples of how policy intentions can be resisted, revised or 
negotiated at the interface between front-line service providers and users in the context of  
a new relationship of ‘co-production’ between communities, service users and providers.  
This study however, is concerned not only with this ‘layer’ of the policy process, but also 
with one behind the ‘front-line’. By this I refer to those strategic planners, commissioners 
and service managers, who, as a result of managerial reforms have been endowed with 
greater degrees of autonomy and power than before, implying new opportunities for agentic 
action in shaping policy outcomes (Newman 2004, 2005b).  
The work of Barrett and Fudge (1981) begins to take account of networks of relationships, 
developed further by that of Hjern and Porter (1981). The latter focused analytical concern 
on institutional complexity, suggesting implementation analysis needs to adopt a multi-
organisational unit of analysis or ‘implementation structure’, defined as the horizontal 
linkages and networks between actors in relationships of mutual dependency. In contrast to 
top-down theorists they argued that policy success is dependent upon, rather than 
threatened by, the existence of implementing networks.  
Over the last three decades however, the degree of complexity in the policy landscape has 
increased further through a shift from government to ‘governance’ (Kooiman 2003; Rhodes 
1997). Governance has been termed a ‘promiscuous’ concept (Newman 2001) referring to 
the multiple ways in which it has been defined and used as an analytical tool. Hence Rhodes 
(1997) distinguishes six distinct approaches; Kooiman (1999: 68) finds ‘at least double that 
amount’ whilst Hill and Hupe (2009) refine the list to produce five broader categories of 
meaning. These categorisations include its use as a normative term for identifying the 
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characteristics of ‘good governance’ as advocated by the World Bank (1989); ‘corporate 
governance’ to refer to the mechanisms and structures through which large organisations 
are managed and controlled; as a reference to the contemporary context in which an 
emphasis on the market and neo-liberal reforms implies the involvement of multiple agents 
in forms of governance; and as ‘global governance’ in reference to governance as 
international order.  
Hill and Hupe (2009: 15) draw on O’Toole (2000: 276) to apply a definition of governance 
that incorporates ‘a more complete understanding of the multiple levels of action and kinds 
of variables that can be expected to influence action’. This supports  their argument that 
contemporary implementation studies need to be concerned with ‘multiple loci, layers and 
levels’ of implementation for it is not just elected politicians, civil servants and public 
administrators that are involved in the policy process but a diversity of actors in a variety of 
organisational contexts.  
For Rhodes (1997) governance refers to a networked form of control within a fragmented 
landscape of organisational arrangements and structures for the delivery of welfare 
following the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. This is linked to the idea of the 
‘hollowed out’ state, of government ‘steering’ rather than ‘rowing’, and the disillusionment 
with the view  that bureaucratic hierarchies can provide the appropriate context in which to 
organise and deliver public services (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). The idea of networks and 
partnerships implies mutual or collective responses to policy problems rather than top-down 
solutions. This is allied to the idea that government can no longer work alone in seeking 
solutions to complex contemporary problems or ‘wicked issues’ (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004) 
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but must involve multiple layers of governance and inter-organisational networks of decision 
makers (Rhodes 1997, 2007).   
This study is particularly concerned with the literature exploring the remoulding of 
bureaucratic hierarchies following the introduction of quasi-markets, external contracting 
and multi-agency partnerships. Together these changes impose new sets of structural 
constraints on and opportunities for action for a greater diversity of implementing agents 
coming together in an extended set of institutional contexts. Whilst partnership infers a 
dispersal of decision making power, market forms of governance bring new forms of control 
and rule making through the processes of contracting and performance management (Pollitt 
2003). The extension of markets has also increased the range of actors and organisations 
with responsibility and power to deliver public policy most notably those in the third and 
private sectors. Over the last fifteen years ‘partnership’ has became a key mechanism for 
planning and delivering services. This has, rhetorically at least, created new relationships of 
collaboration and power sharing between not only the different sectors but also 
communities and service users who have been co-opted as active participants in the policy 
process (Newman 2001).   
Multi-level governance implies the need to look behind the ‘front-line’ and consider the 
opportunities for discretionary action for a broader range of implementing actors in a 
‘dispersed field of agency and power’ (Newman 2004: 20).  Like front line staff, strategic and 
service managers and commissioners will bring their own interpretations to bear on the 
nature of policy problems, and evaluation of different possible responses to these.  By 
implication policy might be negotiated, reformulated, resisted or subverted   in a greater 
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number of contexts and by individuals and groups exhibiting a more diverse range of 
interests, professional experience and value positions.   
It is in the context of a shift in provider responsibility that commissioning has emerged to 
take an increasingly significant role in public service reform. The following chapter examines 
these transformations in greater detail, exploring the growing prominence of commissioning 
in the context of a reduced role for the statutory sector in direct provision. A final theme for 
this chapter however, is to consider what is implied by changes in the governance of welfare 
for the processes of public accountability and how these may present as rationales for 
discretionary action.  
2.8 Accountability in the ‘congested state’  
One of the implications for implementation studies of network and market modes 
governance and an increase in participative democracy is that they have served to make 
accountability more complex (Considine 2002; Newman 2004). Not only are public officials 
tied vertically to state institutions, but contractual and collaborative relationships imply 
horizontal lines of accountability that transgress organisational and sectoral boundaries.  
Newman (2004) argues that these multiple lines of accountability mean public officials must 
confront different and conflicting sets of rules and norms.  These include those that derive 
from networks; those implied by centralised target setting, and contracting such as 
efficiency targets and contractual outputs and those implied by participative democracy and 
neighbourhood governance.   Each invokes a different logic of appropriate action.  Whilst 
networks and partnerships imply creativity, trust and reciprocity, as Considine (2002) 
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suggests, these sit in tension with top down accountability to targets and contractual 
relationships which seek to constrain creativity and discretionary power.  
The complexity of contemporary governance means policy actors are subject to multiple 
lines of accountability so that issues of ‘holding to account’ emerge in different contexts 
(Newman 2004). Whilst these may produce contradictory action, Newman (2004: 29) 
suggests they also open up spaces for agency.  Working from a constructivist perspective she 
explores how different policy actors make appeal to issues of accountability through which 
they ‘construct their professional identities and legitimate their actions’ conceptualising it as 
a cultural and social process as well as something ‘rooted in formal structures and rules’. In 
her analysis deliberative judgements and discretionary behaviours are understood to reflect 
different ethics of accountability. This resonates with both Prior’s (2009) and Parr and 
Nixon’s (2009) analyses of how front-line workers revise and resist official policy discourses 
in order to pursue strategies that, in their judgments, more closely meet the presenting 
needs of services users.  
These analyses challenge the assumptions of rationality and self-interest that, as Taylor-
Gooby (2008) argues, underpin managerial forms of accountability. Thus, while 
managerialist strategies and processes have sought to address problems of implementation 
in the ‘congested state’ (Skelcher 2002), discretionary judgements and the revision of 
prescribed policy objectives by policy implementers may reflect an appeal to an alternative 
ethic of accountability and suggest ways in which they might be resisted or subverted.  
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2.8 Summary  
This chapter has provided an account of two broadly distinct approaches to policy 
implementation analysis:  one that sees the policy process as a rational, goal-oriented staged 
cycle; and the other that views policy as the outcome of the actions and interactions of 
differently situated actors. In adopting the latter approach this chapter has argued for a 
need to focus on the different ways in which policy directives might be interpreted, 
negotiated, or revised by a range of actors at different ‘layers’ of the policy process. These 
interpretations and negotiations are understood as contingent upon actors own values and 
subjective concerns but also constrained and shaped by institutional and structural factors 
so that the latter, as well as the former, are of analytical concern.   
By arguing that policy exists as social construct, the ‘negotiated’ outcome of a set of 
contingent individual and collective interpretations and behaviours, this chapter has also 
made the case for an interpretive approach to the study of policy implementation 
It has been suggested that contemporary changes in the organisation and delivery of public 
services, in particular the move to a commissioning rather than providing role for LAs, imply 
the need to consider the ways in which policy might be negotiated, reformulated or resisted 
by a range of policy implementers situated, not only on, but beyond ‘the front line’.  The 
following chapter explores these policy developments providing detail of the substantive 
context of commissioning in children’s services that forms the focus of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER THREE: COMMISSIONING IN CONTEXT 
3.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter provided a frame for the specific example of policy implementation 
with which this study is concerned.  It was suggested that a shift of responsibility for delivery 
of public services from state to alternative providers implies the need to consider the scope 
for action of a broader set of implementing actors. With a contemporary emphasis on 
commissioning as a set of processes of ‘modern governance’ (Wistow 2007), these 
implementing actors include strategic planners, commissioners and managers from the 
private and third sectors contracted to deliver public services.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the policy context in which 
children’s services commissioning is embedded. First, commissioning is contextualised as 
part of on-going neo-liberal reforms, involving a recasting of the role of LAs as providers to 
commissioners of public services (CLG 2006). These developments imply changes in the 
relationships between the different sectors and an increased emphasis on cost-efficiency 
and the management of policy outcomes through contracts and performance monitoring.  
NL’s reforms of the institutional and organisational arrangements for the planning and 
delivery of children’s services are then explored.  Particular reference is made to partnership 
as the organising principle for the coordination of children’s services and evidence for the 
development of joint commissioning is explored.  Finally the chapter considers the expansion 
of the ‘market’ in children’s services and the evidence for how the principles of 
contestability and competition have been applied by LAs.  
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Commissioning is understood to reflect a number of themes central to NL’s modernisation of 
public services: a separation of function between those commissioning and those providing 
services coordinated through strategic ‘partnerships’; a concern with efficiency and value for 
money driven by competition and contestable markets and achieved through market 
development, improved procurement procedures and greater collaboration; local and 
centralised forms of accountability and performance measured by results through the 
imposition of both nationally defined and locally agreed targets for the achievement of 
outcomes.  
3.2 Neo-liberal reform of the welfare state  
Children’s services commissioning has its evolutionary roots in the changes to the structure 
and organisation of the welfare state wrought by the Conservative administrations of the 
1980s and 1990s.  The NR project of ‘rolling back the state’ was underpinned by an 
ideological commitment to the principle of market-driven competition as the best way of 
securing responsive and efficient public services.  The theoretical underpinning for this new 
approach was developed by public choice theorists who argued that it is preferable to use 
market mechanisms to settle collective choice problems. The NR saw the state as intrusive, 
making excessive demands on taxpayer money and delivering public services that were both 
too expensive and inefficient. State welfare monopolies were seen as guilty of producing 
both a distorting effect on the market and of denying choice to service users (Minford 1991), 
establishing the rationale for a move from hierarchy as the principle mode of governance to 
that of market, and opening up state welfare provision to competition from a plurality of 
providers. Advocates of market-based welfare reform argued that it would deliver 
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improvements in efficiency, increased ‘consumer’ choice, and an increased responsiveness 
to user needs and wants (Minford 1991; Osborne and Gaebler 1992).   
By the mid-1990s Britain saw the expansion, into all areas of welfare, new institutional 
arrangements designed to extend the principle of markets and competition to both the 
provision and management of welfare services.   The concept of the ‘quasi market’ was 
introduced to distinguish this form of market orientation from that of conventional markets 
(Le Grand and Bartlett 1993). The most significant example of the ‘quasi-market’ was the 
introduction of a universal and mandatory separation of purchaser and provider functions in 
the NHS following the 1989 NHS White Paper (DH 1989), allowing the development of 
competition for contracts between different providers in an internal market (Mays and 
Dixon 1998; Smith et al 2004).  
Other significant reforms included the introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
(CCT) in the 1980s leading to extensive contracting out of a range of public services. Within 
community care the early 1990s saw the introduction and rapid development of social care 
markets following the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990. This involved 
substantial contracting out of adult social care services with the independent sector the 
preferred provider (Knapp et al 2001). Within children’s services the 1990s heralded the 
expansion of non-statutory adoption services, fostering agencies and children’s homes in 
both the traditional voluntary child-care sectors and independent and private sectors (Sellick 
and Connolly 2002). These changes   brought together health and social services agencies to 
establish mechanisms for joint planning and commissioning. On an operational level, care 
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managers were tasked with devising individual packages of care with strategic managers 
commissioning from a broad supplier market (Walsh et al 1997).  
Reforms were characterised by a shift to contractual relationships and market forms of 
governance over bureaucratic hierarchies that inevitably involved the displacement of some 
state providers.  For TS providers this entailed the reconfiguration of funding from grant-aid 
to contracts, with services held to account through detailed service specifications (Walsh et 
al 1997). As previously discussed, these changes were accompanied by a growth in 
managerial forms of control and increased centralised scrutiny achieved through national 
target setting, inspection and audit.  
3.3 Commissioning in the context of New Labours ‘modernisation’ of the welfare 
state    
 ‘Rolling back the state’ was not achieved in any simple or straightforward way. A retention 
of state function was justified in dealing with negative externalities (the impact of market 
activities that mean all may suffer in the long run), market inefficiencies and the threat of 
monopoly (Hill 2005). The goal of a significant reduction in public expenditure was not 
realised and in fact increased in some areas (Burchardt and Hills 1999). However, the NR did 
succeed in establishing a legitimised role for the market in delivering welfare services and 
promoting the role of management in achieving cost-effectiveness, creating a new culture 
for welfare that was broadly accepted by NL (Mooney 2006). 
There has been much debate and analysis of the extent to which NL policy was built on the 
foundations established by previous Conservative administrations. Discussion centres on the 
degree of continuity and difference between their approaches and ask whether it is possible 
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to discern a coherent or single NL political project (Clarke et al 2000; Ferguson et al 2002; 
Powell 2002). What emerges is a complex scenario in which NL presented themselves as 
committed to a pragmatic, ideologically neutral ‘Third Way’ approach (Blair, 1998; Giddens 
1998) ‘between state monopoly welfare and private market provision’ (Alcock and Craig, 
2001: 125) whilst seeking to build consensus around a series of ‘modernising’ reforms 
designed to meet the challenges of complex and multi-faceted social problems such as child 
poverty, urban degeneration and rising crime (Newman 2001).  
Newman (2001) describes NL’s vigorous extension of performance management and audit as 
‘a significant point of continuity’ (Newman 2000: 60). With a commitment in their first term 
in office to keep to Conservative spending plans and avoid tax increases NL intensified fiscal 
scrutiny, monitoring, inspection and audit of public services. The role of the Audit 
Commission was expanded and through the introduction of Public Service Agreements 
(PSAs) a process was established for directly tying in resource allocation to defined outputs 
and targets for efficiency and performance (Baldock et al 2007).  
Despite their stress on partnership, NL’s welfare ‘reforms’ were still arguably underpinned 
by an assertion of the supremacy of the role of markets and private sector business 
approaches over state ability to resolve economic and social problems (Grimshaw et al 2002; 
Ferguson et al; 2002; Farnsworth 2006). Following their election in 1997 NL showed a 
commitment to extending the role of the private and third sectors in the direct delivery and 
management of public services with a concomitant shift in role for some parts of the public 
sector from provider to commissioner.   
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Following the 1998 local government White Paper (DETR 1998) NL replaced CCT in 2000 with 
the Best Value (BV) regime. Whilst toning down CCTs more adversarial approach through an 
emphasis on inter-sectoral collaboration, BV nevertheless identified ‘competition’ as a key 
driver for service improvement and delivering efficiency savings.  Competition was more 
broadly conceived within the framework which required LA managers to apply ‘the four C’s 
in service procurement: challenge, compare, consult and compete’ in order to ‘secure 
continuous improvements…having regard to economy, efficiency and effectiveness’ (DETR 
1999:  clause 3.1). These requirements were made subject to audit through the BV 
Inspectorates established under the aegis of the Audit Commission.  
A range of strategies were introduced to promote and develop the capacity of local 
government in its procurement function and to facilitate partnership working between the 
public, private and third sectors. These included the establishment in 2001 of the Strategic 
Partnering Taskforce designed to help LAs develop new public-private partnerships and, in 
2003, the  National Procurement Strategy (CLG 2007; ODPM 2003) involving the creation of 
local centres of excellence in procurement to support LAs in securing efficiency savings 
through collaboration and market development.  
In their third term in office NL reinforced the idea of a commissioning rather than providing 
role for LAs with a stress on the management of competition and contestability in delivering 
service improvement, greater efficiency and better outcomes. Following the Lyons Inquiry 
interim report (Lyons Inquiry 2006) into the role and funding of local government, the White 
Paper ‘Strong and Prosperous Communities’ (CLG 2006) recast LAs as ‘place-shapers’, rather 
than providers, solving problems through partnership and:  ‘…commissioning others to work 
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on solutions – rather than delivering services directly themselves’ (CLG 2006: 94).  This was to 
entail LAs ‘continuing to move away from a narrowly defined approach to service delivery’ 
towards a ‘commissioning role’ that ‘encompasses the whole commissioning cycle: 
identifying needs, planning, sourcing, delivery and performance management’ (CLG 2006: 
109).  
The term ‘commissioning’ is one that is used variably across and within different service 
sectors and policy documents (Hughes and Fielding 2006; Lewis 2004; Smyth 2007).  Hughes 
and Fielding’s analysis of commissioning within Children’s Fund partnerships found that the 
terms ‘commissioning’, ‘tendering’ and ‘bidding’  ‘were commonly applied without definition, 
little consistency and… seemingly interchangeably’ (Hughes and Fielding 2006: 65).  Even in 
the NHS where commissioning has been established far longer than in LAs it is ‘a term used 
liberally and variably’, (Lewis 2004) to mean anything from contracting to the whole process 
of  strategic planning.  
Here the White Paper was clearly seeking to distinguish commissioning from ‘a simplistic 
approach to outsourcing or a return to Compulsory Competitive Tendering’ (CLG 2006: 121) 
adopting the broader concept identified by the Lyons Inquiry:  
 ‘understanding local needs and preferences and making sure that the right 
services are provided to local people through a variety of arrangements including 
collective purchasing, commissioning from suppliers in the public, private and 
voluntary sectors, contracts or partnerships and direct delivery’ (Lyons Inquiry, 
2006). 
However, whilst the White Paper played lip service to the LAs role in identifying need, it 
devoted two chapters to performance management, market development and procurement 
requiring LAs to act as ‘broker, facilitator, procurer [and] market regulator’(CLG 2006: 110) to 
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drive innovation. Achieving cost savings through market management were central themes 
of the White Paper which stressed the need to ‘drive down costs’ through the adoption of a 
strategic commissioning approach to service delivery that employs the techniques of 
‘business process improvement’ to ‘drive out wasteful activity’ (CLG 2006 pp 136-37). The 
2007 pre-Budget report presented councils with the challenge of achieving £4.9 billion cash-
releasing efficiencies during the Comprehensive Spending Review 2007 period (HM Treasury 
2007). Smarter procurement processes, greater competition, the stimulation of new 
markets, asset management and the ability to meet performance and cost-efficiency targets 
were all identified as critical elements in the further transformation of services and delivery 
of savings (CLG 2006, 2007). Whilst it may be difficult to see how achieving efficiency savings 
can be reconciled with delivering better outcomes for citizens the White Paper presented 
the two as mutually dependant, stating ‘we expect local partners to consider as a priority 
how they can maximise the opportunities that LAAs provide in collectively driving efficiency 
and thus achieving better outcomes for citizens’ (CLG 2006: 134).   
While the White Paper described a new place-shaping role for LAs, commissioning had 
formerly been accorded a far more prominent position in the health service than in local 
government.  Introduced into the NHS in 1991 as ‘purchasing’ in the context of an internal 
‘quasi-market’ (Le Grand 1991), it has since enjoyed a somewhat turbulent history of 
development in the wake of continual organisational reform (Mannion 2008). Although 
intended to stimulate improvements in the quality and efficiency of health services there has 
been a widespread recognition that NHS commissioning has failed to live up to these 
expectations (Brereton and Vasoodaven 2010; Kings Fund 2010; Smith and Goodwin 2002). 
In the main this has been identified as due to a range of structural and institutional 
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constraints and lack of commissioner competence (Smith et al 2004; Wade et al 2006). The  
document Health Reform in England: Update and commissioning framework (DH 2006a) 
which followed the White Paper Our Health, Our Care, Our Say: A new direction for 
community services (DH 2006b) nevertheless argued that a strengthened role for better 
quality commissioning was key to achieving health services  reform.  In 2007 the Department 
of Health (DH) launched the world class commissioning programme (DH 2007), intended to 
improve the quality of commissioning. The programme set out eleven commissioner 
competencies against which PCTs have been since subject to external audit. These required 
commissioners to: locally lead the NHS; work with community partners; engage with public 
and patients; collaborate with clinicians; manage knowledge and assess needs; prioritise 
investment; stimulate the market; promote improvement and innovation; secure 
procurement skills; manage the local health system; and make sound financial investments. 
3.4 Commissioning through networks and partnership   
The focus on collaboration and partnership approaches to procurement and commissioning 
presented by the Local Government White Paper (CLG 2006) reflected NLs concern to 
temper the more hard-nosed business approach of their Conservative predecessors. The 
previous chapter suggested that  partnership and networks can be understood as offering an 
alternative to markets (contract-based relations and quasi-markets) in the context of a 
breakdown in commitment to professionalism and bureaucracy as the organising principles 
for the management of welfare provision (Newman 2001).Under NL the development of 
partnership approaches to policy making and implementation was underpinned both by the 
attempt to achieve ‘joined up’ government by integrating policy agendas to deliver holistic 
solutions to complex social problems and to resolve problems of fragmentation and political 
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discord produced by market forms of governance (Cabinet Office 2001). Partnership was 
thus identified as a central mechanism of NL’s modernisation of public services 
distinguishing the ‘Third Way’ from previous administrations.   
Advocates of ‘network’ forms of governance argue that horizontal linkages between 
different parts of the public sector, between the public and private sectors (e.g.  public-
private partnerships), and through other more complex associations between organisations 
and communities,  support flexible, needs-led responses that foster trust, reciprocity and 
mutual advantage (Erridge and Greer 2002). Sako (1992) suggests that obligational 
contractual relationships (OCR), characterised by longer term contractual arrangements and 
greater transactional dependency between partners, are correlated with lower transaction 
costs than more adversarial relations. Grimshaw et al (2002) argue that it is in this context 
that the notion of ‘partnership’ is championed. Positioned as the means of reducing the 
inefficiencies and negative outcomes associated with more antagonistic short term 
contractual relationships, ‘modern’ partnership approaches, it is argued, present 
opportunities for synergy and support longer term relational contracts that maximise mutual 
benefit (Coulston 1998). The potential for building social capital through partnership has 
been argued for with the hypothesis that this will prove beneficial through the reduction of 
transaction costs and the creation of socially cohesive linkages between different service 
sectors (Coulston 1998; Steane and Walker 2000).  
Policy developments under NL sought to emphasise cooperation and collaboration in 
strategic purchasing and commissioning setting out to change the adversarial culture of 
procurement established through CCT (CLG 2006; HM Government 2006; HM Treasury 1999; 
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National Audit Office 1999).  These developments were underpinned by the assumption that 
collaboration supports synergistic gain and programme enhancement through the sharing of 
resources, risks and rewards to gain ‘collaborative advantage’ (Huxham 1996). Hence the 
local government White Paper Strong and Prosperous Communities (CLG 2006: 138) 
identified opportunities for cost savings through partnership based on ‘common vision, 
shared values and mutual respect’. Collaborative working, it suggested, would offer 
‘significant opportunities to improve the quality and efficiency of services’ through ‘joint 
planning, sharing resources and skills, aggregating demand and sharing services across a 
larger area’.   
A related argument was applied in relation to the development of regional commissioning 
for specialist children’s services such as care placements for looked after children. Hence in 
October 2006 the Government published the  Care Matters: Transforming the Lives of 
Children and Young People in Care green paper (DfES 2006a) in which it identified 
commissioning and market management as key processes in achieving efficiency savings for 
LAs through aggregating demand for low-incidence services and collectively delivering more 
effective management of providers.  The joint commissioning guidance (HM government 
2006: 20) similarly encouraged CTs to consider regional or sub-regional co-operation in order 
to ‘manage the markets for particular services, develop specialist providers, make best use of 
scarce skills, or meet high cost and low incidence needs’.  
3.5 Commissioning through children’s trusts 
Prior to the Local Government White Paper (CLG 2006) the development of integrated 
outcome-based commissioning was introduced as a central part of the Every Child Matters 
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Change for Children (ECM CfC) policy agenda (DfES 2003, 2004c). Before this the term 
commissioning had been applied to describe the function of allocating funding, targeting 
provision and managing performance through strategic children’s partnerships such as  
Children’s Fund, Sure Start and teenage pregnancy boards (Edwards et al 2006; Hughes and 
Fielding 2006; Smyth 2007). Whilst these groups had been concerned with the allocation of 
relatively small ring-fenced funds, the ambition of ECM was to learn from these initiatives 
and mainstream strategic commissioning as a way of reorienting services and performance 
managing providers in line with strategically identified priority outcomes (DfES 2003, 2004c).  
Whilst cost savings and ‘collaborative advantage’ were important themes within children’s 
services commissioning, government policy maintained that the delivery of outcomes 
through partnership should take precedence over efficiency and reduction in public 
expenditure (DfES 2003, 2004c). It is in this context that children’s trusts (CTs), as the 
organisational arrangements for integrated governance, strategic planning and 
commissioning, were established.  
Delivering integrated planning and commissioning as envisioned by the ECM CfC agenda was 
predicated on the formalisation of systematic, rather than self-organising collaboration,   
Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) distinguish between policy networks as a mode of governance, 
as conceptualised by Rhodes (1997), and partnerships as an organisational form;  the former 
being self-organising, the latter being steered or co-ordinated by government. Lowndes and 
Skelcher argue that partnerships as organisational forms cannot be assumed to share the 
network characteristics of mutual advantage, power sharing and cooperation. The 
development and maintenance of trust are commonly identified as the most important 
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prerequisites of productive and successful partnership working (Audit commission 2002; 
Hudson and Hardy 2002). With partnership in the context of CTs being linked to and 
regulated by the state, their success, was rendered,  to a large extent, dependent on either 
existing relationships of  inter-organisational collaboration or the ability of coercion to ‘kick 
start’ productive working  (Dietz 2004; Glendinning et al, 2002).  
NL’s ambitious and optimistic vision for a ‘whole-systems’ approach in children’s services 
provision was set out in the ECM green paper (DfES 2003). This described a radical ‘whole 
systems reform’ intended to improve interagency collaboration, firstly to address complex 
problems that cannot be resolved by single service interventions, and secondly to sort out 
problems of communication and service coordination that have beset children’s services 
since the 1960s (Parton 2008), and brought to the forefront of public and political attention 
in 2003 by the Laming Report (DH 2003a).  
The green paper explained this reform by drawing on the imagery of an ‘onion model’ of 
policy implementation. The model depicts the five outcomes, outlined in chapter 1, sitting at 
the centre of the onion whose successful achievement is dependent on the outer layers 
which together describe how a CT should operate. The first layer, integrated front-line 
delivery, is shown as dependent on a set of integrated processes providing information 
sharing and common assessment; integrated strategy providing coherence to planning and 
commissioning arrangements and inter-agency governance providing accountability and 
strategic direction.  
The green paper defined CTs as ‘normally part of the local authority’ with ‘a single planning 
and commissioning function supported by pooled budgets’ (DfES 2003: 72). The expectation 
52 
 
was that they would provide the organisational framework for delivering against the new 
ECM outcomes to be achieved through their development of strategic joint planning and 
commissioning and promotion of integrated working at service delivery level. The Guidance 
document ‘Every Child Matters: Next Steps’ (DfES 2004c: 17) stated that:  
‘The primary purpose of a Children’s Trust is to secure integrated commissioning 
leading to more integrated service delivery and better outcomes for children and 
young people. Children’s Trusts will be formed through the pooling of budgets and 
resources.’  
The subsequent Children Act 2004 set out the statutory framework for the realignment of LA 
children’s services. It legislated for the appointment, in all LAs, of Directors of Children’s 
Services (DCS) and lead members for children’s services and placed a legal duty on ‘relevant 
partners’ to co-operate at both strategic and operational levels. Legislation to ensure 
systematic and formalised partnership working was central to the Act.  Sections 10-24 set 
out the statutory duties placed on LAs and other agencies to cooperate and gave LAs and 
PCTs the power to pool   budgets as a mechanism to facilitate integrated planning and 
commissioning.   
Section 17 of the Act  set out the statutory requirement for LAs to produce a Children and 
Young People's Plan (CYPP) described as a ‘single, strategic, overarching plan for all local 
services for children and young people’  and replacing former requirements for seven 
statutory and ten non-statutory plans. The CYPP was expected to set out ‘agreed priority 
outcomes’ and describe the pattern of services expected to deliver them. This was to involve 
decisions about ‘joint commissioning of services   from within or outside the range of 
partners involved in the trust’ (DfES 2005: 4). The plan was to be aligned with both key local 
strategic plans including the Local Area Agreement (LAA) and the commissioning and 
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operational plans from a range of ‘partner’ agencies.  The DCS was made accountable for the 
achievement of the outcomes set out in the CYPP reporting through the Chief Executive to 
elected members.   
Particular prominence was given to joint planning and commissioning with Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs). This was later supported by best practice guidance issued by DH /DCSF for 
PCTs and CTs (DH/DCSF 2009) that sought to align commissioning activity and introduce 
world class commissioning competencies across agencies. 
The Act did not, however, mention CTs or establish them as statutory bodies. Instead they 
were originally created as 35 pathfinder pilots subject to national evaluation (UEA 2007). 
Between 2003 and the time in which fieldwork took place, there had been considerable 
developments in the policy environment within which they evolved. This meant that there 
were significant differences between what contemporaneous CTs were expected to deliver 
and what pathfinders were originally intended to achieve.  
In January 2003, prior to the publication of the green paper, LAs and local NHS services were 
invited to submit applications to the DH for CT pathfinder status. The DH vision for CT 
pathfinders was that they would ‘bring together services working with children within one 
organisational framework’ by ‘joining up education, social care and health services’ (DH 
2003b: 4).  However the guidance was intentionally non-prescriptive giving leeway to LAs to 
develop them according to local context. The guidance for applications encouraged a focus 
on initiatives aimed at specific groups of children or geographical areas and was therefore 
different in conceptual design to that later described within the ECM green paper.  
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Pathfinders were originally intended to offer learning to subsequent trust development. 
However, almost as soon as they were set up the Government expressed an expectation that 
all LAs would develop CTs by 2008. This led to confusion in some areas about whether CT 
pathfinders were distinct from, or synonymous with, CTs.  Hence in 2007 the national 
evaluation reported that a third of CT pathfinders were still considered as distinct entities 
from CTs albeit with the expectation that they would be absorbed (UEA 2007).  
Following initial confusion over different uses and understandings of the term ‘trust’, and 
intended governance and accountability arrangements, the government issued statutory 
guidance for the development of CTs in 2005. This guidance stated that whilst trusts were 
‘not legal entities’ but ‘partnerships between different organisations who provide, 
commission or are otherwise involved in delivering better outcomes for children’ they were 
nevertheless expected to ‘drive whole system change through clear leadership and effective 
local change programmes’ (HM Government 2005). The lead and accountable body for CTs 
was the LA children’s services department.   
The Children’s Plan (DCSF 2007b) described a new leadership role for CTs establishing their 
responsibility to ‘deliver measurable improvements’ and highlighting their role in 
commissioning services on the basis of a comprehensive needs assessment and ‘informing 
and influencing the LSP as it relates to children, young people and families’. The DCSF issued 
further draft guidance in April 2008 (DCSF 2008a) proposing a strengthened role for what 
had become known as ‘children’s trust arrangements’, stating that they must not be an ‘add 
on’ but ‘central to the process of improving outcomes’.  Whilst to all intents and purposes 
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compulsory the DCSF subsequently consulted on legislation to establish CTs as statutory 
bodies with set objectives and prescribed membership.   
In 2008 the progress made by LAs and partner organizations in developing CTs was subject 
to evaluation by the Audit Commission.  The Commission’s report, published in October of 
that year found little evidence that ‘children’s trusts, as required by the government, have 
improved outcomes for children and young people or delivered better value for money, over 
and above locally agreed cooperation’ (Audit Commission 2008: 4). The report can, in some 
ways, be understood to reflect an ‘implementation deficit’ approach identifying ambiguous 
policy, local skill deficit and obstructive partnership working as barriers to the ability of CTs 
to improve outcomes for children. It highlights confused statutory guidance and lack of 
clarity in national policy messages as barriers to CT development.  The less than prescriptive 
approach taken by the government, keen to give opportunity for local discretion over the 
development of CTs, it suggested, had lead to their patchy and diverse development on the 
ground (Audit Commission 2008). The complexity of establishing interagency governance 
arrangements was reported to have impeded progress and resulted in considerable local 
variation in the way trusts had developed, a finding supported by the National Evaluation 
(UEA/NCB 2007). Hence despite, or indeed because of Government guidance, four years 
after their introduction, the Audit Commission found ‘considerable local confusion’ over 
both the purpose of CTs and whether they were a new statutory body or form of mandated 
partnership. In an attempt to clarify their status the Audit Commission report defined as CTs 
‘unincorporated associations’ meaning that they ‘are not legally accountable bodies for 
spending public money or for achieving public objectives’ but they ‘advise and influence 
local action’ (Audit Commission 2008: 9).  
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The DCSF response was to bring in legislation that established Children’s Trust Boards (CTB) 
as statutory bodies and extended the duty to cooperate to include Jobcentre Plus, schools 
and other maintained educational establishments (DCSF 2009). Thus by 2009 the status of 
CTs had moved from experimental pilot, not mentioned in the 2004 legislation, to statutory 
partnerships.  
At the time of fieldwork, policy identified the extension of a market-based approach to 
welfare delivery developed, coordinated and managed through CT commissioning 
partnerships as the optimal arrangement for delivering effective children’s services.   
In a joint briefing paper (DfES/DH 2005: 5) commissioning was identified as ‘the lynch pin of 
the Every Child Matters agenda’ and described as the principal mechanism for effecting 
change in organisational culture and practitioner behaviour:  
‘Without effective commissioning and market management there will be limited 
scope for investment in preventative services, poor performing contracts, services 
will not be based on needs, there will be little integrated provision or co-location 
of services, and little choice of provider’  
NL children’s policy and guidance documents presented a broad definition of commissioning 
embracing both the processes of strategic planning, and the making and management of 
markets. Subsequent guidance (HM Government 2006) set out a framework for joint 
commissioning and planning describing an iterative, cyclical process that included analysing 
need in reference to the ECM priority outcomes; identifying what services would be required 
to meet that need; procuring those services; and monitoring and evaluation. This framework 
is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter in reference to how it presents as 
rational model of decision making for local policy making.   
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Following ECM the expectation that commissioning should play a pivotal role in both 
improving outcomes for children and delivering cost savings grew in prominence (DCSF 
2007a; DH/DCSF 2009). This came with the recognition that the process of moving to a joint 
planning and commissioning approach was a ‘step change’ that might ‘take some local areas 
5 years to implement’ (HM Government 2006: 5).  Evidence indicates that it has been slow 
to embed and remains underdeveloped in many areas (Audit Commission 2008; Gill et al 
2011; Macmillan 2010; Shared Intelligence 2008; UEA 2007) despite efforts to enhance 
commissioning competence at a local level through the Commissioning Support Programme 
(CSP) and the Centre for Excellence in Outcomes (C4EO).  
In 2007 the national evaluation reported that only 16 of the 35 pathfinders had produced a 
joint commissioning strategy and that commissioning was a reality for only a third (UEA 
2007). In 2008 the Audit Commission (2008: 5) reported that commissioning was ‘still at an 
early stage’ in most areas and that where a commissioning strategy was in place these had 
had little impact ‘because there is little experience or knowledge of joint commissioning’ 
Both studies found that where joint commissioning had been accomplished it had tended to 
focus on providing specialist services for targeted groups rather than universal, generic or 
preventative provision.  Furthermore both reports provide evidence of reluctance to pool 
budgets and little redirection of funding across sectors. 
The national evaluation (Bachmann et al 2008) also reports a wide disparity between local 
areas in the implementation of children’s trust arrangements and their commissioning 
functions. Thus, for example, while one area had merged the management structures of the 
PCT and LA others had only met with the minimum compulsory requirements of the 2004 
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Act. The evaluation provides a case study demonstration of the degree to which 
implementing organisations can exercise discretion with regard to a set of broadly defined 
government directives. This highlights the importance of understanding the impact of local 
cultures, histories and experiences of collaboration on the implementation of nationally 
formulated policy directives.  
3.6 Bringing in the Third Sector  
NL’s project of increasing the profile of the voluntary and community sector (VCS) in 
providing welfare services (HM Treasury 2002) meant that, although not obliged, CTs were 
required to consider how they would include it in planning, commissioning and delivering 
services.    
Under NL the concept of mutualism enjoyed a renaissance with an early interest amongst 
policy makers in the concept of social capital in fostering civic engagement and promoting 
social inclusion (Fahmy 2004). Mutualism can be understood to underpin the emphasis 
placed on the role of the VCS in shaping, commissioning and delivering services; a role 
accorded them due to their perceived closeness and commitment to users and assumed 
altruistic goals and values (Kelly 2007).  
The VCS has always played a significant part in delivering children’s services. However, NL 
showed an explicit commitment to ensuring them a greater role in delivering a broad range 
of children’s services from childcare and youth activities to intensive family support. 
Particular emphasis was placed on their role in developing and implementing programmes 
targeted at ‘hard to reach’ groups aimed at preventing social exclusion and addressing 
inequalities in outcome (DfES 2004b; DfES 2007). These included early Sure Start Local 
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Programmes (SSLP), many of which were originally located outside LA structures (Melhuish 
and Hall 2007), and programmes of targeted preventative activity commissioned from the 
VCS by Children’s Fund Partnerships (Edwards et al 2006).   
NL’s rationale for the enhanced role for the VCS was based on several lines of argument. 
These included claims that the sector offers a distinctive, or added value dimension to public 
service delivery; that it is particularly well placed to meet niche needs and work with ‘hard to 
reach’ groups and communities; and that it would be more likely to promote a public sector 
ethos thus moderating the effects of market reforms (HM Treasury 2002; Hutton and Beven 
2003).   
In a move that has since been subject to debate (Alcock 2010),  the creation of the Office of 
the Third Sector within the Cabinet Office in 2006 brought the VCS together with social 
enterprises, and other not-for-profit organisations, under the umbrella definition of ‘third 
sector’ (TS). ‘Compacts’ introduced in 1998 provided both national and local level 
frameworks for relationships of engagement between government and TS seeking to 
regulate but also facilitate those relationships (Alcock and Scott 2002; Craig and Taylor 
2002).  
The discourse of ‘partnership’ was employed to describe this new relationship implying a 
sharing of power, common objectives and mutual advantage (Lewis 2005). As part of 
becoming ‘fit partners’ (Ling 2000) however, the TS were required to develop market and 
performance competence and, in securing contracts, demonstrate they were working to 
centrally defined objectives (Carmel and Harlock 2008; McLaughlin 2004; Osborne and 
McLaughlin 2004).  The shift from grant giving to contract funding in 2002 provided a 
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mechanism for coordinating and monitoring, or ‘governing’ service delivery by the TS (Alcock 
2010).  By way of ensuring that TS organisations were able to compete on a ‘level playing 
field’ and hence facilitate ‘market contestability’, the  Treasury Review of the role of the 
sector in delivering public services (HM Treasury 2002) recommended that contracted 
services be awarded three year funding along with full cost recovery. In addition 
considerable government investment was made available to build TS capacity to engage with 
formal partnerships and build skills relevant to procurement and commissioning including 
tendering, contract negotiation, and performance monitoring.  
Early evidence of TS problems in engaging with this new culture of contracting (Alcock et al 
2004) led to the establishment of the National Programme for Third Sector Commissioning in 
2006. The Programme identified the achievement of ‘better public outcomes’ yielding not 
only ‘community benefits’ but also ‘efficiency gains’ as dependent on both, ‘optimal 
involvement of the third sector’ and ‘smarter, more effective and innovative commissioning’ 
(Cabinet Office 2006). In 2007 the Audit Commission suggested a more coherent or 
‘intelligent’ approach to commissioning the TS was needed.  Their report recommended 
commissioners take a more considered approach to both selecting the types of organisation 
best fitted to deliver services and to developing processes to ensure a variety of providers 
were able to engage in the contracting process (Audit Commission 2007).  
Whilst these moves have been actively embraced and welcomed by some TS representatives 
(Martikke and Moxham 2010; Shared Intelligence 2008) there have also been fears 
expressed about the extent to which the sector has been ‘tamed’ through funding in an 
attempt to institute it as a site of ‘governable terrain’ (Carmel and Harlock 2008). A common 
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concern is that services risk being driven by government agendas at the expense of 
organisational mission and the traditional roles of advocacy and campaigning (Smerdon 
2009). Empirical studies provide corroborating evidence of these and other negative impacts 
of public sector commissioning on TS providers. These include: potential or actual  ‘mission 
drift’ and lost capacity to act as ‘advocates for local people’ (Cairns et al 2006; Packwood 
2007; Shared Intelligence 2008); loss of organisational independence; threats to reputation;  
and issues related to sustainability (Martikke 2008; Martikke and Moxham 2010).  
Several reports highlight enduring problems for TS organisations in engaging with the formal 
processes of commissioning and contracting. These include confusion and uncertainty 
around the complex and bureaucratic nature of contracting and procurement, inappropriate 
time-scales to submit tenders, problems with meeting performance management 
requirements, capacity issues  and fears related to financial risk (Buckingham 2009; Martikke 
2008; Packwood 2007; Phillips et al 2010; Shared Intelligence 2008; Wynne 2008).  
The engagement of the TS as members of strategic children’s commissioning partnerships 
has also proved problematic suggesting that they are not yet ‘active partners’ with respect 
to agenda setting and policy shaping (Lewis 2005). Research indicates that it is particularly 
true for smaller organisations (Mason and Barkat 2009; Gill et al 2011; Thompson 2008). This 
is due both to their capacity to operate in such forums and perceived problems of 
representation of a broad and diverse sector (Edwards et al 2006; Gill et al 2011; Thompson 
2008). Representation on strategic partnerships is often limited to infrastructure 
organisations or larger national charities leaving smaller organisations feeling marginalised 
and undervalued (Gill et al 2011; Shared Intelligence 2008). The Audit Commission (2008: 33) 
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report on the development of CTs echoes these findings identifying TSOs as ‘least likely to 
feel they are making an effective contribution’ to CTs, reporting on-going capacity issues and 
the need to focus on core business as limits to engagement.  These findings add empirical 
weight to Newman’s (2001) argument that the discourse of ‘partnership’ serves to mask 
differences between stakeholders, in particular the imbalance of power between public and 
third sectors.  
3.7 Developing the market in children’s services  
The discussion so far has centred on the evolution of the broad and specific policy context 
for joint strategic commissioning within children’s services provision. It has explored how NL 
sought to redefine the relationship between statutory, private and third sector providers of 
welfare in terms of ‘partnership’, with joint commissioning intended to provide a mechanism 
for identifying shared strategic priorities, and coordinating and managing delivery by these 
different providers.  
However, while commissioning built on partnership implies power sharing and consensus 
building, this sits in tension with the fact that commissioning as a process is underpinned by 
the principles of competition and contestability. Furthermore, as Newman (2001) points out 
the optimistic language of partnership can be contrasted with the practical realities of 
partnership working. Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) argue that different modes of 
governance exist at different stages of a ‘partnership lifecycle’ and that relationships can be 
adversarial and competitive particularly when limited resources give rise to competition for 
funding.  
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While the policy of enhancing the role of the TS was purportedly based on their ability to 
deliver more responsive, needs-led services this was also linked to NL’s second term goal of 
delivering public service reform through the application of contestability and a broader 
mixed economy of providers (PMSU 2006).   The following sections pick up on this theme 
exploring evidence of the impact of NL’s policy of an expanded role for the market in 
delivering children’s services and the application of contestability by LAs and commissioning 
partnerships.  
Developing the market for children’s services was identified as a key component of the 
strategic commissioning role allotted to CTs. Commissioning guidance advised they 
encourage and support the development of new markets ‘in order to improve services and 
sustainability’ suggesting that ‘market representatives should be involved in CT governance, 
and high level planning and decision making’ (HM Government 2006: 27).  
Competitive tendering was identified as key to ensuring ‘the most efficient and effective 
delivery of outcomes’ and the guidance stressed that this would, not only entail competition 
between external providers, but also that,  increasingly ,‘internally provided services’ would 
have to ‘compete against external providers’(HM Government 2006: 21). With both in-house 
and external providers coming together in CT partnerships the coexistence of potentially 
conflicting modes of governance is implied.  
During their three terms in office NL continued to open up areas of children’s service 
provision to the market, surpassing those of previous Conservative administrations. This 
involved the extension of markets into new areas of child welfare as well as continuing to 
support existing markets. In 2004 the DfES commissioned PWC to produce a report detailing 
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the ‘existing and potential state of the market for children’s services’ and ‘the appetite and 
capacity for expansion’ (PWC 2004: 1). This was followed by a series of reports on the 
potential for developing five children’s services markets: children’s homes; fostering; 
childcare; parental and family support services; and positive activities for young people 
(PWC 2006, 2007a,2007b,2007c,2007d.) Whilst the market for the first three services had 
been actively developed over the past decade and a half, an expansion into the latter two 
service areas was evidence of on-going commitment to further marketisation. Whilst policy 
did not identify the private sector as the preferred provider, and purported to support 
market contestability over more direct forms competition, it did make assumptions about 
the supremacy of market type mechanisms and business type practices to organise and 
deliver welfare services (DCSF 2007a; PMSU 2006).  
The rationale for the development of children’s services markets was that they would 
improve outcomes for children by delivering higher quality services whilst offering choice to 
both commissioners and users and cost savings to LA budget holders. Hence the guidance 
document ‘Delivering Better Children’s Services through Better Market Development’ (DCSF 
2007a: 4) argued that a well designed market-based approach   would  support better 
outcomes for children because competition leads to ‘higher quality’, ‘lower cost’, and more 
innovative services that ‘offer consumers a greater choice’.  
3.8 Market contestability  
The cost-saving and quality arguments for provider plurality presented by government 
(PMSU 2006) are underpinned by the economic theory of market contestability.  The 
premise of contestable markets is that low market entry and exit barriers enable potential 
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competition from alternative providers sufficient to force a monopoly provider to drive up 
quality whilst containing or even reducing cost. In theory this can result in improved 
provision even without formalised competitive procedures being enacted. Advocates of 
contestable markets suggest this helps cut management costs associated with competitive 
tendering and can be applied in situations where markets are poorly developed or a 
monopoly provider exists (Baumol et al 1982, Mulgan 1995). The theory of contestable 
markets can be seen to have particular appeal in the context of public service provision 
where markets are often poorly developed and supply-side problems common. Contestable 
markets, it is argued, present a pragmatic solution to the dualism of ‘hierarchy’ versus 
‘market’ presenting a middle way of organising public provision that combines the benefits 
of both forms whilst testing the ability of partnerships based on ‘relational-contracting’ to 
remain competitive (Grace et al 2007).   
Grace et al (2007) develop a model for the relationship between challenge, contestability 
and choice that positions ‘challenge’ as the broadest concept enabling the questions ‘should 
we be doing this?’ and ‘are we doing this the right way?’ Contestability is understood as a 
sub-set of challenge, useful in challenging monopolies and quasi-monopolies or when 
market conditions rule out competition. Finally competition sits as a sub-set of contestability 
applicable when market conditions allow.  
3.9 Can markets deliver better outcomes for children?  
The question of whether children’s services markets can deliver the promise of better 
outcomes achieved through cost savings, extended choice and improved quality of service is 
not particularly well evidenced. Where evidence is available it refers to services where there 
66 
 
are long established policy drivers for the development of markets (e.g. Sellick 2006). 
Evidence from other areas of public service provision suggests that market methods, 
including competition and contestability, do not always achieve desired objectives (Grace et 
al 2007; Herfetz and Warner 2007).  
Grimshaw et al (2000) argue that where cost benefits have been achieved through market 
type reforms these need to be considered with regard to the wider social and political 
context. Hence early studies of efficiency savings delivered through CCT showed these 
involved a trade off against resultant losses. These included the additional transaction costs 
associated with contracts and monitoring (Boyne 1999a et al; Marsh 1998), as well as less 
direct social disbenefits including loss of public sector ethos, lowered wages, increased 
unemployment, and erosion of trust between principals and agents (Boyne et al 1999b; 
Escott and Whitfield 1995; Grimshaw et al 2000).  
Contemporary evidence suggests that some TS employees have experienced similar social 
disbenefits as a result of their organisations entering into public sector contracts.  These 
include job insecurity (Alcock et al 2004; Cunningham and James 2009; Martikke and 
Moxham 2010), less favourable terms and conditions, increased workloads (Cunningham 
2008; Cunningham and James 2009) and low staff morale (Martikke 2009). In reference to 
the broader political context, the issues discussed above regarding mission drift and loss of 
advocacy, could also be considered disbenefits. In addition there is empirical evidence that 
competitive commissioning practices have compromised collaborative working between a 
range of TS organisations at the local level (Buckingham 2009; Milbourne 2009).      
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While the Audit Commission report (2007a) found councils had achieved cost savings 
through market mechanisms, including competition and contestability, their analysis did not 
involve consideration of either offsetting social losses or economic transactional costs. The 
Commission’s report was based, in part, on a national study of contestability and 
competition in local government carried out by Grace et al (2007).  This study suggests that 
whilst cost benefits had been evidenced, there were also ‘significant examples where 
outsourcing after competitive exercises had increased costs because of poor contract design 
or management’ (Grace et al 2007: 60). It also finds that the transaction costs associated 
with exploring contestable options were ‘rarely articulated’ or ‘made transparent’ by LAs. 
These include the transition costs associated with moving from one organisational position 
to another, including those due to contracting, legal and accounting processes,   subsequent 
contract management costs and loss of flexibility. Furthermore they report that the 
‘relationship between competition and overall quality of services is much less clear’ (Grace 
et al 2007: 91).   
Finding evidence to support the DCSF claim that an expansion of the market in children’s 
services will deliver cost savings and better outcomes is equally problematic. In Grace et al’s 
(2007) study the response rate from those involved in children’s services was low at only 3% 
of respondents. They suggest that apparent biasing of the sample reflects where 
contestability and competition has been most applied. However some children’s services 
have been subject to market reforms for some time and include residential care, adoption 
and fostering services, some specialist services for disabled children and provision of child 
care.  Despite this, evidence of impacts of market-type policy reforms is elusive.   
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One exception is research by Sellick (2006) and Sellick and Connolly (2002) on commissioning 
foster care in the UK. This indicates that the economic costs associated with contracting 
independent fostering providers (IFP) are high, often three times higher than in-house 
provision, in part accounted for by higher fees paid to carers. Whilst levels of satisfaction are 
higher amongst the latter there is no concrete evidence that this contributes to better 
performance (Kirton et al 2007). However some evidence suggests there may have been 
gains in terms of placement stability and placing children with more complex needs (Sellick 
2006).   
3.10 Reluctance to pursue externalisation and barriers to market development   
Best Value (BV) arguably sought to take on board some of the lessons of CCT removing 
‘compulsory’ from the process and promoting partnership as the solution to low trust 
commissioner/supplier relations. However, despite being encouraged rather than compelled 
to engage with market testing, the evaluation of BV (Martin et al 2006) presents evidence 
that many LAs are reluctant to use competition or have used competition ineffectively. Risk 
aversion, organisational culture, client capacity and supply-side weaknesses were all 
identified as barriers to the effective use of competition.  The report concludes that although 
BV had operated as ‘an important driver of internal change’ it had not provided a ‘strong 
push for competition between service providers and did little to encourage councils to 
develop and manage supply markets more effectively’ (Martin et al 2006: 17).  
This raises the question of how far ineffective or non-use of markets is explicable in terms of 
a) gaps in skill and capacity to exploit competition and contestability effectively  or  b) the 
concerns LA officers may have over the appropriateness of market testing and outsourcing 
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and how well or ill-founded these may be. The answers to this question raise further 
questions of whether, or how far, ‘more intelligent’ commissioning is capable of delivering 
solutions or, more fundamentally, whether failings in the ability of market-type reforms to 
deliver promised outcomes necessitate a focus on alternative, more effective reforms within 
the public sector itself. 
Audit and inspection reports repeatedly raise issues of commissioner competence, 
highlighting gaps in capacity, skills and expertise (Audit Commission 2002, 2003, 2007a). 
PWC (2004) similarly identify a range of barriers to developing market contestability many of 
which are related to contractual and commissioning competence and capacity. Grace et al 
(2007) argue that a sophisticated approach to the use of markets requires new skills in their 
development and management that have not been required before. They describe a number 
of prerequisites of effective commissioning and contestability that include good market 
intelligence and analysis alongside appropriate monitoring and contract procedures.  
However, they also stress the critical importance of ‘sufficient capacity in terms of people 
and skills’ who are possessed of ‘a mindset and a willingness to use the full repertoire of 
improvement methods…informed by a culture that is conducive to change’ (Grace et al 
2007: 96).   
Whilst this may be so, there remains the question of whether there are rational or justifiable 
motives for not pursuing market competition and contestability for some services and in 
some local contexts. Explanations of reluctance to develop market approaches offered by 
government-funded reviews and inspection reports whilst acknowledging managerial 
concerns, such as supply problems and principal-agent difficulties, as legitimate,  identify 
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political and cultural concerns as less valid and more of a problem (Audit Commission 2002, 
2003, 2007a; PWC 2004). Hence whilst identifying a range of legal, economic, contractual 
and commissioning barriers to effective market operation, PWC regard political and cultural 
barriers as ‘the most significant’ barriers to market entry and exit. These include: ethical 
considerations related to profit motive; more favourable attitudes towards TS organisations; 
the political context in which decisions are taken and (undefined) ‘unfavourable attitudes 
towards developing contestability’ (PWC 2004: 10). In considering how best to lower these 
barriers and conceding that some barriers may be designed to protect children, the report 
makes little attempt to unpack whether or not they are well-founded or represent valid 
reasons for not pursuing market approaches. Past Audit Commission reports (2002, 2003, 
and 2007a) similarly appear to construe LA reluctance to develop market contestability as 
dysfunctional. They identify the development of a ‘mature and pragmatic’ approach as key 
to better performance even providing a ‘mindset temperature gauge’ for senior managers to 
determine whether ‘relevant individuals’ ‘have the right mindset’ to use competition and 
contestability (Audit Commission 2007: 47).  
In an empirical study involving six LA case studies Entwhistle (2005) identifies five different 
arguments employed by LA stakeholders against externalisation and reviews the research 
evidence to consider the academic support for them. He summarises the five themed 
objections as: ‘a desire: to be a model employer; to protect the public service ethos; to 
maintain control of the delivery of public services; to guard against dependence on 
imperfect supply markets and to protect the core competencies of the organisation’ 
(Entwhistle 2005: 191).   
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The first two arguments directly speak to the negative consequences of externalising 
services discussed above, making the case for recognition of the particular strengths of the 
public sector. This is an argument made by Grimshaw et al (2002) whose detailed 
investigation of two case study public private partnerships demonstrates little evidence of 
public sector gain. The authors conclude that what is needed is not better public sector 
market management but ‘recognition of the distinctive qualities’ of both the public sector 
ethos and producer market. The former includes ‘fairness, antipathy to corruption [and] 
reliability’ whilst the latter allows the ‘political management of ‘prices’ for the non-paying 
customer’ (Grimshaw et al 2002: 499).   
The need to promote the positive qualities of a public sector ethos relates to the idea of 
functional matching. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) argue that different service sectors have 
different functional attributes making them better fitted for delivering different types of 
service. Similarly Billis and Glennerster (1998) argue that the VCS may have an advantage 
over other sectors in particular circumstances.  PWC (2004) suggest that the TS may be 
better placed to deliver parental and family support services and there is a widespread 
support in the literature for an extended role for the TS based on its ‘added value’ (Gill et al 
2011).  
However, there is a paucity of comparative evidence on the distinctive value TSOs might 
have over the public sector, or their ability to deliver better outcomes. In 2008 the Public 
Administration Committee stated that they were ‘unable to corroborate’ the claim made by 
Government that ‘third sector organisations can deliver services in distinctive ways which 
will improve outcomes for service users’ (House of Commons Public Administration Select 
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Committee 2008: 3), a position supported by Macmillan (2010) in his evidence review of the 
sectors role in public service delivery.  While there may be little ‘robust’ research evidence 
on the outcomes of TS delivery, there is qualitative evidence of   commissioner support of TS 
ability to fill gaps in provision and engender trust amongst more marginalised communities 
(Packwood 2007).  
Entwhistle (2005) similarly finds little empirical evidence to support the idea of functional 
matching. He does however find evidence to support the idea of a public sector ethos. He 
cites Boyne’s (2002) review of thirty five empirical studies that finds ‘strong evidence of a 
public sector ethos’ characterised by public managers who are ‘less materialistic’ and with a 
‘stronger desire to serve the public interest’ than their private sector counterparts although 
no reference is made to those in the TS (Boyne 2002: 112 cited in Entwhistle 2005).  
The third argument against externalisation identified by Entwhistle relates to ‘principal-
agent’ difficulties or the problems experienced in controlling external contractors. The 
experiences of Entwhistle’s respondents are reflected in the findings of Grace et al (2007) 
who report that ‘even authorities which demonstrate outstanding practice in using 
competition and contestability have generally also had negative experience of using the 
market and market mechanisms’ (Grace et al 2007: 11).   Entwhistle’s review of the 
literature on principal-agent problems finds these concerns to be well supported by 
established theory. This in turn lends support to Erridge’s (2003) argument that internal 
providers have advantage when ‘high-discretion responsive services’ are required, and 
‘future needs and priorities cannot be predicted with certainty; outputs are diffuse and 
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difficult to measure; [and] flexibility and responsiveness, local knowledge and the exercise of 
political judgement are required ‘(Erridge 2003: 95).  
A preference by some commissioners for informal mechanisms for allocating funding and 
awarding contracts over competitive processes (Martikke 2008; Packwood 2007) may 
represent a mechanism for avoiding anticipated principal-agent problems with unknown 
providers.  Martikke (2008) reports that the majority of TS organisations in her study identify 
networking, and informal relationships as more important in helping them to secure funding 
than going through formal tendering processes. Moreover she reports that historical funding 
on the basis of long-standing, trusting relationships was common practice in her case 
studies. While this may represent a form of relational contracting she also found that these 
funding relationships were characterised by a lack of performance monitoring, raising 
questions about the quality of provision as well as accountability.  Furthermore she suggests 
that historic funding relationships appear to hinder the ability of TS to deliver needs led 
services and access ‘hard to reach’ communities.  
The next set of concerns articulated by Entwhistle’s respondents refers to supply side 
problems. Where markets are limited, or there is no existing market, it would clearly be 
difficult if not impossible to ‘encourage diversity, innovation and the competitiveness of the 
supply base’ (DETR 1999: 13), or to avoid potential exploitation by monopoly suppliers or 
‘cartels’.  As discussed above the academic theory of contestable markets was central to NL 
policy in seeking to overcome these problems.  
Grace et al (2007) identify a number of market characteristics that favour the use of 
competition and contestability including market maturity and the size and scope of the 
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market. In common with Entwhistle they identify the desire to protect core competence as a 
barrier to externalisation. Both studies however find little consensus over what constitutes a 
‘core service’. One LA in Grace et al’s study identifies child protection as a core service 
arguing that this represents too risky an area of service delivery to be outsourced. This raises 
the question of whether some services should ever be subject to market testing, perhaps 
those that meet Erridge’s above criteria or where the ethical and moral barriers are set too 
high.   
Grace et al (2007) note a trend in some mature public sector markets for reverse contracting 
whereby previously outsourced services are moving back to in-house provision. This may 
represent evidence of where contestability has been effective in driving up in-house quality 
and efficiency or, alternatively, provide evidence of market failure and the limited benefits 
of externalisation.  Unison (2010) provides evidence for second of these explanations 
producing case study examples of cost-savings to LAs through bringing services back in-
house. 
In children’s services there is mixed evidence for a retrenchment in contracting out. In a 
DCSF commissioned survey of private and TS providers respondents were more likely to 
agree there had been a shift towards greater in-house service provision (Phillips et al 2010). 
However Packwood (2007) reports that commissioners are more likely to claim the opposite 
as true. Although there has been an increase in the value of contracts awarded to alternative 
providers this does tend to reflect new areas of provision where there have been specific 
policy directives to secure external contracts. This is particularly true for programmes 
funded through former ring-fenced or area-based grants. Despite guidance suggesting that 
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internal services should be held open to competitive tendering there is very little evidence 
that mainstream provision has shifted to external providers (Phillips et al 2010).   
3.11 Summary  
This chapter has outlined key features of the policy context for commissioning in children’s 
services.  It has described how the role of LAs has been recast as strategic ‘place shaping’ 
and commissioning accorded a new prominence in securing better outcomes. The duty of 
partnership in children’s services sought to facilitate the development of integrated service 
provision and cooperation within and across the statutory, private and third sectors. With 
commissioning intended to provide the mechanism for identifying shared strategic priorities, 
coordinating delivery by a range of providers and achieving accountability through contracts 
it could  be understood as offering a set of solutions to the ‘problems’ of implementation 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
However, the chapter has also discussed how, under NL, whilst a focus on partnership was 
intended to ameliorate the negative effects of markets this sits in tension with the use of 
competition and contestability as drivers of public service reform and the goal of cost-
effectiveness. There is evidence to suggest that competition between providers has 
compromised collaborative working (Buckingham 2009; Milbourne 2009) and this may 
present as an additional barrier to outsourcing in addition to those identified by Entwhistle 
(2005).   
Evidence of the slow development of children’s services commissioning would suggest that 
there has been some reluctance amongst CT partners to establish commissioning as a core 
function, despite the pivotal role accorded to it within ECM. This raises questions about the 
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acceptability of market modes of governance to some LAs and the degree to which they are 
willing to relinquish their delivery role in some areas of provision. Given that LAs have been 
granted considerable space for autonomy in deciding on how they move to a ‘place-shaping’ 
role there is space for it to be resisted or treated as a discretionary policy directive.  
Also open to critical scrutiny is the extent to which the TS has become ‘mainstreamed’ 
(Kendall 2009) through co-option as ‘partners’ in delivering to government agendas. 
Evidence presented in this chapter suggests TS organisations have different experiences of 
engaging with both formal partnership structures and the processes of commissioning. 
While some may have embraced the market as offering new opportunities for funding 
others express concern about ‘mission drift’ and marginalisation. What is missing however is 
evidence of how TS providers might engage with commissioning whilst resisting 
‘mainstreaming’ through negotiation or revision of policy agendas at the point of delivery.   
In order to provide insight into the implementation of joint commissioning at a local level 
three research questions have been identified. The first is concerned with the local 
organisational and institutional factors that might act as barriers or facilitators. The second is 
similarly concerned with context and asks how past histories of service provision and 
partnership working impact on the development of joint commissioning arrangements. The 
third is concerned with how local policy actors interpret or frame understandings of 
commissioning and asks what discourses and arguments different stakeholders draw on to 
make the case for or against commissioning.    
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CHAPTER FOUR:  COMMISSIONING CHILDREN’S SERVICES: 
THE ROLE OF EVIDENCE 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter discussed commissioning as a mechanism for co-ordinating and 
managing service delivery, and hence policy outcomes, in the context of NL’s ‘third way’ 
modernisation of welfare with a commitment to ‘partnership’ and a broader mixed economy 
of welfare. This chapter speaks to the second analytical theme identified in chapter 1, 
exploring how commissioning with its appeal to evidence based decision making and 
outcome based accountability is expected to enhance the project of rational, ‘non-political’ 
local level policy making.  Establishing measurable outcomes as the criteria for resource 
allocation and the rational appraisal of evidence of ‘what works’ in selecting from policy 
options together suggest further potential   solutions to the ‘problem’ of implementation.   
The last decade witnessed a growing orientation towards rational planning in children’s 
services matched by a substantial increase in quantitative data and research evidence on 
which planners and commissioners could draw to inform needs analysis, targeting, and 
programme design. This reflected NL’s declared commitment to the use of evidence in policy 
making based on a philosophy of ‘what counts is what works’ (Blair 1998). This chapter 
begins with a review of evidence-based policy making (EBPM) and considers some of the 
conceptual and methodological problems associated with it.  It then moves on to its 
application in the specific context of children’s services commissioning. It examines how 
policy guidance has framed this for commissioners and planners and reflects on the 
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underlying assumptions it makes about the possibility of rationally informed decision 
making.  
Finally attention is given to how policy actors understand and use different forms of 
evidence in decision making. Some of the political, practical and conceptual complexities of 
trying to implement an evidence-based approach to local decision making and 
commissioning are highlighted.    
4.2 The growth of evidence-based policy and practice   
Whilst the relationship between policy making and research evidence is not new, the idea of 
‘evidence-based policy’ (EBP) has come increasingly to the fore over the last two decades 
and was given particularly strong endorsement by the former NL government. In a speech to 
the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) in February 2000, David Blunkett (former 
Education and Employment Secretary) called for a new relationship between government 
and the social sciences claiming that:  
‘Social science should be at the heart of policymaking. We need a revolution in 
relations between government and the social research community - we need 
social scientists to help determine what works and why, and what types of policy 
initiatives are likely to be most effective’ (Blunkett 2000). 
Following the era of Thatcher’s ‘conviction politics’, NL declared a retreat from ideologically 
justified political projects towards a supposedly more pragmatic policy agenda (Solesbury 
2001).  The idea of using evidence to inform policy making implies a more ‘scientific’ and 
instrumentally rational approach; a depoliticised process in which policy becomes ‘an 
exercise in social technology’ (Schwandt 1997: 74). Underpinned by the modernist 
assumption of progress through science, the search for ‘what works’ can be understood as 
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an attempt to modernise policy making rescuing it from ‘the irrationalities and indignities of 
politics’ (Stone 1997: 6).  
EBP was a core theme of the NL modernisation programme (Bochel and Duncan 2007) 
evident, though not elaborated on, in the White Paper ‘Modernising Government’ (Cabinet 
Office 1999a).  Here the government committed itself to improving their  ‘use of evidence 
and research so that we understand better the problems we are trying to address’  and 
‘learning the lessons of successes and failures by carrying out more evaluation of policies 
and programmes’ (Cabinet Office 1999a: 20). The follow-up report ‘Professional policy 
making for the twenty-first century’ (Cabinet Office 1999b: 14) identified the ability to 
develop an evidence-based approach using ‘the best available evidence from a wide range of 
sources’ as one of nine competencies of modern policy making with the conscious aim of 
making contemporary policy more rational, fairer, and outcomes-focused.   
Despite the Cabinet Office’s (1999a) reference to a broad range of evidence, that included 
research, statistics, expert knowledge and the outcomes of consultation, commentators 
have since observed that that in practice NL made recourse to a more limited range of 
evidence, and that it was quantitative evidence of ‘what works’ that dominated debates 
about evidence-based policy and practice (e.g. Davies et al 2001, Klein 2003, Pawson 2006)  
The concept of ‘evidence-based’ policy making was mirrored by a concern to promote the 
use of evidence in practice (Rycroft-Malone 2006).  A key influence here had been a parallel, 
though earlier, commitment to evidence-based medicine. This followed an erosion of public 
trust in the professional judgements of clinicians in the wake of highly publicised failings of 
some members of the medical profession including, for example, the public inquiry into 
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children’s heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary (Kennedy 2001).   The establishment of 
the Cochrane Collaboration in 1993 with its brief to conduct systematic reviews of research 
evidence for the efficacy of clinical interventions, had already set new standards for what 
counts as robust evidence of ‘what works’(Coote et al 2004).  
The logic of the work of the Cochrane Collaboration was extended into the field of social 
policy, in part through the work of its sister organisation the Campbell Collaboration 
(established in 2000). This supported the diffusion of medically derived forms of research, in 
particular systematic reviews of trial-based research evidence, across a range of policy areas 
including crime, education and social welfare.  In preventative children’s services there has 
been a move towards funding specified ‘evidence-based’ interventions including Family 
Nurse Partnerships and Multi-systemic Therapy (Barnes et al 2008; Littell 2005). The use of 
secondary data analysis to identify groups ‘at risk’ of poor outcomes has also come 
increasingly to the fore, (for example in the use of The Family and Children Study data to 
support the Think Family initiative (SETF 2008)), dovetailing well with both the prevention 
and outcomes focused agendas in the child and family policy domain.   
4.3 Conceptualising evidence  
Taken at face value, the notion of using research and other forms of evidence to identify 
‘what works’ as a basis for policy decisions, appears to make intuitive good sense.  However, 
making a reality of EBP is more difficult, especially given the complex nature of the policy 
environment and the multi-dimensional or ‘wicked problems’ that policy programmes 
increasingly seek to address.  
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Twin concerns of NL were to use evidence of performance in order to improve accountability 
and efficiency, and evidence of ‘what works’ in order to improve policy effectiveness 
(Sanderson 2002).  The former was introduced in chapter 2, understood as a set of top down 
mechanisms designed to control policy outcomes.  The latter refers to the instrumental role 
of evaluation in informing policy; a position underpinned by a number of assumptions 
pertaining to the way in which the policy process plays out and the basis upon which we can 
identify effective policy and practice.  
Tensions in EBP discourse concern the relative value accorded to different forms of evidence 
as inputs into the policy process. This debate can be understood as residing within the two 
approaches to understanding the policy process introduced in chapter 2.  Hudson and Lowe 
(2004) suggest that the idea of using retrospective, summative evaluation evidence in order 
to determine whether or not a policy has worked fits well with the rational ‘stagist’ model of 
policy making.  Here, evaluation comes at the end of the ‘policy cycle’ meaning that policy is 
worked out ahead of implementation and evidence fed in once implementation has begun.  
As policy is goal-led then evidence should be capable of informing policy makers about 
whether goals have been met, providing feedback to inform future modification.   From this 
perspective evidence is understood as objective or ‘value-free’ and taken to be the most 
influential component of policy decision making, playing an instrumental rather than 
‘enlightenment’ role (Weiss 1998).  
From an alternative perspective that understands the policy process as complex and 
inherently political, evidence is understood to play a messier and more haphazard role, 
being only one part of the process of policy formulation.  This has led to a preference 
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amongst some policy analysts for an alternative terminology including  ‘evidence-aware’ 
(Davies et al 2001) and ‘evidence-inspired’ (Duncan 2005) that suggest the need to 
understand the interplay between evidence and the myriad of other influences on the policy 
process.   
Evidencing outcomes requires the evaluator to answer the question ‘what is the impact of 
policy x on problem y’, and is thus concerned with causality and attribution. Within the 
rational model of policy making the use of quantitative outcome data has therefore tended 
to be more highly valued than other forms of evidence (Sanderson 2000). Quantification 
refers to a methodological approach that involves operationalising variables so that they can 
be quantified and categorised in relation to each other in order to produce assessments of 
predictability and generalisability. The use of quantitative methodologies is most closely 
associated with a positivist or neopositivist ontological and epistemological position that 
assumes that objective, value free knowledge of an external ‘real’ world is possible.  
Related to this position is the assumption of a rational analysis/politics dichotomy (Morcol 
2001).  According to the logic of this assumption analysis is a rational, scientific process 
which renders decision making free from the influence of the institutionalised expression of 
values - politics.  Despite attention being drawn to the limitations and shortcomings of 
quantitative analyses (e.g. De-Leon 1994), statistical data has an enduring appeal for policy 
makers and remains arguably the most common form of evidence used in policy design 
(Neylan 2008).  Stone (1997) observes that the popularity of quantitative analysis is partly 
because by measuring something people tend to notice it more.  
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One of the assumptions of the EBP movement is that not all evidence has equal status but 
can be evaluated hierarchically with the ‘gold standard’, randomised control trial, ‘RCT’, in 
pride of place, followed by quasi-experimental approaches. This evidence hierarchy is one 
that has been subject to challenge in the policy analysis literature (e.g. Fischer 1998) 
reflecting different levels of acceptability of the use of research methodologies emanating 
from health-related fields of enquiry within other professional and academic domains.  
Marston and Watts (2003) point out, there is a need to be critically aware of the way in 
which certain forms of evidence are privileged over others and the assumptions this entails 
about what constitutes a claim to knowledge. If knowledge can be ordered into a hierarchy 
that values certain forms of evidence and particular methodologies over others then the 
notion of EBP is clearly not a neutral concept, but exists as a ‘powerful metaphor in shaping 
what forms of knowledge are considered closest to the ‘truth’ in decision making processes 
and policy argument’ (Marston and Watts 2003: 145).  
4.4 Post-positivist challenges to EBPM  
There are profound differences amongst academics about what constitutes a claim to 
knowledge and there have been challenges to the whole concept of EBP from social 
constructionists and post- positivist scholars who reject its rationalist assumptions and claim 
to objectivity (e.g. Dryzek 2002, Fischer 1998, 2003, Parsons 2002, and Schwandt 2000).  
What is up for debate is whether it is possible to find what Parsons (2002) terms the  ‘high 
ground’  within  Schon’s (1983) ‘policy swamp’, which represents a  body of objective 
evidence that can be employed to ‘command and control’ (Bentley 2002) the policy process 
in a way that obviates values, ideas and politics.  
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From a social constructivist or post-positivist perspective, reality exists but cannot be fully or 
definitively explained or understood. Knowledge of that reality is understood as socially 
constructed and contingent and the dominant use of quantitative methodologies in order to 
establish causal explanations are considered inadequate in advancing knowledge of policy 
solutions to ‘wicked’ social and economic problems (Dryzek 2002; Fischer 1989, 2003).  As 
discussed in chapter 2, from this perspective policy goals are considered ambiguous and 
open to multiple and conflicting interpretations (Yanow 2000), so that policy analysis   
should aim at developing understanding of how these meanings are constructed and the 
way they impact on outcomes (Yanow 2000: 8). According to Fischer (1998: 144) the 
problem of a neopositivist approach is embedded in a misunderstanding of the ‘social’ and 
the false assumption of the possibility of a generalizable, value free objectivity that attempts  
to explain social behaviours without reference to context.  He argues for the reorientation of 
policy enquiry away from instrumental explanations and empirical generalisations towards 
discursive contextual understandings, for while objectivity may be an ideal, it ‘requires a 
critical community of interpreters’.  
Whilst EBP is presented as a core attribute of modern policy making, post-positivists argue 
that rather than signalling a move towards a more enlightened and democratic process it 
signifies the opposite; a re-focus towards the old ‘top-down’ approach that ‘must be 
understood as a project focused on enhancing the techniques of managing and controlling 
the policy-making process’ (Parsons 2002: 44). Positivist thinking, it is argued, is orientated 
towards the instrumental and managerial use of knowledge, and hence the evidence-based 
movement supports a ‘command and control’ form of government.  With its assumption of 
the superiority and value-neutrality of scientific decision making, EBP represents an 
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antipathy to democratic decision making and pluralistic policy making (Fischer 2003; Parsons 
2002; Schwandt 2000). The language of quantification and the presumption that statistical 
data possess an ‘intrinsic authority’ together promote the idea of objectivity and rationality 
(Neylan 2008). This helps   to objectify policy problems and proffered solutions as social 
‘fact’ thereby supporting an appearance of a ‘values-free’ policy agenda that ignores the 
relationship between power and knowledge.  
The EBP movement with its emphasis on knowing and directing rather than facilitating and 
learning (Schon 1973) thus threatens the possibility of realising the Lasswellian vision for the 
role of social sciences in democratising the policy process.  Fischer (1998, 2003) argues that 
the traditional understanding of the policy-analytic role represents an epistemological 
misunderstanding of the relationship of knowledge to politics. If we reject the positivist 
separation of facts from values then policy analysis should not, and cannot, be separated 
from political considerations.  The alternative is a call for a democratised ‘deliberative policy 
making’ whereby policy learning involves critical appraisal of the goals and assumptions of 
policies and ‘consensus is approached through the discursive construction of a synthesis of 
competing views’ (Fischer 1998: 136).    
Recognition of the limitations imposed by a narrow definition of evidence has led some 
policy analysts to advocate for a broader concept of what constitutes valid knowledge 
including tacit knowledge (Flyvbjerg 2001; Parsons 2002; Schwandt 2000), values 
(Williams and Fulford 2007) and community and user views (Barnes et al 2003; Yanow 
2000).  
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Yanow (2004: 12) stresses the importance of valuing organisationally-relevant ‘local 
knowledge’: the ‘mundane, yet expert understanding of and practical reasoning about 
local conditions derived from previous experience’. This ‘local knowledge’ is borne out of 
shared, practical and contextual experience, and is the knowledge of the SLB or front-line 
worker.  ‘Local knowledge’ is distinct from the technical or professional expertise that 
derives from formal and academic systems of learning, resonating with the Aristotelian 
concept of ‘phronesis’. Phronesis refers to practical context-dependent knowledge that 
cannot be reduced to formal rules or general truths (Flyvbjerg 2001).  It is knowledge 
derived from experience but also concerned with deliberative judgements with respect 
to values. In search of an alternative to the standard interpretation of social science 
explanation as involving a formal model of inductive or deductive reasoning, Flyvbjerg 
(2001) makes the case for a phronetic social science. In so doing he argues for the 
primacy of context dependent knowledge that incorporates the idea of policy learning in 
the context of its ethical and moral implications.   
The discussion so far has covered some of the epistemological challenges to achieving EBPM 
in particular its assumption of value neutrality. The following section builds on this to 
explore some of the methodological and practical barriers to evidencing the impact of policy 
initiatives on outcomes with particular reference to complex problems.  
4.4 Methodological barriers to EBPM  
Sanderson (2002) distinguishes two different forms of evidence needed to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of government policy. The first of these refers to evidence for accountability, 
primarily concerned with measures of performance. This is reflected in the concept of 
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outcomes-based accountability and its associated use of performance indicators and targets. 
Evidence for accountability is picked up later while this section explores Sanderson’s second 
form: evidence that is theoretical and aimed at explaining how policy mechanisms achieve or 
do not achieve intended outcomes. This form of evidence refers primarily to that gained 
through research and evaluation and is intended to provide a rational basis both for 
adapting and improving current policy and for future policy decision making.  
In order for evidence to function in the way demanded of a rational model of policy making 
then it should be possible to carry out an objective and scientific evaluation of the identified 
policy (Hudson and Lowe 2004). The use of experimental evaluation methods is traditionally 
understood as capable of producing more scientific and hence ‘valid’ evidence of ‘what 
works’.  However, many researchers reject experimental models of evaluation for multi-
faceted policy initiatives aimed at tackling ‘wicked problems’ on the grounds that they are 
inadequate in linking complex community, population and systems outcomes to multi-
dimensional   inputs (Barnes et al 2003; Martin 2005). Given the complexity of contributory 
factors to negative outcomes (the identified policy problem) there can be no simple causal 
connection between a service or policy intervention and their prevention (Percy-Smith 
2000). In evaluation terms this is described the ‘problem of attribution’ referring to how the 
effects of an intervention or service can be isolated from other influences and factors. This is 
especially difficult where multiple initiatives are focused on areas of particular need and 
where multi-agency interventions are designed to deliver complex solutions to ‘joined up’ 
problems.  
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Davies et al (2001) question the use of RCT and other experimental methodologies for 
producing evidence of ‘what works’ arguing that they  rarely offers insights into why 
something works or why one intervention performs better than another. In other words 
whilst they might be capable of causal description they are poor on causal explanation.  
Tilley (2001) mounts a strident critique of the use of experimental methodologies for 
evaluation. He too criticises their orientation towards demonstrating ‘net effects’ of the 
intervention studied in order to make ‘X produces Y’ type claims without making adequate 
reference to the context in which that effect occurred. He points out that in complex 
situations control groups are unfeasible as it is impossible to hold contextual variables 
constant thereby making it difficult to claim transferability of findings.   
There are also practical impediments to the impact of evaluation research on policy making.  
One of the defining features of NL’s approach to EBP was the use of policy pilots, sometimes 
known as ‘trailblazers’ as in the Sure Start programme, or ‘pathfinders’ as in CTs. However, 
the experience of evaluating complex policy initiatives exposes two sets of problems that 
raise questions pertaining to how knowledge generated can be of instrumental, rather than 
enlightenment, value to policy makers.  The first set of problems refers to the issues 
discussed above and the complexity of real world evaluation.  This means that policy 
evaluation is often unable to the deliver the kind of cut and dried unequivocal answers that 
politicians prefer.  The second refers to the fact that the evaluation process works on a 
timescale that is out of kilter with the demands of politicians and policy makers and hence 
does not yield the kind of timely information they require (Hudson and Lowe 2004).  
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One solution to the problem of lengthy evaluation time-frames  has been to make use of 
systematic reviews of existing bodies of evidence designed to give concrete evidence of the 
effectiveness or otherwise of particular interventions. The advantage of such reviews is that 
they can, theoretically, be used to inform policy decision making before, rather than during, 
implementation.     
Pawson (2002a) identifies two broad approaches to systematic review: numerical meta-
analysis that involves statistical comparison of the net effect of programmes that target the 
same or similar problem, and narrative reviews that likewise consider evidence of the impact 
of different programmes but in a more narrative or discursive manner. Despite their 
temporal advantage, Pawson questions the capacity of either to produce straightforward 
evidence of ‘what works’.  Whilst numerical meta-analyses produce ‘de-contextualised’ 
messages, narrative analyses involve the ‘tacit testing of submerged theories’ meaning they 
are unable to draw inferences that are not theory-laden. Both are criticised for squeezing 
out attention to programme ‘mechanisms’, ‘contexts’ and ‘outcomes patterns’.  
Boaz and Pawson  (2005) also question the usefulness of the systematic review  in informing 
policy and practice  by reference to five contrasting and contradictory literature reviews on 
mentoring schemes for young people ‘at risk’. They discuss the reasons for the ‘mixed 
messages’ produced by the different reviews that include methodological inconsistencies, 
differing interpretations of the same data   and a tendency to ‘go beyond the evidence’ in 
reaching conclusions. Boaz and Pawson’s analysis reveals the process as subjective and 
interpretive rather than objective. This supports the conclusion that evidence is rarely, if 
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ever, unequivocal and it is unrealistic to expect it to deliver prescriptive advice to support 
policy decision-making.  
Prior and Paris (2005) argue that government commissioned systematic reviews often 
demand engagement with the methodological hierarchy previously described. With its 
associated criteria of research validity and reliability this can result in the exclusion of certain 
forms of evidence.  They point out that what is typically excluded are empirical single case 
studies (and hence non-comparative), as well as qualitative data in particular user 
experiences.   In addition evidence about more complex systems such as schools or 
neighbourhoods is relatively neglected, as they do not lend themselves to experimental 
methods due to the control problems previously mentioned (Tilley 2001).  
Fischer makes a broader point arguing that that research is ‘as much a socio-cultural activity 
as a technical enterprise’ (Fischer 1998: 132), and that we need to consider not only its 
outcomes but the judgements that structure and guide the research process itself.  Not only 
are research findings important but also the set of processes by which we construct an 
object of enquiry as the ‘problem’. In deciding what to research, by setting parameters 
around what is of interest, the process is revealed as subjective.   With regard to evidence of 
‘what works’ this can lead to particular groups being left out, or failure to consider the 
relationship between structural factors such as poverty and poor outcomes (Prior and Paris 
2005) with the concomitant privileging of evidence that pertains to the study of particular 
groups of individuals.  
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4.5 Learning rather than knowing   
The problem with establishing an instrumental role for research evidence has prompted calls 
for an alternative relationship between research and policy that promotes the idea of 
learning and long-term enlightenment over instrumentalism (Nutley et al 2007; Sanderson 
2000; Weiss 1980). This recalls the points made above about the need for a wider concept of 
valid knowledge that includes tacit, practical and context specific knowledge.  
Schon (1983) suggests that problems of greatest complexity and importance reside in the 
‘lowlands’ of a ‘policy swamp’ not amenable to knowledge management and control. Instead 
they necessitate the development of reflective practice and a willingness to learn from 
others. This is echoed by Chapman (2004: 11) who argues that, in the context of complex 
policy problems that cannot be reduced to ‘separate rationally manageable parts’, policy 
learning should progress through experimentation and risk taking.   Like Schon, Chapman 
argues that we need to develop ‘learning systems’ that provide for learning and adaption 
rather than knowing and control.  
The idea of enlightenment is linked to the possibility of democratic or ‘deliberative 
policy’ making through policy networks and communities (Rhodes 1997) and the 
importance of local knowledge for policy development, both of which acknowledge that 
government cannot always ‘know best’.  The importance of local knowledge corresponds 
to the idea of context dependent learning and the Aristotelian concept of phronesis. The 
implication is that horizontal learning and  local-centre  knowledge transfer are as 
important as that which is directed downwards resonating with the idea of a dialectical 
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relationship between local and central policy actors (Uitermark 2005) and policy as 
‘negotiated order’ (Barrett and Fudge 1981; Strauss 1978).   
Theory of Change (ToC) approaches that draw on local experiential knowledge have been 
promoted as an alternative to experimental models for evaluating complex community 
based initiatives (Barnes et al 2003; Mason and Barnes 2007). ToC, like other more formative 
and theory-led approaches to policy evaluation, also offers a better opportunity for 
improving implementation, as findings emerge during, rather than after, implementation. 
Pollitt (1999) suggests this may support greater reflexivity among participants. However, he 
also points out a set of limitations including the need for  decision makers to engage with 
complex and ambiguous findings, for such evaluations are testimony to the fact that 
‘evidence, whether new or old never speaks for itself’ (Pawson 2002b: 157). Hudson and 
Lowe (2004) suggest that formative evaluation is best suited for ‘fine-tuning of the policy’  
and raise questions about the possibilities for generating conclusive evidence about whether 
policy interventions ‘work’ or not.   
4.6 Evidence for accountability  
Given the difficulties of using long-term evaluation evidence for short-term instrumental 
purposes it is, perhaps, not surprising that policy makers have turned to alternative evidence 
sources from which to make inferences about policy success or failure. The preferred 
alternative over the past three decades has been what Sanderson (2002) describes as 
‘evidence for accountability’.  Chapter 2 discussed the rise of NPM in the context of a form of 
top down control of the policy process, underpinned by the idea that intended policy 
outcomes could be secured through applying management techniques drawn from the 
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world of business and commerce. Here the use of performance indicators and targets is 
understood as a form of ‘managerialised’ evidence of policy effectiveness; a more short term 
solution to the problem of the long term and equivocal nature of research-led policy 
evaluation.   
The rise of NPM and in particular the use of performance indicators and targets has been 
identified as a leading factor in the increased attention paid to policy evaluation. Walker and 
Duncan (2007) however argue that this attention came in advance of NPM, making 
reference to increasing levels of concern regarding public spending during the 1970s and a 
concomitant shift in focus from policy demands towards cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness.  
Traditionally the emphasis in performance management has sat with questions relating to 
input, process and output or in other words with what we do and how much we do.  The 
more contemporary focus on outcomes and results-based accountability however, has been 
promoted as providing a better basis for determining organisational performance in terms of 
evidence of effectiveness (DCSF 2008c; McAuley and Cleaver 2006; Utting et al 2008). 
Performance management through outcomes, targets, indicators and milestones has 
became an established feature of policy practice at the level of central and local government 
and in the implementation of major policy initiatives, with funding increasingly tied to the 
ability to demonstrate effectiveness.  Government discourses on outcome-based 
accountability claim a number of benefits of target-orientated planning including enhanced 
democratic accountability, greater efficiency, improved performance and greater clarity of 
direction and purpose (HM Treasury 2003).  
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4.7 Evidence and the commissioning process  
The chapter so far has discussed the general trend under NL towards a rationally driven 
policy agenda.  Some of the conceptual and methodological complexities of producing 
unequivocal evidence on which to base policy decision making and action have been 
highlighted . The following sections explore the requirement for LAs and their partners to 
develop an evidence-based approach to local policy making framed as an integral part of a 
rational outcome-focused commissioning ‘cycle’.    
As previous chapters have discussed the NL government set out a programme for the reform 
of children’s services intended to improve outcomes for children through the 
reconfiguration and commissioning of services. Fundamental to these reforms was the 
improved collaboration of services understood to enable the perceived needs of children, 
rather than organisational structures and priorities, to sit at the centre of planning. The idea 
of focusing on the delivery of outcomes was intrinsic to this reform made explicit in the 
creation of a priority ‘Outcomes Framework’, represented as the starting point for 
transforming services.  
The ECM green paper (DfES 2003) defined these outcomes at a relatively abstract level and 
across five broad areas:  health; safety; enjoyment and achievement; economic well-being 
and contribution to society with a stated intention of reducing ‘the gap in outcome between 
those who do well and those who do not’ (HM Government 2004). Achievement of the five 
ECM outcomes was to be measured against 68 performance indicators that applied to 
children and young people, forming part of rationalised national indicator set (CLG/HMG 
2008).  
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The task for strategic partners and service commissioners was to translate these outcomes 
at a local level into a set of priority outcomes that reflected local needs. These priorities 
were to be set out in an overarching strategic Children and Young People’s Plan (CYPP) the 
preparation, implementation and monitoring of which was made the responsibility of the 
Children’s Trust Board (CTB). The Plan was expected be informed by ‘a thorough needs 
assessment’ (DfES 2004c) and CTBs were expected to conduct:  
‘a thorough, wide ranging and up to date analysis of children and young people’s 
needs mapped against existing services, to identify gaps in service provision and 
inform strategic commissioning priorities’ (DCSF 2009: 62).  
Joint commissioning was envisaged as a key strategic planning tool through which the CYPP 
would be realised and better outcomes for children achieved.   The Plan was to be reviewed 
on an annual basis with progress assessed against milestones, and available outcome data 
and consideration given to changing and emerging need.  
The CYPP was expected to be informed by, and aligned with, the ‘Joint Strategic Needs 
Assessment’ (JSNA) with both documents making use of the same datasets and clearly 
focused on outcomes rather than processes.  The production of a JSNA by each LA and PCT 
was (and is)  a requirement set out in section 116 of the Local Government and Public 
Involvement in Health Act (HM Government 2007) and the joint responsibility of Children 
and Young People’s Services, Adult Social Services and Directors of Public Health. The JSNA 
was intended to inform the strategic direction of service commissioning through the 
identification of the aggregated ‘health care and well-being needs of local populations’ and 
the service responses most appropriate to meeting those needs.  
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Evidence was expected to play a variety of roles in the commissioning process, not only to 
support the processes of priority setting, need analysis, targeting, and delivering cost 
effectiveness,  but also inform to understandings of ‘what works’ in programmes of 
intervention.  By implication those tasked with commissioning were expected to act as 
analysts for the commissioning process; as knowledge brokers gathering, collating, 
interpreting and making judgements about how to employ a plurality of evidence sources. 
These sources were to include quantitative and administrative data, provider consultation 
and input from children and young people.  Commissioning as a process thus reflected the 
NL rhetoric that there should be collaboration in deciding what matters as well as evidence 
to determine ‘what works’.  
The requirement that multiple forms of evidence be called into play in making 
commissioning decisions is one which fits neatly with the rational decision making model of 
the policy process discussed in chapter 2. Government guidance (DH/DCSF 2008; HM 
Government 2006) presented commissioning as an ideal process of transparent, evidence-
based, rational decision making directly comparable to the ‘stagist’ policy cycle.  Indeed the 
process set out in the guidance was presented diagrammatically in a form analogous to the 
‘textbook’ policy cycle described by Parsons (1995) and represented in figure 1.   
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Figure 1 Policy/commissioning cycle adapted from Parsons 1995 and HM Government 
2006  
 
Like the policy life-cycle the commissioning process was presented as a model way of 
breaking down decision making into a series of logical steps conceived as a cycle of activities 
in which the final stage of one revolution of the cycle becomes the starting point for the 
next.  
The first stage in this cycle was to involve consideration of ‘the current pattern and recent 
trends of outcomes for children and young people in their area, against national and 
relevant local comparators’ (HM Government, 2006: 6) as the starting place for ‘an overall, 
integrated needs assessment’. An understanding of both ‘universal as well as specialist 
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needs’ (HM Government 2006: 8) was to be informed by a combination of ‘good quality’ 
quantitative and qualitative data that had been subject to ‘high quality analysis’(HM 
Government 2006: 6). 
The pattern of locally commissioned services was to include both preventative as well as 
remedial services and be based   on a careful appraisal of delivery options using service 
mapping and national and local evidence of effective practice to support decision-making. 
Through subsequent contractual processes commissioned services would be required to 
demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness indicating their contribution to the five outcomes.  
The final ‘monitor and review’ stage of the ‘commissioning cycle’  was to involve  both 
internal and external audit and appraisal providing summative and formative evidence of 
effectiveness in achieving the outcomes identified in stage one and intended to  stimulate  
further commissioning or de-commissioning of services.   The ECM green paper made no 
reference to the role of evaluation evidence in informing how well LAs were delivering 
outcomes for children. Instead it referred to the inspection criteria by which achievement 
was to be monitored and the creation of a common data-set intended to act as a bench 
mark against which outcomes would be measured. All children’s services are subject to 
external performance review and inspection and the green paper identified this as a key 
factor in an ‘improvement cycle’ intended to ‘drive local performance.’ (DfES 2003: 26). In 
2005 the outcomes framework was produced in line with guidance on the Inspection of 
Children’s Services (Ofsted 2005) tying in performance targets with information on how 
inspectorates would judge the contribution of services to their achievement.  
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4.8 Outcomes as the basis of need assessment  
Strategic planning and commissioning were understood to require the ‘mapping of outcome 
inter-dependencies’ (HM Government, 2006: 15). However, the ECM framework failed to 
adequately define what an outcome might be. Since ECM there have been numerous 
attempts to establish an agreed definition.   The work of Friedman (2005) on results based 
accountability  has been highlighted as providing a solution to the problem of outcome 
based planning, including active government encouragement for its application in improving 
children’s services delivery (DCSF 2008, McAuley and Cleaver 2006 Utting et al 2008). 
Friedman (2005: 19) defines an outcome as ‘a condition of well-being for children, adults, 
families and communities’. Axford and Berry (2005: 13) suggest a more dynamic definition, 
understanding an outcome as a change of well-being achieved as ‘the product of a policy or 
practice input’, distinguishing this from an output, where the latter are the effects of a 
process typically measured through service indicators.  Their distinction is a useful starting 
point for considering how we might begin to measure the achievement of outcomes but at 
the same time hints at the complexity that lies behind it.  
Friedman’s approach is to identify a set of proxy indicators for desired outcomes measured 
against a pre-established baseline. This raises the problem of identifying appropriate proxy 
indicators. Barnes et al (2004: 2-3) discuss two different ways of understanding what 
constitutes an indicator.  The first is to see an indicator as a ‘quantitative measure generated 
from data collected for administrative purposes, which comprises aggregated data relating 
to a defined population at a specific point in time’.  The vast majority of national indicators 
pertaining to children could be described in this way, including those related to educational 
achievement, child protection and health. The other is that an indicator can be applied to 
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different forms of evidence considered ‘indicative of a particular state or condition’. From 
this perspective indicators can make reference to both quantitative and qualitative data. 
Fewer examples of this type of indicator could be found within the national indicator set but 
included self-reported well-being and level of user trust in services.  
Friedman (2005: 24) argues that it is important to distinguish between ‘high-level’ outcomes 
concerned about the well-being of populations, and service outcomes that refer to users of 
specific services. Delivering population outcomes requires the input of many services, for 
example, having healthy children requires not just the contribution of health services, but 
the provision of decent housing, a safe environment and so on.   The distinction between 
population and service outcomes raises the question of how we demonstrate whether what 
individual services provide will deliver intended benefits to whole populations. The practical 
application of results-based accountability would, therefore, appear to encroach on the 
more problematic territory of summative evaluation for it is concerned with the quantifiable 
measurement of changes in welfare bringing with it all the problems of attribution identified 
in the above discussion.  
Friedman (2005: 28) identifies a framework for doing this that he calls ‘Turning the Curve’.  
According to ‘Turning the Curve’ service planners and providers, in collaboration with local 
communities, are required to refer to aggregate neighbourhood and national  data sets to 
determine the statistical direction of travel of an identified problem.  Once identified they 
are to collectively agree to what needs to be done in order to ‘turn the curve’ and re-route 
the problem in a more desirable direction .  Success is thus indicated by the achievement of 
the desired change in direction of the statistical line.  
101 
 
The approach is intended to orientate thinking towards outcomes rather than outputs or 
processes, but is one that pays less attention to the issues of identifying the nature of the 
problem to be addressed and evidencing effective strategies for tackling that problem.  As a 
summative process it focuses on demonstrating a causal connection between problem x and 
solution y but with the expectation in advance that solution y is indeed the right one to 
employ. Hence the guidance document ‘Better Outcomes for Children and Young People’ 
(DfES 2006b) suggested that ‘by analysing and understanding trend data [stakeholders] can 
construct a strategy for achieving better outcomes’ (DfES 2006b: 10).  However, whilst it was 
necessary to ‘analyse the ‘story behind the baseline’ to determine what factors and 
circumstances are ‘driving each trend’ (DfES 2006b: 11), the document provided scant 
information on how to conduct this critical part of the process. What is required is the need 
to establish an explicit ‘theory of change’ to determine the relationship between need, 
intervention and outcome.  
 4.9 Establishing a relationship between need, risk and outcomes 
Doyal and Gough (1991) distinguish two common uses of the word ‘need’; firstly need 
understood to refer to drives or motivational forces; and secondly need used to refer to any 
necessary means to achieve a given end. The latter can be expressed in the relational 
equation a needs x in order to y. Here need is conceived as relative to defined outcome and 
Doyal and Gough further define the term ‘need satisfier’ as the means necessary to attain 
that outcome.  
Pinnock (2002) argues that traditional planning is couched in terms of service needs, (the x in 
Doyal and Gough’s formula), and that this has tended to support existing patterns of service 
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provision rather than lead to change. Outcome orientated planning however focuses 
attention on Doyal and Gough’s y which has implications for the process of needs 
assessment. The creation of an outcomes framework represents the prescription of the 
desired end state (y), but one that is expected to simultaneously form the starting place for 
the planning of services.  
Establishing outcomes as a starting place reflects a reorientation in traditional thinking about 
service planning which, in theory at least, begins with needs assessment as the basis for 
determining priorities. Starting with an established set of desired outcomes in a sense means 
priorities have already been determined and understandings of need are framed in terms of 
the outcome priorities prescribed. Need assessment then becomes a process of identifying 
what conditions are to be satisfied before outcomes can be achieved, and targeting becomes 
based on an assessment of who is least likely to achieve these outcomes and hence most 
likely to benefit from intervention.  
Focusing on outcomes thus raises three key questions that local policy action needs to 
address: firstly, what is the relationship between desired outcome and need, or what are the 
needs that have to be satisfied before an outcome can be achieved; secondly, what are the 
effective strategies and processes by which these needs can be satisfied, and hence lead to 
the successful achievement of desired outcomes, and thirdly, how do we identify those 
children least likely to achieve outcomes and most likely to benefit from intervention?   
Government guidance suggested that it is the process of answering this third question that 
should provide the basis for local need assessment and targeting rationale (HM Government 
2006). In so doing it drew attention to the use of statistical data to provide evidence of risk 
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factors associated with future negative outcomes. Whilst the five outcomes were to be 
achieved for all children, reducing the gap implied a need to target those most ‘at risk’ of not 
achieving them. The CYPP and the needs assessment that informed it were intended to 
cover all children and young people and hence include universal as well as targeted services. 
However, there was an explicit requirement to target resources at both geographical areas 
and groups shown to be most ‘at risk’ with the intention of reducing inequality in outcomes. 
Thus geographical targeting of services and resources was to be informed through the 
consideration of inequality of outcome between children and young people in different 
localities, whilst group- based targeting was expected to focus on outcomes for three 
nationally specified ‘at risk’ groups: children with disabilities; children with special 
educational needs; and looked after children  (HM Government 2006).  
The ‘Joint Planning and Commissioning Framework for Children, Young People and Maternity 
services’ (HM Government 2006) advised the use of a range of data sources to begin an 
analysis of risk as a basis for planning against outcome accepting that data for emerging 
trends or ‘difficult’ outcomes may not exist.  
The Guidance states that:  
Data should be collected across the age range and be capable of being broken 
down by ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, learning difficulty, 
disability, looked after status, risk of criminality, geographical location, access to 
services, etc. (HM Government 2006: 6) 
Although not made explicit the implication was that being able to break down data into 
these categories would enable its use for targeting purposes.  Information collected was to 
come primarily from existing data sources and where not available LAs are asked to rely on 
proxy measures. The data was intended to  form a baseline of information against which to 
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‘assess current and future needs and plan for improved outcomes’  and to be used for 
benchmarking purposes across other ‘peer’ LA areas or ‘statistical neighbours’ i.e. those with 
similar demography and structure. As a starting place this comparison of local outcomes for 
children against peer and national comparators would provide a baseline against which 
comparative success or failure could be measured.  
The concept of ‘need’ as the organising principal for resource allocation and service 
distribution was thus subsumed within a focus on ‘outcomes’ and ‘risk’. The focus on risk is 
underpinned by the assumption that the underlying determinants of negative outcomes can 
be both determined and acted upon making prevention and early intervention in children’s 
lives a form of insurance for the future (Freeman 1999). The theme of prevention was 
central to NL child policy throughout their three terms in office.  
The emergence of prevention focused policy coincided with NL’s commitment to EBPM and 
was underpinned by research known as the ‘risk and protective preventative paradigm’ 
(Farrington 2000).This paradigm, widely accepted as having practical application in targeting 
intervention, has been built around epidemiological approaches within public health that 
seek to uncover the population based aetiology of ill health and risk factors for disease 
prevalence. Fundamental to risk factor analysis is the possibility of predicting future life 
chances based on early life circumstances. This is described by Rutter (1990) as a ‘risk 
trajectory’ whereby clusters of risk factors compound each other over the life course 
significantly increasing the chances of negative future outcomes. 
The risk and protective preventative research paradigm has proved highly influential with 
policy makers in particular through informing strategies aimed at the prevention of youth 
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crime and social exclusion. It has also been used more narrowly to focus attention on risk 
factors identified as residing within families to inform targeted family support and parenting 
programmes (SETF 2007, 2008).  
However, the application of risk factor analysis to inform targeting and preventative 
interventions is contested on theoretical, definitional and methodological levels. Whilst risk 
and protection analysis seeks to offer predictability, the latter is clearly compromised by 
enormous complexity. There are no predictable linear paths from circumstance to negative 
outcome but a series of mutually interacting factors that differ for individuals and families. 
The relationship between causal factors and outcomes are far from clear, and predictability 
and understandings of causal pathways at the level of the individual problematic (Armstrong 
2004, 2006; France 2008).  
At a local level strategic children’s partnerships have been encouraged to undertake risk 
factor analysis to inform targeting (CYPU 2001; DCSF/DH 2010; SETF 2008). However, 
research indicates that here the degree of necessary statistical expertise is often lacking. 
Hence, Hughes and Fielding (2006) report that local Children’s Fund (CF) partnerships 
encountered a number of difficulties in trying to implement risk and protective factor 
profiling. These included conceptual confusion between partners, a lack of awareness of the 
complexities of risk factor analysis and lack of available relevant data.  The majority of CF 
partnerships used highly aggregated quantitative data to target services at relatively 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Hughes and Fielding argue this led to confusion between 
the identification of those ‘at risk’ of particular negative outcomes with generalised proxies 
for need. Particular risk factors were not easily identified at suitably disaggregated levels to 
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enable more focused targeting whilst those more broadly defined risk factors were not easily 
related to particular planned service provision or specifically identified need (Hughes and 
Fielding 2006).  
In short, establishing a relationship between need, risk and outcome in order to design and 
target programmes of intervention most likely to result in positive outcomes is a complex 
and non-linear process. The concepts of need, risk and outcome together represent a 
contested theoretical underpinning for identifying, understanding and addressing priorities 
for local policy action.  
4.10 Engaging different stakeholders  
While the use of quantitative evidence to establish need priorities was given a high profile in 
commissioning guidance, it also presented child, family and community participation as 
fundamental to delivering outcomes and better services. In so doing it brought with it the 
idea of a possible consensus, albeit state adjudicated, around identifying and prioritising 
needs and determining how these should be met.  
The active participation of children and young people in planning and evaluating services 
was presented as a core aspect of the ECM CfC agenda. This reflected a central theme of 
NL’s policy development; a renewed emphasis on mutualism and a redefinition of the 
relationship between state and public as partners or ‘co-producers’ of welfare (Barnes et al 
2007; Lister 2006).   
According to commissioning guidance qualitative information was to be gained from 
‘children, young people, families, carers, the community, and professionals from all partner 
agencies’ (HM Government 2006: 10) entailing recognition that the local policy process 
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should be influenced by a multiplicity of ‘stakeholders’ or ‘policy relevant publics’ as well as 
those in positions of resource and decision making power. Indeed the requirement to 
engage with a range of ‘bottom up’ as well as ‘top down’ perspectives extended beyond 
consultation and stress was laid on the importance of the ‘active participation’ of children, 
young people, families and carers at ‘an increasing number of decision points’ (HM 
Government 2006: 11) in the planning cycle.  
The active involvement of children, families, community groups and professionals in 
determining how need is defined, assessed and met would inevitably entail the negotiation 
of differently perceived priorities. This was recognised briefly by the guidance and 
underscores what Gough (1992) argues is the essentially political nature of the needs 
assessment process.  Whilst the framework acknowledged that ‘different groups may have 
different views’ and that these ‘can be expected and accommodated’ (HM Government 
2006: 11) Gough argues that the process of needs assessment must accept and overcome 
the tension between ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ approaches and involve processes that 
support the political engagement of communities, shifting the power balance away from 
service providers and strategic planners. The involvement of children, young people, families 
and communities alongside professionals raises the question of how power is distributed in 
the needs assessment process and the relative weight accorded to evidence collected from 
different stakeholders.  
Participation as a concept is variously defined and understood (NECF 2006). In practice it 
ranges from ‘weaker’ forms: passive participation where children/young people are 
consulted and information interpreted by professionals and managers; to stronger, more 
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active forms: participative problem solving involving partial power sharing but in the context 
of pre-determined priorities for action (Borghi and van Berkel 2007; NECF 2006).  Critics of 
participative practice question how far agendas are moved by children’s participation and 
produce evidence that despite widespread involvement of children and young people across 
the UK their views have had little impact on public decision making (Hill et al 2004; Kirby and 
Bryson 2002). The concept of participation also risks overplaying the possibilities of 
children’s meaningful participation in decision making process and evidence suggests  that it 
can become ritualistically institutionalised as purely consultative, or worse, represent 
manipulative activity in political and managerial rhetoric without concrete impact or power-
sharing (Badham 2004; Borghi and van Berkel  2007). Evidence from the national evaluation 
of children’s trusts would seem to support this suggesting there has only been ‘moderate’ 
engagement of children and young people in their development and commissioning 
function, with most areas making only ‘limited attempts at participation’ largely confined to 
consultation (UEA 2007).    
In summary, evidence-based commissioning has been presented as a tool for enhancing the 
rationality of the local planning process. However, there are a number of conceptual, 
methodological and political challenges associated with such an approach rendering it a 
complex challenge for CTs to meet.  The ECM outcomes cover a broad range of policy areas 
and involve a potentially huge diversity of providers. A holistic assessment of need would 
require consideration of the interrelatedness of different factors across a range of service 
domains. Whilst stressing the importance of engaging with users in a process of 
collaborative priority setting, government guidance gave ascendancy to quantitative 
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evidence by focusing on benchmarking and evidencing the scale of identified problems in 
order to inform targeting and measure effectiveness.     
4.11 Understanding and using evidence in practice  
The chapter has so far focused largely on the nature of evidence rather than the context and 
manner in which it is used or translated into practice. Referring back to commissioning 
guidance (HM Government 2006), despite the appeal to engage with multiple forms of 
evidence there was an implicit assumption that evidence could be used in a rational, value 
free way, underplaying the importance of the local context in which that evidence is 
gathered and applied. The guidance made tentative recognition that evidence from a range 
of stakeholders could involve negotiating between potentially conflicting perspectives with 
commissioners acting as a kind of neutral arbiter of competing interests.  However, the part 
played by values and vested interests in sorting, prioritising or rejecting evidence was 
otherwise underplayed. The fact that local level policy making takes place in the context of 
power inequalities and that knowledge is entwined with values was ignored.  
The appeal to EBPM sits well alongside NPM. Data generated from PM is intended as an aide 
to effective and rational decision-making, providing information to guide continuous 
improvement helping to achieve organisational goals more efficiently and effectively. This 
raises the question of the degree to which performance data actually drives decision making 
and hence its success as a tool of local governance that promotes accountability.  The key 
issue here is what is done with the information gathered, for achieving accountability rests 
in part on a rational and objective utilisation of data generated.   
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The presuppositions behind EBPM and the model of commissioning presented by policy 
guidance are, not only that concrete evidence exists on which to base decisions, but also 
that policy actors will use it to draw particular kinds of rational inference. This is, as Webb 
(2001) suggests, underpinned by a set of assumptions about the nature of social action; that 
decision-makers are basically rational even if that rationality is ‘bounded’. The term 
‘bounded rationality’ was coined by Simon (1976,1987) to describe rational choice that takes 
into account the dual constraints of imperfect knowledge and a limited capacity to absorb 
information and deal with complexity.  
Lindblom’s (1959) ‘science of muddling through’ presents a challenge to idea of rationally 
motivated decision making. He argues that the form of ‘scientific’ or ‘root’ ‘means-end’ 
decision making of the type suggested by the commissioning cycle is both practically and 
conceptually impossible in the context of complex policy problems.  He suggests that policy 
decision making is not theoretically driven but essentially incremental involving negotiation, 
or ‘partisan mutual adjustment’ alongside trial and error. Efforts to increase the rationality 
of the process, he argues are doomed to failure whilst ‘muddling through’ presents both a 
good description of the process and a good model for actual decision making as it avoids 
serious mistakes. Lindblom has been criticised for assuming a pluralist position and paying 
scant attention to the issue of power differentials in decision making processes (e.g. Dror 
1968), although he did revise his position in later work (Lindblom 1977). It is not the 
intention to discuss theories of power and agenda control here but to recognise only that 
whilst decision making is unlikely to progress through rational appraisal of proffered 
alternatives neither will it be the product of a negotiated consensus between equally placed 
groups.   
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How policy actors understand evidence and how they chose or are able to employ evidence 
together pose a threat to the possibility of a rationally informed policy making. As previously 
discussed, the idea of an end to ideologically driven policy making assumes a rational 
analysis/politics distinction that ignores the impact of political interests, values and ethical 
considerations on the process of decision making (Hawkesworth 1988; Morcol 2001). To 
return to Lipsky (1980, 2010), he argues that rational decision making is not only constrained 
by the capacity of policy actors to interpret and act on information but also more subtly, by 
their   information ‘biases’. This is supported by empirical research, which indicates that 
policy actors often selectively or retrospectively appropriate evidence or interpret it to 
justify pre-existing decisions thus rendering the rational analysis /politics distinction 
fallacious (Coote et al 2004; Weiss 1979, 1980).  For example, Weiss (1979, 1980) argues that 
politicians are more interested in re-election than respect for evidence and that 
governments seek to legitimise politically-driven priorities and existing policies with 
retrospective reference to research evidence.   
Coote et al (2004) identify multiple factors influencing the way national and local level policy 
actors interpret and apply evidence in practice. These include perceptions about the validity 
of claims to an ‘evidence-base’, doubts about the quality of available evidence and a paucity 
of conclusive or appropriate evidence, particularly in reference to complex policy problems. 
They also report a set of conflicting pressures that impact on the process of decision making 
including capacity and resource problems, tensions between innovation versus adherence to 
an evidence-base and pressure to act quickly in response to changing policy priorities.   
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Research also suggests tensions between the different epistemological positions implied by 
a ‘top-down’ approach based on formal evidence versus a ‘bottom-up’ approach based on 
experiential or tacit knowledge (Coote et al 2004; Freeman 2007; Mason and Barnes 2007). 
The epistemological assumptions underpinning decision making amongst public health 
practitioners are explored by Freeman (2007).  Drawing on the work of the structural 
anthropologist Levi-Strauss, he suggests they engage in ‘epistemological bricolage’ piecing 
together different forms of knowledge from multiple sources.  In Levi-Strauss’ (1966) theory 
of intellectual bricolage, the ‘bricoleur’ works to transform available conceptual tools and 
resources into novel structures, but always from a finite repertoire of sources, to deal with 
the particular problem or goal in hand. For Freeman’s public health practitioners these 
sources include the experiences and practices of peers, their own experiential knowledge as 
well as engaging in the more rational process of sifting and appraising research evidence 
according to their professional training. In so doing they operate within and across different 
frames or ways of thinking: institutionalist, constructionist and rationalist which can be 
complementary but also sit in conflict with each other. Freeman’s analysis thus moves 
beyond the more narrow view of policy agents appropriating evidence in a way that is purely 
instrumental or self-serving. Instead he reveals his practitioners as reflexive ‘situated agents’ 
(Bevir 2003), negotiating their way between different epistemological domains ‘naturally’ as 
well as instrumentally as they interpret, develop and create policy in practice.   
In summary, the commissioning cycle presents ‘evidence’ as a problem of knowledge 
utilisation but whose evidence, what counts as evidence and how that evidence is applied in 
practice is far from straightforward.  There are a complexity of factors that impinge on the 
interpretation and application of evidence in practice. These include a range of institutional 
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and resource constraints as well as the epistemological assumptions, value positions and 
strategic interests of policy actors. Together with these bring into doubt the feasibility of a 
rationally informed planning process.    
4.12 Summary  
This chapter has explored the rise of EBP as a means of securing a form of de-politicised 
decision-making based on the assumption that it is possible to secure the  policy ‘high 
ground’ in Schon’s  (1983) ‘policy swamp’.  Presented in almost identical format to the 
‘stagist’ model of the policy process, an evidence-based approach to commissioning can be 
understood as an attempt to enhance the rationality of the local policy process and lift it out 
of its political context. Outcome based accountability and evidence-based decision making 
can be understood as strategies to help clear up the problems of ambiguous policy 
objectives and ‘goal-value’ conflict, whilst the prescription of evidence-based programmes of 
delivery places limits on the discretionary powers of front-line implementing agents.  Such 
an approach however, is predicated on a set of assumptions relating to the nature of 
knowledge, the validity of different forms evidence, and the ways in which that evidence 
might be applied in practice.   
As local policy makers, commissioners work in complex decision making contexts. One of the 
goals of this thesis is to explore how they set out to meet the conceptual and 
methodological challenges presented by an evidence-based approach to planning and how 
different forms of evidence are gathered, understood and applied. In so doing it considers 
how actors’ epistemological assumptions and value positions and local contextual factors, 
impact on the use of evidence in practice.   
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The following chapter describes the methods and methodology that were employed for the 
case study research upon which this thesis is based.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction  
This thesis is primarily concerned with the implementation of a set of policy directives that 
focus on process; namely the development of an evidence-based approach to 
commissioning children’s services. The findings presented in subsequent chapters are based 
on case study data of an LA in the West Midlands.  This chapter provides a justification for 
the chosen research methods beginning with an explanation for why the research is located 
within a social constructivist perspective.  It lays out the argument for a  case study approach 
that sets out to explore the meanings that specific policy directives have for differently 
situated policy actors and how these interpretations may affect implementation in a local 
context.  The final sections detail the methods employed for data collection and analysis.  
5.2 Rationale for the research design and methodology  
Establishing an ontological and epistemological position is the foundation from which any 
research methodology progresses. Ontology is concerned with the assumptions or claims 
that we make about the nature of social entities or ‘reality’ whilst its ‘twin term’ 
epistemology refers to how we might construct or have knowledge of those entities.   
‘Objectivism’ is predicated on the ontological assumption that there is a tangible external 
reality that exists independently of our perception or knowledge of it and is the starting 
point for positivist or neo-positivist research (Grix 2004).  The epistemological assumption of 
this research paradigm is that knowledge of the world is possible and that it objectively 
reflects rather than interprets this reality (Morcol 2001).  
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In policy analysis the research methodologies most closely associated with this position 
involve the use of quantitative methods of data collection and analysis such as survey 
research and the secondary analysis of large scale data sets. In the policy implementation 
literature, positivism is the position most closely associated with the prescriptive, ‘top-down’ 
approach outlined in chapter 2, with theory principally derived from economics and the field 
of organisational studies shaping understandings of implementation (Fischer 2003; Hill and 
Hupe 2009; Yanow 1993).  
A second dimension of a positivist approach is the assumption of a separation of facts and 
values. Dryzek (1993) explains that policy analysis grounded in a positivist paradigm is 
typically underpinned by an assertion that interventions should be based on ‘causal laws of 
society’ verified by ‘neutral observation’. The ontological assumption of an independent 
objective reality means facts can be distinguished from emotional states or ‘values’.   It is 
this assumption of a fact/value dichotomy that Fischer (1998) argues has given rise to a 
‘technocratic’ form of policy analysis concerned primarily with identifying the most efficient 
means of achieving politically identified goals. In adopting this approach, he argues, 
inherently normative political and social issues are repositioned as ‘technically defined ends 
to be pursued through administrative means’ (Fischer 1998: 131).  By avoiding the goal-value 
conflicts associated with policy agenda setting, social problems are reinterpreted as issues in 
need of improved management and program design.   
Associated with this ‘value-neutral’ position is a belief in the ideal of scientifically informed 
decision making explicit in the NL evidence-based policy project and the rational ‘stagist’ 
model of planning and commissioning presented in chapters 3 and 4. The concept of 
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prevention and the allied use of social epidemiology to identify and objectify social need 
discussed in chapter 4, are similarly founded on positivist assumptions of an objectively 
observable causality and the possibility of uncovering social ‘fact’.  
5.2.1 Constructivism and interpretive research  
Over the last three decades there has been a sustained critique of mainstream policy 
analysis as over dominated by a neopositivist perspective (e.g. Dryzek 1982, 1993; Fischer 
1998, 2003; Spicker 2011; Torgerson 1986; Yanow 1993, 2000), a position supported by 
empirical studies that show a distinct leaning towards positivistic positions amongst policy 
professionals (Durning and Osuna 1994; Morcol 2001). This critique has been fuelled by a 
recognition that policy analysis has failed either to develop a predictive science of society or 
provide solutions to ‘wicked’ social and economic problems (Dryzek 2002; Fischer 1998, 
2003).  From a ‘post empiricist’ (Fischer 2003) or  ‘post-positivist’ perspective (Dryzek 2002) 
an alternative approach drawing on a social constructionist epistemology and interpretive 
methodologies is advocated as better suited to understanding the complex, 
multidimensional nature of social reality (Fischer 2003; Yanow 2000).  
Interpretive methodologies in the social sciences cover a spectrum of approaches but are 
commonly based on the constructivist epistemological assumption that we live in a ‘social 
world characterised by the possibilities of multiple interpretations’ (Yanow 2000: 5), and  
that knowledge of this world is socially constructed and culturally and historically contingent 
(Parsons 2010). This is not to deny the existence of an object world but to assert that we 
cannot know its true nature in a way that is independent of our perception of it.  
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A constructivist epistemology coupled with interpretive methodologies has became 
increasingly influential in the field of policy analysis through the work, amongst others, of 
Torgerson (1986, 1997), Fischer (1998, 2003) , Dryzek, (1982, 1993, 2002 ) and Guba and 
Lincoln (1989). Here concern is with developing understanding of the meanings that policy 
has for a range of ‘policy relevant publics’ (Yanow 2000: 8) and the effect these various 
interpretations have on policy outcomes. As chapter 2 established this represents a 
departure from ‘top down’ approaches that assume policy should, and can, have clear and 
unequivocal meaning. Instead, interpretive policy analysis makes the assumption of multiple 
interpretations and this ‘multivocality becomes the reason for, and explanation of 
implementation difficulties’ whilst the task of the analyst is to ‘uncover or anticipate these 
multiple interpretations’ (Yanow 1993: 55). The focus moves beyond attempting explanation 
of social reality to explanations of how multiple realities are constructed by social groups.    
The approach taken in this thesis incorporates a social constructivist perspective with the 
ontological assumption that social reality is produced and reproduced by social actors. This 
entails recognition that knowledge of the social world is both situated and contingent. 
Human action is understood as dependent upon the shared meanings we have developed to 
interpret and order our social worlds. These sets of interpretations, constructed ‘in a 
moment of contingency’ (Parsons 2010), from a multiplicity of possible sets, constitute a 
world of meaning that becomes deeply embedded or institutionalised (Douglas 1987). The 
notion of contingency, however, acknowledges a role for agency for, if we have constructed 
the world in one way, then we can conceivably reconstruct it or construct it in alternative 
fashion (Parsons 2010).   
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From an interpretive perspective policy analysis needs to seek understanding of the different 
ways in which a policy issue is collectively ‘framed’ or interpreted. According to Yanow 
(2000), groups of policy actors, who through processes of interaction and common 
characteristics such as professional training, or organisational role, develop sets of shared 
meanings, beliefs and values coming together as ‘communities of meaning’ whose 
‘cognitive, linguistic and cultural practices reinforce each other to the extent that shared 
sense is more common than not’ (Yanow 2000: 10). Within the policy process there will be 
multiple ‘communities of meaning’ at the level of policy design (as in policy networks and 
advocacy coalitions), and at implementation. These communities may change depending on 
the issue in question and individuals may belong to multiple communities.   Studies of the 
role of local governance structures and partnership working in policy implementation (e.g. 
Edwards et al 2006; Parr and Nixon 2009; Sullivan 2009) provide evidence of multiple 
communities of meaning both within and between organisations and service sectors as well 
as communities.   
Such studies show that policy debate and conflict remain alive at implementation. For 
Yanow the source of this conflict is where a clash of interpretive ‘policy frames’ occurs when 
different ‘communities of meaning’ focus on or value different elements of a policy issue. 
According to Fisher a policy frame refers to the way a policy issue is ‘selected, organised and 
interpreted to make sense of a complex reality’ (Fischer 2000:  145). Yanow (2000) argues 
that frames highlight and value some issues whilst excluding others and that ‘frame conflict’ 
occurs when different communities of meaning highlight and include different elements of a 
policy issue. A key focus of interpretive policy analysis is therefore to explore how policy 
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issues are framed by the different actors involved in the policy process and how these effect 
policy outcomes.   
5.3 Developing a case study research strategy  
Case study research (CSR) is concerned with understanding the complexity of events and 
processes within single or particular settings (Stake 1995), allowing the researcher to ‘retain 
the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events’ (Yin 2009: 5). Yin suggests that 
CSR is the best method to use when the investigator wants to ‘understand real-life 
phenomenon in depth’ and where this understanding ‘entails important contextual 
conditions’ that are ‘highly pertinent’ to the phenomenon of study (Yin 2009: 18). CSR is thus 
concerned with understanding holistically, seeing parts as constituents of the ‘whole’ in 
order to capture the broader contexts and frameworks within which people behave and 
experience (Peacock 1986). 
As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, the rational model of commissioning presented through 
government guidance paid lip service to the possibilities of conflict and diverse interests 
suggesting these could be reconciled through the open and transparent procedures of needs 
assessment and market contestability.  The focus on partnership assumes that collaboration 
in the pursuit of collectively agreed altruistic goals is possible. The introductory chapters to 
this thesis established the contention that policy directives often gloss over localised 
interpretations treating them as hindrances to successful implementation. I would argue 
that the processes by which commissioning strategies have developed are highly contingent 
upon local histories and cultures of service development, partnership working and 
participation. Furthermore the judgments and decisions of policy actors involved in 
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implementing evidence-based commissioning involve a reconciliation of these extrinsic 
factors with their own interests, experiences, values and understandings of the various 
policy directives that they are working on. It is through developing understanding of the 
ways in which policy is interpreted and developed locally that lessons for the broader 
context can be learnt. The use of case study presents an ideal methodology for this form of 
in-depth exploration.   
Research design should be driven by the research questions it attempts to answer as 
Flyvbjerg (2006) suggests: ‘Good social science is problem driven not methodology driven in 
the sense that it employs those methods that for a given problematic best help answer the 
research questions at hand’ (Flyvbjerg 2006: 242).  
The research questions I am seeking to answer are concerned with two complex themes.  
Firstly I am concerned with understanding the political and cultural context in which 
commissioning is evolved and decision making takes place and the tensions that might 
pertain between the exercise of rational altruism and the multiple intervening factors upon 
which those decisions are contingent. Secondly I want to understand the way strategic 
decision makers and service providers ‘come to know what they know’; the different ways in 
which evidence is perceived, gathered, understood and used to inform decision making. 
These questions, detailed in the introduction and at the end of chapters 3 and 4, are 
principally explanatory, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions rather than predictive or concerned with 
frequency. They are therefore best suited to an interpretive, case study methodology.  
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5.3.1 Building theory from CSR  
Qualitative research methodologies are often purported to be inductive, meaning that they 
are theory generating rather than hypothesis testing (Strauss and Corbin 1990).  However 
more positivist exponents of CSR stress the importance of theory development before 
commencing fieldwork.  Hence Yin (2009) argues this is important in the design phase and 
distinguishes CSR from more ethnographic methodologies that deliberately avoid specifying 
theoretical positions and advocate a ‘grounded theory’ approach. He suggests there is a 
need to develop a theoretical approach but that this does not need to be ‘grand theory’, 
more a ‘hypothetical story’ about why events occur (Sutton and Staw 1995). In similar vein 
Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that case studies can be used for testing and generalising theory in 
the ‘soft sense’ by which he refers to the testing of propositions and hypotheses. He further 
argues that CSR is ideal for testing through ‘falsification’ or through disproving what is held 
to be generally true.  
Yin (2009) argues that CSR is concerned with analytical generalisability rather than statistical 
generalisability by which he means that it aims to expand and generalise theories that have 
been tentatively identified at the design stage.  According to this logic previously developed 
theory can then be used as a template with which to compare empirical findings.  Silverman 
(2005) concurs with the idea that pre-specified theories can be ‘tested’ in qualitative 
research helping to establish analytic generalization and hence ‘build’ theory.   
It is this rather than a ‘grounded theory’ approach that was taken in this study. Hence from 
the initial stages of identifying the research questions and engaging in the academic and 
policy literature relevant to the subject, I actively identified theoretical themes for 
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exploration in fieldwork. These themes have been highlighted in the summary sections of 
the previous three chapters.   
5.3.2 Reliability, generalisability and sampling in CSR 
The contention that the CSR is not suited to hypothesis or theory testing is related to the 
issue of generalisability.  Criticisms of CSR classically focus on concerns related to its 
‘external validity’ suggesting that it is impossible to offer generalisability on the basis of a 
single or small number of cases (e.g. Campbell and Stanley 1966). These criticisms are rooted 
in a positivist epistemological position which advocates a hypothetico-deductive model of 
social inquiry, typically relying on statistical sampling to test theory and generalise findings 
across populations.  
These contentions are countered by interpretive exponents of the case study as 
representing a fundamental misunderstanding of the intent of CSR. Hence Stake (1995: 4) 
asserts that it is the uniqueness and complexity of the single case that we are interested in 
and that ‘we do not study a case primarily to understand other cases’ Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) suggest that it is contingent upon the reader’s analysis and understandings of the 
findings that determines their applicability in other settings.   They argue that it is the rich 
and detailed accounts or ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) given of local context that 
provides the material by which others may decide on the transferability of findings.  Fischer 
(1998) argues that the idea that qualitative research should be designed so as to allow its 
results to be empirically testable is to misunderstand its very nature. Qualitative approaches, 
including the single case, rest on a different epistemological understanding of social reality 
and its construction. Fischer (1998: 137) suggests that applying the criteria by which 
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quantitative research is judged represents an attempt to ‘neo-positivise’ qualitative research 
that only serves to ‘reproduce the problems it sets out to resolve’.  
In  developing an alternative approach to the social sciences based on the Aristotelian 
conception of ‘phronesis’, Flyvbjerg (2001, 2006) argues that it is only by developing context-
dependent experience of cases that human learning is able to progress from ‘beginner’ to 
‘expert’. In rejecting the possibility of a predictive social science he suggests that instead it 
can only offer concrete and context -dependent knowledge and that this is more valuable 
than a search for universals. This context-dependent knowledge, moving the learner from 
beginner to expert, is what lies at the heart of CSR.   
Flyvbjerg (2006) suggests that formal generalisation is overrated as the main way of 
progressing scientific knowledge and that this is only one way of accumulating knowledge.  
He suggests that CSR can aim towards pure description without attempting to generalise and 
can still add to the sum of knowledge in a given field. An insistence on formal generalisation, 
he suggests ‘represents a limitation in the field of human inquiry’ (Flyvbjerg 2006: 226).   
Yin suggests that there are five situations in which single case studies would be appropriate. 
These are where the case study:  represents a ‘critical case’ in testing a well-formulated 
theory; is an extreme or ‘unique’ case; is ‘revelatory’ in that researchers have not previously 
been able to explore such a case; is longitudinal or where the case study is used as a pilot. By 
way of contrast Stake (1995) suggests that it is contextual uniqueness of the single case that 
is of primary interest. As representation is difficult to defend with what will be an inevitably 
small number of cases he suggests choosing one that is best suited to answering the 
research questions, what Bryman (2004) terms an ‘exemplifying case’. Furthermore focusing 
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on one particular case does not mean studying single phenomenon as the case study 
generates ‘a multitude of qualitative-interpretive, within-case “observations” reflecting 
patterns of interaction, organisational practices, social relations, routines, actions and so on’ 
(Yanow et al 2009: 4).  
5.4 The case study  
The case study identified was a unitary, metropolitan LA in the West Midlands re-named 
‘Downton’ so as to protect confidentiality.  Downton was chosen for a number of reasons, 
including pragmatic ones related to geographical proximity and access but, more 
importantly, methodological.  
CSR is concerned with depth and nuance rather than statistical inferences and 
generalisation. As such the selection of case study sites does not require a traditional 
representational sampling approach.  The logic underlying the selection of Downton follows 
what Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 370) describe as ‘theoretical’ or ‘purposive sampling’ 
whereby the case is selected on the basis that ‘the processes being studied are most likely to 
occur’.  Hence Downton was chosen, not because it represents an example of Yin’s ‘critical’, 
‘unique’ or ‘revelatory’ cases, but because it presented a suitable and meaningful empirical 
context in which the research questions might be answered.   
Evidence shows that CTs have been slow to develop commissioning strategies and integrated 
commissioning activity (Audit Commission 2008). In choosing a suitable case study site I was 
concerned to identify an area in which some degree of integrated commissioning activity 
was underway. To explore what local options might exist I made contact with the Care 
Services Improvement Partnership (CSIP) Lead who had responsibility for supporting LAs and 
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PCTs with developing children’s services commissioning in the West Midlands. He reported 
that only two LAs within the region had progressed to the stage of commissioning services, 
one of these being Downton. As this was geographically local it presented as both accessible 
and methodologically appropriate for exploring the research questions. In addition it had a 
history of and reputation for both ‘good’ partnership working and participation and had 
been a CT pathfinder.  
5.5 Sampling and accessing the research participants  
The primary focus of this study is the interpretation and implementation of policy by 
strategic decision makers and planners, the policy in question being the development of 
joint outcome-based commissioning through CT partnership arrangements. It was therefore 
necessary to involve members of their Children and Young people’s Trust Board (CYPTB) and 
commissioners from the joint commissioning team and to ensure that these participants 
were representative of the different service sectors that together deliver children’s services. 
It was also important to explore the experiences of commissioned service providers and to 
develop understanding of their role in informing strategic decision making.  
The case study can thus be understood as involving more than one unit of analysis. Whilst 
the case study refers to one LA as the holistic unit of analysis it includes several sub-units; 
namely the CYPTB, the commissioning directorate with their different domains of 
responsibility and the various commissioned services. In this sense it represents what Yin 
(2009: 50) terms an ‘embedded case study design’. Yin suggests that one of the potential 
problems of an embedded design is that the researcher becomes focused on the sub-units at 
the expense of the larger unit of analysis. The key to avoiding this is to produce an 
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operational definition of the case.  Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest building outwards 
from an initial focus and identifying what the case is not, as well as what it is. In terms of 
identifying research participants this involved working to include key people  involved in 
making strategic and operational decisions about the profile of commissioned services and 
discounting inclusion of service planners and providers  not involved in critical aspects of the 
commissioning process.  
Initial informal contact with the case study site was made through a former colleague now 
working as a Senior Commissioning Manager within the Directorate of Partnership and Joint 
Commissioning (DPJC) in Downton. This person became a key informant facilitating more 
formal access to the wider directorate and partners within the CT.   
Formal contact was then made with Director of Joint Commissioning (DJC) who, following a 
telephone conversation was sent an outline of the proposed research activity. This 
document gave details of the research aims, its links to government policy and an indication 
of its relevance and intended outputs. After consulting the DCS the DJC gave formal written 
agreement for Downton’s involvement in the study.  The DJC then forwarded a letter to an 
initial set of potential participants.  These included members of the CYPTB and the joint 
commissioning team. Those initially approached were relatively senior officers with a clear 
power of veto over involvement. The letter invited them to take part in an in-depth 
interview and covered details pertaining to the aims of the research, broad thematic areas 
to be covered during interview and issues of confidentiality and anonymity. Five members of 
the Board then contacted me directly by phone or e-mail and arranged an interview time. A 
further four expressed a willingness to be involved back through the DJC and were contacted 
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by phone. It should be noted that in no way were participants made to feel obliged or 
coerced into being involved in the research. The DJC suggested that service providers should 
be indentified through commissioners. These were approached once in the field when I had 
built a more rounded picture of service development in Downton.  
In identifying interviewees for inclusion I was concerned not with obtaining a ‘census’ view 
of commissioning across the CT partnership but with achieving what  Mason (2002: 124) 
terms a form of ‘strategic sampling’. Here the aim is to produce, through sampling, ‘a 
relevant range of contexts or phenomena’ enabling ‘strategic comparisons’ that support the 
testing and development of hypotheses and propositions. Hence just as Downton was 
selected as a case study through a process of purposive sampling so interviewees were 
initially identified on the basis of their relevance to the research questions and the 
theoretical and analytical framework employed.  
I aimed to identify individuals that were involved in different aspects of the commissioning 
process; from needs assessment through to procurement, both as providers of 
commissioned services and as members of strategic planning bodies. It was also important 
to ensure participants came from a range of different professional and sector backgrounds 
providing potentially contradictory accounts and experiences of partnership, service delivery 
and the development of commissioning. I was also interested in narrative accounts of the 
historical development of both the CT and commissioning within Downton and hence sought 
to identify individuals with a long experience of these.   
In the design stages of fieldwork I debated whether or not it would be appropriate to include 
children and young people as research participants. The ECM policy agenda and 
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commissioning guidance documents consistently stress the need to involve children in local 
level decision making as described in chapter 4. However the main focus of enquiry in this 
study is policy implementation at the strategic planning level and I was therefore more 
concerned to elicit the beliefs, attitudes and experiences of strategic decision makers in 
relation to participation than those of the young people themselves.  
5.5.1 Participant profile  
A total of 23 people agreed to participate in the study. Eleven members of the CYPTB were 
approached, of whom nine accepted and two declined to be interviewed. One of these was 
the newly elected member with responsibility for children and young people. He had only 
just joined the CYPTB as the new Chair and felt he had no relevant contribution to make. The 
second of these was the Director of Children’s Social Care who did not wish to participate as 
he had recently been interviewed as part of the review of commissioning arrangements. He 
subsequently left the LA during fieldwork. The profile of research participants is represented 
in table 1 below.   
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Table 1 Research participants 
 STAKEHOLDER TYPE 
SECTOR Service Provider 
Strategic managers/ 
CYPTB Member 
Commissioner 
Local Authority 
(LA)  
 Director of 
Children’s Services 
(DCS)   
Senior Commissioning 
Manager: area-based 
grants   
 Head of Service:  
Education 
Senior Commissioning 
Manager: 
procurement 
 Head of Extended 
Schools  
Senior Commissioning 
Manager: Sure Start 
  Participation Officer 
Health Sector 
(PCT and NHS Trust)  
Head of children’s 
community health 
services (PCT)  
Director of Women 
and Children’s  
services 
Senior Commissioning 
Manager: teenage 
pregnancy/young 
people  
Consultant 
paediatrician (NHS 
Trust) 
Director of Public 
Health (DPH)  
Senior Commissioning 
Manager: children 
NHS   
 Director of Joint 
Commissioning 
Director of  Joint 
Commissioning  
 Third Sector  
(TS) 
Senior Manager 
Third Sector 
Organisation  
Independent Chair   
Senior Manager 
Third Sector 
Organisation  
Chief Executive Third 
Sector Organisation  
 
Senior Manager 
Third Sector 
Organisation  
Chief Executive Third 
Sector Organisation  
 
Chief Executive 
Third Sector 
Organisation  
Chair of Board for 
Third Sector 
Organisation  
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Members of the Board were drawn from the LA, PCT, local NHS Trust and the TS. Of the 
three TS representatives two were represented on the Voluntary and Community Sector 
Executive Group.  The five Senior Commissioning Managers were variously employed 
through either the PCT or LA and each had a different commissioning and planning portfolio. 
These were as follows: area-based grants; teenage pregnancy and young people’s health; 
NHS child health services; Sure Start Children’s Centres; and procurement and preventative 
services funded through the former Children’s Fund.    
Nine providers of children’s services commissioned through the DPJC were interviewed. 
Senior managers were approached as they were most closely involved in the commissioning 
process. They included seven senior managers from the TS (three of whom also sat on the 
CYPTB), one from the PCT and one from the NHS Trust.  Attention is frequently drawn to the 
diversity of scope, structure and scale of the different organisations situated between state 
and market that under NL became known as the ‘third sector’ (Kendall 2009).  The range of 
organisations involved in this case study reflected some of this diversity. Of the five TS 
organisations represented, three were delivering a range of services including: Sure Start 
Children’s Centres; tier two Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services; family support; 
child care and support to teenage parents. The fourth was providing sexual health services 
including:  contraception; pregnancy testing and counselling; screening and educational 
outreach work. The final service had been de-commissioned but had been delivering 
targeted youth support.  
I also approached a TS organisation commissioned to deliver services to young carers, 
however the manager of this service was on long-term sick leave and I was unable to recruit 
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her to the study. There were a number of smaller providers commissioned to deliver 
preventative children’s services who could have been approached. However these had been 
commissioned under the Children’s Fund (CF) and would have experienced commissioning in 
a very different way, according to other priorities and under CF governance arrangements. It 
was therefore decided not to include these in the study.  
5.6 Data collection  
5.6.1 Establishing research reliability and validity    
Reliability and validity are traditionally concerns of the positivist research tradition. Within 
this tradition validity refers to the degree of confidence in the ‘truth’ of an empirical finding, 
whilst ‘reliability’ refers to a concern with consistency and predictability. Establishing 
reliability depends on replication with the assumption being that similar results will be 
obtained if the same research approach is taken with comparable subjects under 
comparable conditions (Fischer 2003).  
The applicability of the concepts of reliability and validity to assessing the credibility of 
qualitative research has, not surprisingly, been subject to considerable debate. The apparent 
need to defend the rigour of qualitative methods has led some to adopt the yardsticks by 
which quantitative research is traditionally assessed. Hence Yin (2009) sticks closely to the 
criteria by which quantitative research methodologies are evaluated and suggests that the 
tests of reliability and construct, internal and external validity are equally applicable to 
judgements of CSR.  
Guba and Lincoln (1994) suggest alternative criteria which they argue are more pertinent to 
qualitative research.  They identify four criteria which parallel those more traditionally 
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associated with quantitative research: dependability; confirmability; credibility and 
transferability.  Questions of transferability (external validity or generalisability) and 
dependability (reliability) have already been discussed in section 5.4 above.  
One commonly adopted ‘solution’ to the issue of establishing ‘confirmability’, and internal 
validity or credibility in qualitative research is data and method ‘triangulation’. Triangulation 
typically refers to the use of multiple sources of evidence such as interview, documentation 
and observation in order to identify ‘converging lines of enquiry’ and hence provide stronger 
substantiation of findings (Yin 2009: 115). The idea is that multiple data sources are analysed 
together to provide several measures of the same phenomenon. The assumption underlying 
this approach is that there is a single or ‘better’ version of the ‘truth’ whose likelihood of 
being uncovered is correlated with the number of sources used.  This assumption sits 
uneasily within an interpretive approach that admits to a plurality of world views and forms 
of explanation and is concerned with developing understandings of these alternative 
perspectives.  
A more pragmatic perspective is offered by Silverman (2005) who, keen to argue for rigour in 
qualitative research methods, embraces a broader view of triangulation. For him the 
strength of using different forms of data is that they can be compared in order to make 
better sense of each other. Here the intention is not to confirm a single hypothesis but to 
focus on the situated aspects of different accounts that draw attention to differences as well 
as similarities. Of themselves multiple accounts provide testimony of differing versions of 
reality and conflicting world views and it is the tensions and contradictions in different 
accounts as well as the points of synthesis that are of interest.   Rather than attempting to 
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establish the ‘truth’ of empirical findings, Fischer (2003: 154) suggests that  in a world of 
multiple realities, it is more relevant to  consider research subjects as a reference point in 
establishing  ‘creditability’  through establishing ‘compatibility of the constructed realities 
that exist in the minds of the inquiry’s respondents with those that are attributed to them’.  
In this study data collection was from two key sources namely in-depth interviews and 
documentary evidence. The subsequent sections discuss and detail the processes by which 
these were organised and carried out.  
5.6.2 Qualitative in-depth Interviews  
Qualitative in-depth interviewing is typically characterised as flexible, responsive and 
informal, enabling the interviewee to produce rich, detailed responses or ‘thick description’ 
(e.g. Mason 2002). Unlike structured interviews they are designed to explore the distinctive 
features of specific contextualised events focusing in on the experiences, understandings 
and beliefs of individuals (Vromen 2010).  
There is a considerable literature providing detailed accounts of how to conduct in-depth 
interviews, some of which advise  ‘rapport-building’ and remaining ‘neutral’ in order not to 
‘lead’ the interviewee and thereby produce ‘distorted’ accounts of the interviewees 
perspective (e.g. Ackroyd and Hughes 1992).  Rapley (2004) argues that this reflects an 
analytic position that views interview data as ‘resource’ whereby data collected is assumed 
to reflect the interviewees lived reality outside the interview. An alternative perspective 
offered by a constructivist perspective is to view the interview as collaboratively and locally 
produced:  ‘the joint production of accounts or versions of experiences, knowledges, 
opinion, truth etc’ (Rapley 2004 authors own emphasis).  Understanding the interview as an 
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essentially social and interactive encounter renders interviewer neutrality impossible, for at 
the very minimum the latter are engaged in structuring and guiding the interview (Gulbrium 
and Holstein 2002). From a constructivist perspective the interview does not provide a direct 
point of reference to the interviewees independent lived experience but the interviewer and 
interviewee are together understood as ‘co-constructors’ of the interview content (Gulbrium 
and Holstein 2002).  
What this means in methodological terms is a relaxing of the traditional directive to the 
interviewer to be mindful of ‘leading’ the interviewee or expressing one’s own experiences 
or thoughts. Instead the researcher should be wary of seeking to objectify the participant 
and aim to use ‘their thoughts, feelings and intuitions as part of the research process’ 
(Blaikie 1993: 210). This may involve a form of reciprocal disclosure not as a matter of 
orthodoxy but when it makes sense to do so in reference to the specific interactional context 
(Reinharz and Chase 2002).   
It is Rapley’s (2004: 25) description of what he terms ‘interviewing as mundane interaction’ 
that most closely fits with the format of interviewing developed during this research. 
Described in straightforward and commonsensical terms, Rapley suggests this involves the 
initial introduction of a topic followed by active listening, producing follow up questions and 
asking participants to unpack key ideas and terms.  
The guiding format of my in-depth interviews was based around key themes identified in my 
initial literature and policy review. In a preliminary interview with my ‘key informant’ these 
were explored with a view to establishing their relevance and appropriateness for future 
interviews. This interview was also used as a way of gaining a preliminary insight into the 
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evolution, organisation and structure of the CYPTB, its various sub-groups and the 
commissioning directorate. This provided detailed contextual background to the case study 
and ensured I was familiar with the names of various people, organisational structures, 
procedures and processes that can appear overwhelmingly complex to a person coming 
from the ‘outside’.   
Subsequent interview guides (see appendices 2-3) were designed to accommodate a range 
of differently placed interviewees with the intention of using them flexibly in a manner 
suited to each individual’s specific professional role and experience.  In practice the original 
interview schedules served only as a broad indicative framework of issues to be explored.  
Understood as a collaborative and interactive process, the interviews were guided both by 
the experiences and perceptions of interviewees as well as my own framework. The 
outcome of this style of interviewing meant at times focusing down on particular issues or 
themes whilst at others going off on tangents to my original schedule.   
In discussions that explored experiences of the commissioning process and in more 
conceptual reflection over how they understood issues such as ‘evidence’, ‘need’ or 
‘effective practice’, I evolved a style of ‘vignette’ questioning aimed at getting them to 
explore real life experiences so as to avoid getting text book answers to questions (Mason 
2002, Wilks 2004).  ‘Vignette’ questions proved particularly useful in generating reflective 
thinking and helped ground beliefs and accounts of behaviour in particular lived contexts.    
All interviews were recorded and transcribed and interviewees were offered the opportunity 
to receive a copy of the transcription to check for accuracy or edit if they felt this was 
necessary. This corresponds to a form of insider audit or ‘respondent validation’ (Hepburn 
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and Potter 2004) as a technique for promoting credibility. In practice whilst some 
participants took the opportunity to view the transcribed material none offered any 
feedback or suggestions for changes.  
5.7 Ethical considerations  
The research was given formal ethical approval through the University of Birmingham’s 
Research Ethics Committee. Three ethical issues were encountered when conducting this 
research: a potential imbalance of power, presenting as a methodological as well as ethical 
issue; confidentiality; and informed consent.  
5.7.1 Imbalance of power  
There is often an assumption that the interviewer sits in a position of power over the 
interviewee and that the former need pay methodological and ethical attention to 
redressing this imbalance. Given the seniority of the research participants’ status within 
their organisations the danger in this study was rather that the relationship of power was 
reversed. This situation presented a potential set of problems, including, at the offset, one of 
access which had to be negotiated through a fairly lengthy process.  Other problematic 
issues might have involved the interviewee trying to set the agenda or establish stringent 
boundaries to what was included and excluded from the interview.  In practice this proved 
not to be the case and several interviewees expressed their thanks at the end of the 
interview variously describing the experience as ‘cathartic’, ‘very interesting’, or as an 
opportunity to reflect on experiences and ideas in a way that was seldom offered.  
There is also a fear often expressed in ‘how to’ guides to qualitative interviewing, that 
participants and in particular ‘elite’ groups might talk in their professional capacity or as 
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representatives of their particular organisations (e.g. Mason 2002). However as Rapley 
(2004: 30) observes, it is not always as individuals that interviewees express themselves but 
also as ‘representatives of broader collectives’ and hence should be acknowledged as such.  
It was my experience in interviewing for this study that interviewees often presented 
alternative accounts of their experiences and thoughts on particular issues, speaking both as 
representatives of their organisation or profession as well as more reflective private 
individuals. Their narratives were thus treated not solely as expressive of individual 
experience but also of a broader collective ‘voice’.  
5.7.2 Confidentiality and anonymity  
Protection of individual anonymity was assured through removal of names, ascription of 
pseudonyms and through allocating a positional category to each respondent rather than 
identifying them through their professional title. The geographical location was similarly 
anonymised through use of a pseudonym and the decision was taken to leave out 
demographic data that would make it easy to identify the LA area. The names of documents 
have also been changed. Interviews were recorded, anonymised and stored on a password 
protected PC for the duration of the research project.  Written documentation was kept 
securely locked and only I had access to the data.  
Whilst having a previous history of working within Downton had advantages as far as access 
was concerned it also entailed potential disadvantages in relation to perceptions of 
confidentially. I had anticipated that previous acquaintance with three interviewees might 
be a problem. In practice two with whom I had had minimal past professional contact did 
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not remember me and were happy to be interviewed. The third however declined to 
participate in formal interview.  
Despite written and verbal assurances of anonymity and confidentiality these were concerns 
raised by some participants in the course of fieldwork, primarily during interview but also 
subsequently through e-mail contact. Concerns were clearly related to the potentially 
politically sensitive nature of some of the topics discussed. On a couple of occasions 
interviewees asked for the voice recorder to be turned off whilst discussing a particular 
issue.  To further allay fears interviewees were invited to review transcripts of their 
interviews and edit out parts over which they were concerned. As discussed above whilst 
respondents did take up the opportunity of reviewing their interview they did not edit 
material. One respondent also asked that they be consulted over direct quotes in published 
outputs.  
5.7.2 Informed consent  
As described above interviewees were initially invited to be part of the research by the 
Director of Commissioning in Downton and asked to make subsequent contact with myself 
by either e-mail or phone. Following this contact willing participants were sent a briefing 
sheet detailing the research objectives, methodology and issues related to confidentiality, 
anonymity, use of information and the right to decline to answer particular questions (please 
see appendix two). Before the start of interview following a verbal explanation of the above 
each participant was asked to sign a consent form indicating that they gave consent to 
participate on the conditions detailed. In addition interviewees were made aware in the 
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briefing sheet and verbally that they are free to withdraw at any point from the research 
process and have their interview data disregarded.  
5.8 Documentary data   
The documentary evidence gathered included a number of reports and strategic planning 
documents. All needs analyses relevant to children and young people and conducted in the 
previous two years were included.  So too were all current joint strategic plans that made 
reference to children’s services and the operational plans of the DPJC.  Two pertinent 
independent reviews were also examined. The documentary evidence is detailed in table 2.  
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 Table 2 Documentary evidence  
DOCUMENT TYPE 
Strategic Plans Operational Plans Needs Analyses 
Independent 
Evaluations 
Local Area Agreement 
Implementation Plan 
2008- 2011 
 
Interagency 
Commissioning 
Framework 2005 
 
Joint Strategic Needs 
Assessment (2008-9) 
 
Review of the joint 
commissioning 
arrangements for 
children and young 
people (2008) 
Joint Commissioning 
Strategy 2007-2010 
DPJC Business Plan 
2009-2012  
Children and Young 
People’s Needs 
Analysis  
Review of children and 
young people’s 
participation  (2009) 
Downton Children and 
Young People’s Plan 
2007-2010  
 Report on teenage 
conception 
 
 
Downton Children and 
Young People’s Plan 
2009-2012  
 Report on Children’s 
Services Mapping  
 
Downton Children and 
Young People’s Plan – 
current updated 
version 
 Epidemiological Needs 
Analysis to inform 
Targeted Youth 
Support  
 
  Young Carers Needs 
Assessment   
 
142 
 
5.9 The process of data analysis  
This section sets out the set of processes by which the data collected during fieldwork was 
analysed. The first part focuses largely on the thematic analysis of the interview data which 
in broad terms refers to ‘a method of identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) 
within data’ (Braun and Clarke 2006: 79). The more holistic or non-cross-sectional analysis of 
the case study data is also discussed. The second part discusses the approach taken in the 
analysing the documents gathered during fieldwork.   
5.9.1 Interview data  
Ritchie et al (2003) identify two broad, overlapping stages in the process of qualitative data 
analysis:   data management involving the ordering and categorisation of data; and sense 
making through the production of descriptive or explanatory accounts.  In my analysis these 
stages were gone through at different orders of complexity.  At a lower order of complexity 
was a process of familiarisation with the data in reference to the original research questions. 
This involved transcribing each interview in full followed by ‘immersion’ in the data through 
subsequent reading and re-reading of the transcripts and production of interview summaries 
structured under thematic headings.  
At a second order of complexity came the subsequent task of thematic coding of transcripts. 
The key purpose of thematic coding is to provide a consistent and analytically coherent way 
of organising and making sense of qualitative data (Boyatzis 1998). Interview transcripts 
were thematically coded using ‘NVivo’ software employing a set of coding categories that 
had been devised and revised prior to, during and after fieldwork. This was both an inductive 
and deductive process with codes generated in part from the research questions and key 
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concepts identified within the theoretical framework and in part from prominent repeated 
themes apparent in interview transcripts. The initial coding list produced was considered 
flexible and modified as analysis progressed. Transcripts were coded and re-coded in the 
light of subsequent revisions.  
The decision to use NVivo was based on two advantages I believe it offers over manual data 
coding. Firstly it presents a more efficient and systematic way of structuring the process of 
thematic analysis and secondly it reduces the temptation to hone in on selected quotations 
or pieces of data to build pre-emptive theoretical assumptions without searching for counter 
evidence or fully considering other data (Kelle 2005; Seale 2005). Interview transcripts were 
coded under three key ‘organising themes’ represented by ‘tree nodes’ in NVivo. These 
were: ‘commissioning’, ‘structures and governance’ and ‘evidence and learning’. Under each 
organising theme were a number of lower order themes (or nodes) derived from the 
literature review and moderated recursively.  
The strategy so far described  identifies data analysis as a process that starts prior to 
interview as it is in preliminary process of researching around  topic that initial theoretical 
themes for inclusion are tentatively  identified.  This represents a different position to that 
offered by proponents of a purely inductive or ‘grounded theory’ approach whereby 
analytical themes are understood as residing in the data awaiting discovery (Strauss and 
Corbin 1990). The idea is that interpretation of data proceeds via a process in which 
‘concepts are identified and their properties and dimensions are discovered in the data’ 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990: 101).  My position accords more closely with Silverman’s (2005: 
162), who describes the process of transcript analysis as a ‘theoretically saturated activity’. 
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Rather than acting in a purely inductive manner the researcher is accorded a more active 
shaping role, working iteratively with transcript data   to see how the ‘puzzle’ being 
examined ‘arises and is resolved’ (Mason 2002).   
As this is a case study, I was concerned not only with cross sectional analysis of the data, but 
also with developing contextual understandings of specific cases or parts of the data set. In 
other words I was concerned with the holistic as well as what was common or consistent 
across the data set (Mason 2002). Issues such as partnership working within the CT Board or 
relationships between providers and commissioners did not occur consistently across the 
data set, being issues applicable only to certain respondents. These, as with narrative 
accounts of commissioning development, were considered as ‘holistic sequences’ and 
multiple individual accounts of the process were examined as ‘wholes’ rather than compared 
cross-sectionally.  Differing accounts of these processes were compared with each other as 
wholes in order to identify conflicting or converging situated interpretations.  
5.9.2 Documentary data analysis 
There is a relative paucity of literature that speaks to how documents can be used in 
research. The first point to note is that documents should not be considered as substitutes 
for other sources of data but as important in their own right (Silverman 2005). In reference 
to the organisational documents included in this study it is clear that they do not offer 
transparent representations of organisational intent, structures, or decision-making 
processes but instead ‘construct particular kinds of representations with their own 
conventions’ (Atkinson and Coffey 2004:58). From a social constructivist perspective they 
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can be understood as presenting examples of the way an organisation produces or 
constructs ‘social facts’ (Green and Thorogood 2004).  
The documents incorporated into this study have been collectively produced in that they 
have been conceived, written and commented on both by a series of individuals and groups 
during formal and informal meetings. They are understood, as Freeman suggests (2006), as 
points of reference that shape and frame particular ways of conceptualising problems and 
around which people construct accounts of and rationales for the work they are engaged in. 
Analysed as ‘texts’ they are used to address questions of what, at the organisational level, is 
considered important, and how collectively they construct particular interpretations of 
policy issues and social problems. As text these documents were analysed thematically in 
similar fashion to the interview data. However as some documents comprised large sections 
of text speaking to single or a relatively small number of themes these were coded manually 
rather than using NVivo.  
Core to Prior’s (2004) position on the use of documents in social research  is that  it is not 
only the text or content of a written document that provides a point of analysis but  also the 
processes through which those documents are produced and circulated, and the functions 
they perform in organisational life. In reference to how the documents chosen for analysis 
were put together this involved exploration of how and by whom they had been produced. 
Thus, for example the strategic plans, as public documents, are considered as products of 
particular legal requirements, shaped by more formal systems of accountability and state 
bureaucracy (Scott 1990). Their function following production is viewed as similarly 
important, involving examination of such issues as how they are circulated, who reads them, 
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and how they frame problems, specify solutions or are used strategically to justify certain 
courses of action.   
The majority of the documents collected were concerned in some way with analysing need 
as the proclaimed starting point for strategic priority setting and planning. Some of these 
documents represent the compilation of previously collected statistical and administrative 
data, whilst others involve the primary collection of more qualitative data. In reference to 
the former Prior (2004: 347) highlights the importance of considering the administrative and 
bureaucratic processes by which the ‘generative documents’  that are used as source 
material for the production of epidemiologically informed   documents are produced.  These 
‘secondary’ documents draw on numbers of incidences of previously defined and recorded 
occurrences (teenage pregnancy, obesity etc) and are thus dependent on a set of pre-given 
terms. These terms define the conceptual structure of ‘secondary documents’ and reflect 
fundamental assumptions about the nature of problems and their solutions.  
Thus, it is as ‘functioning agents in their own right’ as well as ‘text’ (Prior 2004: 346) that the 
documents in this study have been used as case study material. In other words, they are 
considered important in terms of how they have been put together and employed, as much 
as what they ‘say’.  
5.9.3 Sense making and descriptive analysis  
The next stage of analysis was to produce descriptive accounts of the interview and 
documentary data based around the two broad analytical themes of evidence and the policy 
implementation context.   Coding reports generated using NVivo were manually put 
together into a series of grids or frames (Ritchie et al 2003) thematically organised under 
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each of the research questions. These were cross-referenced with themes from the 
documentary analysis. These grids were then used to explore relationships between 
responses, points of difference and similarity and to develop some tentative typologies of 
participants’ experiences of and understandings of commissioning and of the ways in which 
they understood and used evidence in decision making. These were then bought together 
with the contextual or ‘within case’ case study material to construct more systematic 
accounts of the data and help further the development of a more theoretically informed 
analysis.   
5.10 Summary  
This chapter has provided a theoretical and methodological rationale for the interpretive 
case study approach employed in this research. It has also given a reflective account of how 
the empirical and analytical stages of the research were conducted and considered the 
ethical issues that were part of this process.  
The following section of the thesis provides an analysis of the case study. It is divided into 
three chapters: the first two speak to the political and organisational context in which 
commissioning is evolved; and the third to the interpretation and use of evidence by 
strategic decision makers and service providers.  
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CHAPTER SIX: IMPLEMENTING JOINT COMMISSIONING  
 
6.1 Introduction  
The focus of this chapter is on the first analytical theme and explores the following research 
question:  what are the key organizational and policy factors influencing the local 
interpretation and development of joint commissioning?  
 In particular it addresses the sub-questions:  
 What are the organisational and institutional barriers and facilitators to 
implementing joint commissioning?   
 How do past histories of service provision and partnership working impact on the 
implementation of joint commissioning arrangements?   
Chapter 3 provided detail of the policy context for developing joint commissioning through 
CTs describing how these were initially established as pathfinders before becoming statutory 
in 2009 (DCSF 2009). In Downton commissioning was evolved through their pathfinder CT 
and this chapter explores the events and circumstances that shaped its development.  
During fieldwork Commissioning Managers and interviewees who sat on the CYPTB gave 
accounts of a number of critical factors that they felt provided the foundational context for 
understanding contemporaneous commissioning activity. Interviewees were often more 
eager to discuss the past than they were the present, stressing the importance of recent 
historical context in explaining and understanding current successes and failures. Together 
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they described a history of organisational change and uncertainty combined with 
problematic experiences of partnership working in the context of developing children’s trust 
arrangements. Changes in leadership and constraints imposed by poor performance and 
past service failures were described as militating against the development of trust between 
partners as a foundation for joint commissioning. While policy presented joint 
commissioning through CTs as part of the solution to service failure in Downton this was 
experienced as a distraction from the imperative of sorting out a set of enduring service 
specific problems. Furthermore, reluctance amongst LA officers and elected members to 
share decision making and resource control, and a resistance to relinquish their delivery role 
are identified as impeding the implementation of a joint commissioning approach.  
The data has been organised chronologically. Firstly, the development of the CT pathfinder 
between 2004 and 2006 is examined. A set of contextual factors that acted as barriers to 
commissioning are highlighted. Secondly, the development of commissioning from 2006 to 
2009 is detailed and consideration given to the on-going effects of recent history. 
As a reflection of the confusion surrounding the development of CTs and CT pathfinders it is 
necessary here to clarify the terminology used in the forthcoming account. In this chapter 
the term CT pathfinder is used to refer collectively to the ‘Children’s Trust Project Team’ 
(CTPT) together with the Trust Board or ‘CYPTB’. However in interview participants refer 
alternatively to the ‘Children’s Trust’, the ‘partnership’ or the ‘Trust’ when discussing either 
the CYPTB or the CTPT. Figure 2 provides a diagrammatic representation of the strategic CT 
partnership structure.  
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Figure 2 Children’s trust partnership structure   
 
Implementing joint commissioning:  2004 – 2006  
The following section provides an introduction to the early development of the pathfinder 
CT as the structural arrangement for implementing joint commissioning. The narrative then 
moves on to consider in more detail the organisational and historical factors that have 
structured the development of joint commissioning as a core function of the CT pathfinder. 
6.2 The CT pathfinder  
Downton was one of the thirty-five LAs to achieve CT pathfinder status announced by the 
Department of Health (DH) in July 2003. The CT pathfinder was subsequently established in 
April 2004.  At the same time, and in accordance with the ECM green paper (DfES 2003) and 
Children’s Act 2004, the LA began the process of restructuring in an endeavour to align 
education and children’s social care.  The DCS described this as having ‘arrived late in 
Downton compared to other Local Authority areas’ due in part to difficulties in appointing a 
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DCS, with two interims preceding the appointment in 2007 of the post holder at time of 
fieldwork.  
Downton’s original application to the DH set out an ambitious vision for their CT pathfinder 
as the cross agency structure for planning and commissioning integrated children’s services. 
Beginning with a focus on commissioning preventative and early years provision the 
intention was to extend this approach to cover a far more wide ranging portfolio of services 
including the development of multi-agency services. The proposal clearly identifies service 
commissioning as the central role of the pathfinder and details an intention to develop 
pooled budgets.  
The CT pathfinder developed as a separate dedicated unit known as the ‘Children’s Trust 
Project Team’ (CTPT), headed up by a ‘Children’s Trust Project Director’ (CTPD) appointed at 
the level of Chief Officer.  The latter, true to the intention of the original proposal, began the 
process of building the commissioning function of the CT pathfinder, bringing together a 
small team of commissioners drawn both from the former Children’s Fund and from inside 
the PCT as well as the ‘Strategic Partnership Manager for Children’s Services’ who had been 
central to developing the original pathfinder vision. In its first year of operation the CT 
pathfinder created a ‘Local Children’s Commissioner’ with a role to act as ‘champion’ for 
local children and young people, began some initial work on information sharing and 
assessment (ISA) and took the lead role in developing Downton’s  first CYPP.  
According to the DH application the intention had been to build the CT pathfinder on a pre-
existing partnership structure that had been born out of the former Health Action Zone 
initiative.  The formal governance arrangements for the pathfinder were left undetermined 
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in the original application.  However the hope was expressed that they would be through the 
existing Children and Young People’s Partnership (CYPP) who, it was expected, would be 
responsible for decision-making and delegated arrangements, in particular the anticipated 
pooled budget arrangements.   This intention was realised when the CYPP was restructured 
to become the CYPTB providing the governance framework for the CT pathfinder and 
integrated planning across the PCT and LA. An independent Chair was appointed to the 
Board although the policy expectation was that CT Boards would be chaired by the Lead 
Member for Children and Young People. Whilst this was initially designed as a temporary 
measure the external Chair went on to hold the position for the next four years.  
Despite building on pre-existing partnership structures the process of establishing the CT 
pathfinder, whilst simultaneously but separately setting out to realign children’s services 
within the LA, was described by interviewees as having created significant and enduring 
tensions and confusion amongst different stakeholders within children’s services. These 
tensions centred on the different perceptions of the legitimacy, status and function of the CT 
pathfinder and its relationship to the wider reforms in LA children’s services.   
In 2009, when fieldwork took place, the CTPT had evolved to become the Directorate of 
Partnership and Joint Commissioning (DPJC) described as the ‘operational arm’ of the CYPTP. 
During fieldwork the members of the DPJC felt they had settled into a period of relative calm 
and stability. However, since its inception as a CT pathfinder in 2004 ambiguity had persisted 
as to its status and role, in particular concerning its status as a commissioning trust. This 
ambiguity and the marginalisation of the CT pathfinder reflected a resistance on behalf of 
the LA to consider commissioning as part of its core function.  
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These tensions were in part a function of the confusion generated by the fast changing 
policy context and the resultant ambiguity surrounding the relationship between pathfinders 
and the later statutory CTs.  However they also reflected broader issues in the political and 
organisational landscape within which the CT pathfinder was embedded. These tensions and 
ambiguities are explored in the forthcoming sections as a set of barriers to the development 
of joint commissioning as the core function of the CT pathfinder.   
6.3 Problematic partnership  
Building the CT pathfinder on existing strategic partnership arrangements proved insufficient 
to ensure productive collaborative working. Instead commissioners and those interviewees 
represented on the CYPTP presented a history of problematic partnership work and 
organisational turbulence as   major barriers to the development of the emergent CT 
pathfinder as a structure for joint planning, investment and commissioning. 
A number of interviewees described a disparity between the way Downton was able to 
project an image of positive partnership working to the outside world and its capacity to 
realise this in action. These interviewees expressed the opinion that although ‘Downton  is 
supposed to be partnership city...it talks a much better partnership game than it delivers’ 
(Chair), suggesting that it had been awarded pathfinder status in part because of an 
‘undeserved national reputation for doing this sort of thing well’ (TS Board Member).   
As the two principal players in the design and delivery of children’s services a relationship of 
collaboration between PCTs and LAs is critical to the development of integrated strategy and 
provision.  However, in Downton the relationship between these two organisations was 
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described as characterised by suspicion and a lack of trust.  The Chair described his own 
appointment as indicative of a relationship of mistrust between these two stakeholders:  
‘Although they wanted the cabinet member for children’s services to chair the 
meetings...there were some relationship difficulties with the PCT’s and they 
thought it would be helpful to have someone who was trusted by all agencies’ 
(Chair)  
Mistrust was described as having built up historically, in part as a function of organisational 
structure. Within the LA geographical boundary there had been until recently, three PCTs. 
Interviewees from both sectors suggested that over time the added complexity for the LA of 
having to engage with three corporate structures had acted as an organisational barrier to 
the development of both joint strategic planning and collaboration at service delivery level, 
because ‘there is one LA but there were three PCTs, and no one in the LA ever understood 
why there were three PCTs. It made life difficult and the LA never really supported it’ (LA 
Board member). One interviewee suggested that previous resistance to reorganisation was 
based on a desire to protect the status of senior officers rather than work in the best 
interests of local communities and that this had helped foster a relationship of mistrust 
between the two organisations so that ‘the LA was clearly suspicious about the PCT 
arrangement in Downton (TS Board member).   
6.4 LA commitment to the CT pathfinder  
The research literature on strategic partnerships emphasises the importance not only of 
engagement of the right organisations but also their representation by people of 
appropriate seniority with decision making powers and the ability to commit resources 
(Dean et al 1999). Without the individual commitment of senior representatives the 
partnership runs the risk of marginalisation supporting the perception that it is peripheral to 
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the ‘core business’ of partner agencies (Hudson and Hardy 2002). The national evaluation of 
children’s trusts supports this claim highlighting the committed representation of partners at 
Chief Executive and Director level as ‘instrumental in brokering change, in establishing 
organisational commitment and in removing structural and procedural barriers to effective 
children’s trust arrangements’ (UEA/NCB 2007: 90).  
Between 2004 and 2006 commitment from senior LA officers to the CT pathfinder was 
described by interviewees as missing.  Hence, despite the ECM agenda taking centre stage 
within the LA with the reorganisation of education and children’s social care, interviewees 
described an almost complete lack of buy-in from the LA to the whole concept of the CT 
pathfinder. This was demonstrated by a consistent failure of senior people and the elected 
member to attend CYPTP meetings, evidenced by scrutiny of the minutes of meetings and by 
the accounts of Board members:   
‘I just found that extraordinary. Meeting after meeting there wouldn’t be a single 
cabinet member present who was meant to be. Most of the Directors who were 
meant to be there wouldn’t be there, nor heads of service.  (TS Board member)   
 Without consistent and committed representation from senior LA officers on the CYPTP the 
capacity of the pathfinder CT to influence mainstream activity and ‘drive whole system 
change’ was compromised. There was a near consensus amongst interviewees that ‘the 
Children’s Trust Board never meant much, it never really bottomed out its role’ (TS Board 
member). Hence in contrast to the ECM policy expectation that CTs would provide the 
organisational arrangements to drive service improvements through integration and joint 
governance, in Downton the CT pathfinder was described as having a ‘peripheral’ rather than 
central role.  
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As discussed in chapter 3, government guidance on the role and status of CTs was 
ambiguous with the result that, in Downton, the intended roles of both the CTPT and the 
CYPTP were variously interpreted and understood by different stakeholders.  The loose and 
ambiguous use of the term ‘trust’ within the guidance was reflected in different narrative 
accounts of the development of the CT pathfinder which reveal multiple understandings of 
the purpose of the CT in Downton. The accounts given by TS interviewees reflected more 
closely the ECM directive that CTs should provide the structure for evolving mainstream and 
targeted services with a stress on a commissioning approach. One TS Board member 
described the concept of a CT as ‘a different kind of partnership’ that ‘the Local Authority 
side didn’t understand’. Here he was referring to its intended role in delivering the whole 
systems reforms in children’s services as envisioned by ECM, suggesting that this was not the 
role that had been assigned to it in Downton. Instead, being built on a pre-existing 
partnership structure that had been involved in determining the strategic direction of 
relatively small areas of provision, the CT pathfinder had continued to be perceived as 
marginal  by the LA, who never showed  ‘a real commitment to the Children’s Trust’.   
Reflecting optimistic policy discourses of ‘good partnership’ one interviewee suggested that 
it required the creation of a ‘comfort zone between agencies’ in order to ‘create synergy, 
understand the differences and build up trust’. This, he explained, was a prerequisite for 
beginning ‘to evolve services’ in the way ECM aspired to do. As the lead and accountable 
body in children’s services he argued that it was the role of the LA to facilitate this process of 
collaboration but that this was a task they had both failed to understand or embrace.   
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6.5 Separate development  
In the accounts of LA interviewees a far more marginal role was assigned to the CT 
pathfinder viewing it as a discrete body responsible for contracting TS organisations to 
deliver grant funded preventative services. As a reflection of this the development of the CT 
pathfinder is described as having happened in parallel to the integration of children’s social 
care and education within the LA  as part of ECM reforms:  
‘Over here there was a new integrated structure starting to develop around 
children’s services and over there was the Children’s Trust completely separate – 
it was bizarre’ (PCT Board member).   
This idea of separate development is reiterated in various accounts. It reflects how the CT 
was originally perceived within the LA; not as a partnership of agencies working together to 
drive that integration but as a separate structure somehow sitting to one side of those 
agencies delivering children’s services.    
Differing accounts of the role of the CT pathfinder were underpinned by a semantic 
confusion between the CTPT described as the ‘operational arm of the CYPSP’ and a wider 
conceptualisation of a CT as a strategic partnership sitting under the Local Strategic 
Partnership (LSP). During fieldwork the name ‘children’s trust’ was still being used 
interchangeably with what had later become the DPJC despite numerous restructuring of the 
Board and its sub-groups.  Whilst the CTPT was perceived as an apparently separate 
commissioning unit it had, paradoxically, become conflated in people’s understandings with 
the CT:  
‘The team that was responsible for partnership and commissioning tended to be 
seen as aligned, as synonymous really with the Children’s Trust  and yet somehow 
separate from the council and the PCT whereas in fact it is a joint unit between 
the council and the PCT’ (PCT Board member)  
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One of the consistent messages from the literature on strategic partnership development is 
the importance of the development of sets of relationships based on trust and transparent 
lines of accountability (Hudson and Hardy 2001; Sullivan and Skelcher 2002). In Downton 
however a lack of clarity over CT pathfinder versus LA responsibilities meant this ‘separate 
entity’ came to be regarded with suspicion by people and in particular by senior officers 
within the LA.  The lack of clearly demarcated lines of responsibility and accountability,   
according to LA interviewees, contributed to a growing level of mistrust between the 
different partners.    
Not only did interviewees construct alternative interpretations of the role of the CT 
pathfinder but they also produced different accounts of this separate development, 
variously locating the blame for the set of tensions generated.  For the DCS, problems in 
developing as an effective partnership stemmed from the way in which the pathfinder had 
evolved rather than the other way round; ‘it set back the council and the Partnership on 
children’s services (DCS).  
In his account the friction generated by the ambiguous status of the CT pathfinder was 
interpreted as a function of the behaviours of individuals within the CTPT. He suggested that 
the perception that the CT pathfinder was independent of the LA and PCT was reinforced by 
the fact that the CTPM reported directly to the Chief Executive of the LA rather than to 
himself.  He felt there was a clear tension in this line of accountability, sending conflicting 
messages about where responsibility for the strategic direction of children’s services lay, 
effectively representing a challenge to his own authority:   
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‘It wasn’t very clear what was going to be the responsibility of the Children’s Trust 
and what was going to be the responsibility of children’s services within the 
council.  It gave rise to a considerable amount of tension and uncertainty… and 
the behaviours some of the people adopted reinforced that…attitudes about 
accountability and who they were accountable to, it all became a bit diffuse 
really’. (DCS) 
On coming into post the first CTPM was described as having begun the process of trying to 
‘align the resources that were joined up around children and young people’ (DPJC) bringing 
together funding for Early Years provision, the prevention budget and some relatively 
marginal funding streams including the Drug Action Team (DAT) funding that was associated 
with children and some Children and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) that had 
previously been jointly commissioned through the former children’s partnership structure.  
Interviewees suggested that a ‘counter-narrative’ had been constructed around the CTPT, 
describing it as ‘dangerous’ (LA Board member) and  threatening existing power relations 
and structural arrangements for the allocation of resources. The Team, who were 
synonymous with the CT, became widely regarded as ‘empire building’ (DCS), seeking to take 
increasing control over various budgets and funding streams with indeterminate and opaque 
accountability: 
 ‘All the time the children’s trust was developing it felt like [name of children’s 
trust project director] was collecting more and more resources around her and 
people were very suspicious of  that’ (PCT Board member)  
The situation was described as having ‘come to a head in 2006’ following concern raised by 
the recent CSCI inspection about the effectiveness of a multi-agency service for children with 
disabilities for which the CTPT held operational management responsibility. This was 
compounded by the report findings of an external consultancy working on Change 
Management that highlighted continued ambiguity over understandings of the role and 
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direction of the CT pathfinder, identifying it as a ‘significant risk’ to the ability of children’s 
services in Downton to deliver on their improvement strategy.  
In the face of this the interim DCS and PCT Chief Executive decided to bring in external 
consultants to conduct a review of CT partnership and governance arrangements.  One of 
the recommendations of the review was that the CTPD report to the DCS rather than the LA 
Chief Executive. At this point the CTPD ‘decided it was melt down and it was time to go’ 
(DJC). What had been the CTPT was subsequently reconfigured as the ‘Directorate of 
Partnership and Joint Commissioning’ (DPJC) as part of a deliberate strategy to distinguish it 
from the broader concept of ‘children’s trust arrangements’ and establish it as the 
‘operational’ arm of the CYPTB.  
This history of confusion surrounding the respective roles, responsibilities and 
accountabilities of the pathfinder CT and the LA had resulted in limited delegation of 
authority and resources to the CYPTB and the DPJC thereby limiting their capacity to 
function as sites for decision making and change. However this can also be understood as a 
function of a set of broader structural issues related to a history of failing service provision in 
the LA and the persistence of organisational ‘silos’, within which  each of the key statutory 
service areas remained accountable for their own performance measures.  
The following sections explore these factors in more depth identifying them as significant 
structural barriers to the implementation of joint commissioning as a mechanism for 
evolving integrated services as envisioned by ECM.    
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6.6 Failing services and organisational uncertainty  
Difficulties in establishing trusting relationships as the basis of developing joint working were 
primarily rooted in structural conditions rather than personalities. Several interviewees 
highlighted a number of significant changes in both the national policy and local 
organisational landscapes as barriers to the ability of the CT pathfinder and later children’s 
trust arrangements to achieve the level of integrated commissioning and service delivery 
that had been envisaged at the outset.  
The CT pathfinder was described as emerging at a time of considerable organisational 
change and instability within LA children’s services and the PCTs. These related to poor 
performance in education and children’s social care, changes in key personnel and 
leadership and the need for systemic structural change in the LA and PCTs. Together these 
are described as providing a weak foundation on which to build integrated planning and 
commissioning so that ‘trying to create a Children’s Trust which was predominately about 
commissioning was pretty tricky’ (Chair). 
A history of poor delivery across children’s services and in particular the serious under- 
performance of children’s social services and education meant that the LA had been under 
close scrutiny from central government.  At the point when the CT pathfinder was 
established children’s social care was described as ‘a mess across the board’ as well as there 
being ‘some real challenges about educational performance in Downton’ (TS Board member).  
Major issues about the quality of safeguarding and a failure to meet education targets had 
meant that they had been regarded by government as being in special measures. Things 
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having failed to significantly improve meant that having just ‘had a bad inspection they were 
again on the verge of special measures’ (PCT Board member).    
The climate of organisational instability was reinforced by the failure to appoint and retain 
senior people within key LA children’s services posts. Given the significant problems within 
the two main LA areas of children’s services, it is perhaps not surprising that during the 
period between 2004 and 2007 Downton saw three Directors of Children’s Social Care and 
two interim Directors of Children’s Services preceding   the appointment, in 2007, of the post 
holder in place during fieldwork. In addition there was a change of LA Chief Executive in 
2006. These factors combined meant trust and confidence in senior leadership was low; ‘We 
have some really good policies and talk a good talk. But there is poor leadership. I think we 
lack that clear leadership’ (TS Provider).    
The reorganisation of the three PCTs to one in 2005 also saw the appointment of a new 
Chief Executive. These multiple changes in leadership were described as having 
compromised the development of productive, trusting strategic links between the two 
agencies, weakening the capacity of the CYPTB to provide a forum for the development of 
integrated strategy, for as one interviewee observed, ‘partnerships are often about people 
and people had significant turnover that time’ (Chair).  
The three major statutory service areas of education, social care and health were all 
primarily concerned with their own principal strategic priorities existing as a set of 
competing demands to those of partnership, integration and the development of a joint 
commissioning function. For the LA the priorities were on sorting out fundamental systemic 
problems in the areas of safeguarding and education. The focus of activity was on shorter 
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term organisational goals and targets set following the outcome of recent inspections, ‘the 
short term traffic light stuff’ (TS Board member), rather than on achieving a long term joint 
vision for children. The CYPSP published in 2007 reflected this, establishing a set of priorities 
focused around recommendations following the recent Joint Action Review (JAR) with an 
emphasis on the ECM educational and safeguarding targets.  In Downton, the integrative 
agenda of ECM thus appeared to sit in tension with service specific pressure for change in 
education and social care.  
Given the peripheral role of the CYPTB it was perhaps not surprising that actions to bring 
about significant changes in the management and delivery of both children’s social care and 
education following JAR and Ofsted inspections were described as having taken place within 
those organisations. The CT pathfinder having been originally conceived as a commissioning 
trust, developing in parallel with the realignment of LA children’s services was described as 
sidelined in these agendas:  
All the attention was focused on sorting out its children’s social care. That was a 
major priority and hadn’t got much to do with the Children’s Trust, the way it was 
conceptualised; it hadn’t got much to do with the Children’s Trust. They just got 
on and did it and told the Children’s Trust occasionally what was going on. It was 
hard for the Children’s Trust to actually shake that’ (Chair)  
The separation of safe-guarding from the CYPTB was described by another participant as 
reinforced by the separate development and accountability of the Local Children’s 
Safeguarding Board (LCSB). As a statutory requirement of the Children Act 2004 the creation 
of LCSB was described as happening ‘in a parallel world’ so that broader issues in relation to 
safeguarding, including prevention and early intervention, were divorced from the CYPTB.  
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As with social care, work to drive improvements in educational attainment was described as 
having had ‘nothing to do with the CT. It was reported to us and we endorsed the steps that 
were being taken but that was the education services agenda and they were driving that’ (TS 
Board member). As an underperforming LA that had been in special measures, Downton had 
been under pressure to meet targets for educational improvement for a considerable length 
of time.  This was described as an area of responsibility that the LA felt pertained solely to 
them as the accountable body so that ‘Education never really seemed to come into it, you 
don’t touch it, don’t look at overall performance figures, it’s “leave that to us we know all 
about that”’ (TS Board member). 
Indeed education and schools were repeatedly described by interviewees as operating in 
isolation to the wider CT. The Children Act 2004 had not placed schools under a statutory 
duty to cooperate with CTs so that in Downton, according to one LA Board member, ‘schools 
won’t even know what a Children’s Trust is, they won’t have any idea’. This detachment from 
the CT was described not only in reference to performance but also in reference to extended 
schools. 
As the CT pathfinder was developing the extended schools initiative had been introduced. 
Described by the DfES (2005) as sitting ‘at the heart of improving outcomes for children’, this 
gave schools a role to commission and manage a set of additional services including family 
support, child care, and extended learning. However the policy tension between integration 
as enshrined in ECM and school autonomy, as encouraged by the 2005 Education White 
Paper (DfES 2005) meant that schools in Downton had opted to develop these services 
without reference to any similar activity coordinated through the CT. This was described as a 
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function of schools preference to work autonomously and without interference from the LA: 
‘Schools like to get their money in their own budgets so they will employ somebody in-house. 
They like to be in control of the process, they struggle to work with others’ (LA Board 
member).    
Not only was the CT pathfinder described as peripheral to the strategic concerns of the LA 
but also to those of the NHS. The focus for the PCT had been internal and concerned with 
the major reorganisation engendered by the directive from the DH to restructure from three 
corporate structures to one. In addition, the local reform agenda of acute children’s health 
services was described as NHS led: ‘the review of Downton hospitals 2010 agenda, although 
there is some token involvement of the social services people, was driven by the NHS’ (Chair).   
Nevertheless, in contrast to the LA, senior PCT representation on the CYPTB proved to be 
consistent so that ‘the chief executive of the PCT would be there meeting after meeting’ (TS 
Board member).  However the impact of the PCT on the development of the Board and the 
work of the pathfinder CT was questioned by some interviewees, as, ‘whilst they were 
present, they were not engaged with’ (Chair). Interviewees from all sectors suggested that 
this was due to the domination of the LA in the children’s services agenda. The ECM targets 
were described as referring primarily to areas of service provision pertaining to the LA rather 
than shared. NHS interviewees identified a different set of more important ‘hard’ targets as 
priorities as ‘children’s services are not frankly a strategic priority for the health service’ (PCT 
Board member). Commissioning in the PCT was described as chiefly concerned with adult 
acute sector contracting. Furthermore, the generic approach taken to children’s 
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commissioning meant different areas of provision were not separated out as in adult 
services giving it a marginal status and leading to problems of capacity.  
As few of the ECM targets related directly to health or were relevant to health service 
priorities, a CT that was driven by the LA children’s services agenda was understood to ‘have 
little relevance within the wider NHS’ (NHS Board member).  The relative lack of health 
targets attached to ECM meant PCT and acute sector interviewees tended to see ECM as 
more relevant to the LA with the NSF for Children Young People and Maternity Services 
(2005) and the Darzi Report (DH 2008) identified as the policy directives most relevant to the 
health service.   
In summary, interviewees clearly experienced a tension between the policy directive of 
partnership and integrated strategy and the need to respond as distinct agencies for the 
achievement of targets for which they were individually hierarchically accountable.  The 
impact of government inspections in education and social care had been a focus on short 
term goals and a reversion  to historical organisational ‘silos’ in the face of service failure.  
Joint commissioning was thus rendered of marginal significance to the three key statutory 
agencies delivering children’s services.  
6.7 Corporate governance and the role of the CYPTB  
As chapter 3 discussed, the ECM policy intention was that CTs would provide the main 
vehicle for inter-agency governance arrangements and strategic direction. However, unlike 
Care Trusts CTs had not been created as legal bodies with their own legally incorporated 
governance and financial arrangements. In Downton the ability of the CYPTB to establish 
inter-agency governance and strategic coherence had been compromised by the 
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organisational uncertainty and policy tensions discussed above.  In addition, it has been 
observed that multiple and conflicting interpretations of the role of the CT pathfinder had 
led to tensions between sectors about the respective responsibilities of the latter and the 
LA.  
The role and function of the CYPTB was variously understood and described by different 
interviewees. One of the key points emerging from interview data was a perceived tension 
between the intended roles of the CYPTB as prescribed by policy, versus the experience of 
those represented on the Board.  For TS members particularly, the intended role of the 
CYPTB was described in concrete, instrumental terms as building integrated delivery but, 
more importantly, developing the process of commissioning. In the following quote a 
significant role for commissioning is identified as the mechanism for integrating front line 
delivery, developing new services where needed and effecting service change:  
‘The way I understood it, the role of the Board  was to begin to knit together the 
range of services against identified need and the interrelationship between them 
and within that commission the relevant services and particularly where changes 
were needed where services were needed to be put together in some way or 
where gaps appeared and specific action through commissioning needed to be 
taken’   (TS Board member)  
However rather than developing this proactive, policy making and commissioning role the 
Board was described as a passive receiver of done deeds requiring approval. This was 
referred to rather disparagingly by several interviewees as ‘rubber stamping’ some ‘fairly 
well worked through policy ideas’  so that ‘they get the seal of approval of the Trust’ (PCT 
Board member).  
Research on the function and impact of corporate Boards tends to mirror this observation 
(Freeman and Peck 2004; Peck 1995). Contrary to the policy expectation that Boards should 
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provide a forum for establishing local policy objectives and strategic vision their function 
more commonly involves the approval of decisions and strategies established by managers 
within their host organisations. Freeman and Peck (2004, 2007) argue that contrary to the 
popular perception that Boards should be judged in terms of instrumental efficacy their 
greatest value lies in a more hidden ‘symbolic’ function. This, they suggest, includes a form 
of public avowal to the importance of collaboration providing precedence for local 
partnership working and a way of sustaining commitment amongst senior players to the area 
of service provision overseen by the Board.    
In Downton the Chair emphasized a symbolic over instrumental function for the CYPTB  
saying that what became increasingly apparent to him was that ‘the purpose of the CT was to 
be not to do’ whilst his task was ‘to get them to like each other and not fall out’. From his 
perspective the most important functions of the CYPTB were to both generate a sense of a 
shared legitimacy and to present a public show of collaboration. Thus, whilst ‘things might 
have got done anyway through individual agencies’ the approval of the Board for actions 
taken presented an image of committed partnership and unity to the outside world that 
meant ‘we’re doing this because Downton want us to’ (Chair). What his analysis suggests is 
that the primary function of the Board was the production of a public statement of intent; a 
demonstration of conformity with the external requirement of partnership between sectors 
rather than a network of collaborators.  
Other interviewees similarly express the opinion that the Boards function was a legitimating 
one; with strategy formulated and decisions taken in more traditional, hierarchical and 
separate forums by executive members. However, they were less likely to accept this in such 
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pragmatic terms.  Some Board members felt they existed as a partnership only whilst at 
meetings and, that despite sharing a high level common vision of the priorities for children 
and children’s services, there was a tendency to ‘go back to organisational silos’ (PCT Board 
member). Thus, whilst interviewees agreed there was a ‘good understanding of what each 
other’s agencies can do and provide’ (TS Board member), when it ‘comes down to it they 
then go back and address their own issues’ (Chair).  This observation echoes the problems 
discussed above highlighting the challenge presented by mandated ‘partnership’ to 
established cultures of working.  
Rather than functioning as a system for providing strategic lead the Board was described as 
‘inward looking’ and whilst  ‘not a terribly challenging board, it has challenged the 
governance arrangements’.  Interviewees described a history of flux in respect to its 
development saying that ‘the governance structure keeps being altered or slightly amended 
and although the issue of governance was continually on the agenda it remained ‘very 
similar to what it’s been before’ (NHS Board member).   
Participants suggested that the lack of clarity over the form and function of the CYPTB and 
its various incarnations over time gave testimony to how it had not established a clear and 
consistent vision for how it would provide the governance arrangements for the CT. The fluid 
and evolving nature of the Board was described by this participant as indicative of the 
problems in achieving governance through partnership:  
 ‘I mean for a start the Partnership keeps changing its name. It has had about four 
different names over as many years. That gives you an indication that it hasn’t 
quite worked out how it’s going to monitor these things and provide the 
governance structure to the children’s trust (TS Board member).  
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Existing hierarchically ordered governance arrangements were recognised by some 
interviewees as sitting in tension with the concept of integrated governance articulated by 
ECM. Different professional cultures, finance and management structures as well as 
organisationally specific modes of accountability were clearly identified as barriers to 
achieving integrated governance:   
‘people come from all sorts of backgrounds, completely different management 
structures and trying to provide a single governance structure when actually 
we’ve all got separate ones is impossible’ (PCT Board member)    
The problems incumbent upon the formal structures of partnership to develop a more 
instrumental function rendered engagement with the CYPTP a kind of luxury that some 
provider representatives felt could ill afford to indulge in: we’ve all got other jobs to do. It’s 
on top of everybody’s other job’ (NHS Board member). Clearly for this interviewee the 
dictates of formal partnership were experienced as an ‘add on’, an additional pressure to her 
priority task of service delivery rather than a mechanism for improving the integration 
services in the pursuit of better outcomes.   
6.8 Engagement of the TS  
This inward focus of the Board’s activity towards its own structure, membership and sub-
groups represented a source of frustration to TS members. In contrast to the lack of LA 
engagement with the CT pathfinder, TS involvement had been consistent from its inception, 
so that:  ‘the only folks at the last meeting I went to that had been there from the beginning 
were the folks representing the voluntary sector and Connexions’ (Chair). The TS had also 
made a considerable effort to ensure a form of democratic representation for the sector on 
the CYPTB.   
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For these representatives the disparity between the intended role of the CYPTB as a 
commissioning trust, and their experience of the Board as an approval mechanism meant it 
had not delivered what they had anticipated in terms of changing the balance of the 
provision of children’s services towards the TS. There was a sense of frustration aroused by 
the mismatch between the expectations that ‘partnership’ could serve as a mechanism for 
power sharing and delivering change and the lived experience of the Board as a site for 
reproducing the status quo:  
 ‘Well you go and have a meeting and do all the niceties [but] nothing really 
changes. You go in there  you play the music you all dance round you make 
comments on various papers but you know, we are very good at creating a lot of 
work to do but you don’t change bugger all. So papers are put to the board but 
nothing fundamental changes’ (TS Board member)  
TS interviewees drew attention to the way existing structures and vested interests serve to 
replicate and entrench ‘siloed’ patterns of service delivery. The capacity of the Board to 
provide strategic direction and effect cultural change was understood by these interviewees 
as limited by the behaviours of statutory sector providers who were unwilling to relinquish 
control over their budgets or allow parts of their services to be outsourced:  
‘People are the barriers, they’ve got their money, and Downton is no different to 
anywhere else. People hang on to their chiefdoms and the idea of sharing them 
isn’t happening’ (TS Board member)  
Particular stress was laid on the failure to extend the commissioning role of the CT 
pathfinder as a means to achieve better outcomes by securing service delivery through TS 
agencies rather than the LA.  For these interviewees a lack of LA understanding about the 
importance of commissioning as a mechanism for evolving better services through out-
sourcing meant the CT had failed to live up to expectations:    
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 ‘They don’t understand it and that’s a huge shortcoming. That’s why the trust 
seems to me to be nonsense.  Not only because it wasn’t a true partnership, they 
paid lip service to it, but also because they didn’t genuinely try to  invest in 
services that would make sure that what was being bought was the right thing 
(TS Board member)  
The particular interest expressed by TS interviewees in the commissioning role of the Trust 
will be explored further in the next chapter. Here it is important to note that there was a 
perception amongst these Board members that the CYPTB functioned primarily as a ratifying 
body for decisions taken elsewhere with little sense of it acting as a forum for the 
redistribution of decision making power. Given the limited capacity of the Board to make 
decisions about the use and allocation of resources, the motivation behind TS engagement 
with the Trust was to advocate for commissioning and maintain a profile amongst, and 
access to, decision makers. With resource power lying with the statutory sector and all TS 
members dependant on the LA and PCT for funding the major part of their services, they 
recognised that engaging with the formal mechanisms of ‘partnership’ was a necessary part 
of ensuring survival.  
At the same time however, they expressed a clear resistance to being brought into the 
statutory arena as ‘governable terrain’ (Carmel and Harlock 2005). TS interviewees 
consistently referred to themselves as external to the CYPTB; as an invited rather than 
integral part of the ‘partnership’.  In the following the quote the interviewee is clearly 
identifying himself as detached and independent from the statutory sector. He describes his 
role on the CYPTB as one of facilitating them to fulfil their obligation of partnership with the 
TS thus subtly shifting the balance of power back in his own direction:  
 ‘From an external perspective I think it is more difficult for voluntary 
organisations. We sit on things that are not part of our day job, that do not 
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consume part of our daily thinking necessarily. We are happy to contribute some 
of our time to support things as a partner but it’s not always clear as to why 
something exists or what it does (TS Board member) 
Another interviewee stressed the difficulty for those in the TS to keep pace with the logic 
behind the restructuring of the Board. Whilst describing himself as a ‘partner’ on the CYPTB 
he simultaneously positioned the Board as a structure pertaining to the statutory sector with 
the latter clearly in control of the agenda. Describing himself as ‘outside’ he expressed 
confusion around how it functioned:  
 ‘…it’s not always obvious to people from the outside looking in...It seems like 
sometimes the music stops and we all move round and change chairs and we’re 
told the CT has now restructured and is going to do things in a particular way (TS 
Board member).  
There was also considerable cynicism expressed at the former DCS’s reported declaration of 
entering a ‘brave new world of going into partnership with the VCS blah, blah…’  The 
principal mechanism for achieving this had been through the establishment of a set of sub-
groups of the CYPTB into which ‘a lot of energy and commitment that had gone in from the 
VCS’ to ensure representation. However, with the decision to ‘change the structure and 
shelve some of the groups’ this work had been left redundant, so that TS organisations ‘were 
left with the impression of why did we put the time and energy into that?’ This interviewee 
went on to observe that:  
 ‘ no one is paid for that, for helping the statutory services engage with the VCS –
changing the goal posts – that has happened on two or three occasions now – we 
just let them get on with it to be honest (TS Board member)   
Not only does this seem to illustrate a lack of understanding on behalf of the LA of the effort 
required for the TS to engage with the formal mechanisms of ‘partnership’ but, like the 
previous interviewee, his comment suggests that the VCS were engaged in a process of 
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helping the statutory sector meet a top-down requirement to work with them. Together 
these accounts serve to highlight the failure of the formal ‘partnership’ Board to function as 
a collaborative network through which sectoral boundaries might be transcended. Instead 
they underscore relationships of unequal power between the sectors and serve as a contrast 
to the idea that ‘good partnership’ should involve relationships of ‘equal status’ (Hudson and 
Hardy 2002).  
Developing the Directorate of Joint Commissioning and Partnership: 2006-2009  
As previously discussed, the CTPT was reformed in 2006 as the ‘Directorate of Partnership 
and Joint Commissioning’ (DPJC) in an attempt to clear some of the previous ambiguity 
surrounding its role. The new post holder also changed her job title, becoming the ‘Director 
of Joint Commissioning’ (DJC) in January 2006. She described how as an initial ‘outsider’ she 
too had felt suspicious of the CTPT and that it wasn’t until she gained better knowledge of 
the team that she realised  ‘they weren’t the bogey people that people thought. It wasn’t 
what was being portrayed from the outside’ (DJC).   
Whilst optimistic that the situation would improve on her taking up post she found that the 
understanding she had developed with regard to the team was not shared. Despite the fact 
that the recommendations of the independent review had been put in place she explained 
how entrenched perceptions of the former CTPT as ‘being special and different right from 
the outset’ proved difficult to overcome:  
‘I thought that when I became Director it would be different that I could say; “look 
I came from the outside, I had the same suspicions, but it’s not like that”. But it 
didn’t help me. I was just like them in everybody else’s perceptions’  
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She described the subsequent process of trying to develop the commissioning function of 
the Directorate as difficult, engendering feelings of isolation and frustration. Because of the 
depth of bad feeling against the former CTPT she explained that they had ‘evolved as a 
commissioning team in a very hostile environment’ during the three years between 2006 and 
the time of fieldwork, and that this had been a ‘painful and very traumatic journey’.  
 One of the key tensions she articulated was defensiveness on behalf of the LA with regard 
to resource control. In her account the idea that the pathfinder had been engaged in 
‘empire-building’ had gained an undeserved rhetorical hold on the popular imagination of 
the Council:  ‘The idea of empire building was deeply engrained in the psyche of the council. 
It got to the point that even very senior people in the council believed it too’. Furthermore, 
despite significant investment in the commissioning infrastructure it had been constrained in 
its capacity to evolve as a means for effecting change. This had fed the view that the 
commissioning team had failed to demonstrate value for money so that there: ‘was a 
general rhetoric that the children’s trust, which we were synonymous with, was very 
expensive and produced nothing’ (DJC).   
The appointment of the new DCS in 2007 reportedly exacerbated the situation as his lack of 
enthusiasm to the whole idea of commissioning was demonstrated by early efforts to 
obstruct the development of a joint commissioning agenda. The DJC described how tensions 
grew to the point that she and the DCS ‘came to a head and had a really heated discussion’ 
with him questioning the worth of the DPJC, and suggesting that it be disbanded.  
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6.9 Resisting pooled budgets and joint commissioning  
Given such low levels of trust between agencies and the lack of enthusiasm for joint 
commissioning, subsequent attempts to develop pooled budget arrangements for joint 
services proved difficult. The government had identified the power to pool budgets (made 
possible through section 28 agreements of the Health Act 1999 and through article 10 of the 
Children Act 2004) as a key infrastructural shift to help overcome barriers to collaborative 
working and support joint commissioning. The joint planning and commissioning framework 
(HM Government 2006: 24) stated that it expected services to be ‘increasingly 
commissioned from pooled resources including finance, capital and staff’.   However whilst 
work on developing pooled arrangements was described as having started in earnest, soon 
after: 
 ‘the energy and enthusiasm for pooled budgets disappeared completely…we 
were left with a mass of work we’d done around developing a pooled budget, a 
case study in good practice and no commitment to it whatsoever.’ (DJC)  
This reflects Audit Commission (2008) findings who reported ‘a widespread reluctance to 
pool budgets’ amongst CTs. In Downton this reluctance was identified by interviewees as 
due to a combination of factors. These included changes in people in key decision making 
roles, most significantly the appointment of the new DCS and a new lead member for 
children’s services who both replaced people supportive of the idea.   
 Another contributor was the growing anxiety within the Council about pooled budgets, 
provoked in part by recent problems experienced in mental health and learning disabilities 
services where a pooled budget arrangement had been established in haste and ‘had started 
to unravel, had come a cropper’(DCS). In addition the technical and legal process of 
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establishing a section 28 agreement was described as ‘complex, difficult and anxiety 
provoking’ while ‘nobody could really define what a section 10 meant’ (DJC). 
The intention to work towards pooled budgets had been signalled within the draft 2007 
CYPSP. In an attempt to facilitate the development a more integrated approach to 
commissioning through pooled budget arrangements a ‘Joint Commissioning Board’ had 
been established as a sub-group of the CYPTB. However pooled budget arrangements were 
subsequently removed as a commitment from the CYPSP when requested by the LA Chief 
Executive and deputy leader. Given the degree of organisational turbulence discussed in 
previous sections the new DCS similarly felt the time was not right to work to pooled 
budgets suggesting that ‘there was no appetite for it and nobody wanted to go down that 
road’.  
When the commitment to pooled budgeting dissipated the Joint Commissioning Board was 
‘left out on a limb’ (DJC). Having had relatively little decision-making power or funding 
devolved to it the ‘level of impact that the Commissioning Board had was minimal…its scope 
was relatively small’ (Chair).  Hence, whilst the CYPTP ‘talked a lot about how desirable it 
[joint commissioning] was and how we could do it, it didn’t talk much about what was 
actually being commissioned’ (Chair). Furthermore the ‘little commissioning that was 
permitted’ was described as ‘really marginal to the totality of what was going on’ (TS Board 
member).  
The Joint Commissioning Board was subsequently dissolved and the preferred funding 
mechanism was to align budgets around highly specified service areas ‘where the delivery 
has PCT funding as well as LA funding but quite separate in terms of they are funding 
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different aspects of an overall programme’(DJC). These included the budgets for teenage 
pregnancy and the drug and alcohol team (DAT). The team were also given responsibility for 
the detail of some ‘single issue’ areas that formed part of PCT block contracts but for which 
they did not hold direct budgetary control Thus, though described as ‘joint commissioning’, 
as one interviewee observed there was ‘very little joint about it’ (PCT Board member).    
For TS representatives the reluctance to pool budgets and delegate decision making to 
partnership structures was interpreted as an unwillingness to devolve power so that ‘they 
saw the Children’s Trust purely as the LA pretty much deciding who, what, and where things 
should happen’ (TS Board member).  The development of a commissioning role for the CT 
was described as posing a potential threat to the LAs ability to take autonomous decisions 
over resource allocation  ‘They were making a decision about something and I was saying 
“what about the commissioning role?” and they were saying “it’s our money we’ll decide 
how we spend it”’ (TS Board member). This meant that the LA ‘very sceptical about joint 
commissioning’ so that ‘the Children’s Trust was never really about commissioning’. (Chair)  
Some interviewees located this scepticism in a fundamental misunderstanding of how 
commissioning would work in practice suggesting that ‘People involved from the education 
perspective from the past and the people involved in children’s social care from the past 
really didn’t understand commissioning’ (TS Board member).The DJC described how the 
climate of mistrust that had grown up around the former CTPT had left the impression 
amongst both PCT and LA officers that by assuming a lead on an area of service development 
the DPJC would be seen as ‘taking it away from everybody, sitting  in a little room, deciding  
how things are going to be, and then coming  back and telling  them’. For her this 
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represented a misinterpretation of commissioning as an exclusive rather than inclusive 
process.  
Interviewees from all sectors described a deep reluctance on the behalf of the LA to accept 
the commissioning or ‘place shaping’ role prescribed for them in the CLG White Paper 
(2006). The idea of developing as a commissioning organisation was described as ‘an alien 
concept in the Local Authority…where the providers are the people who determine what is 
provided’ (TS Board member). For another interviewee, from the NHS where commissioning 
and providing functions are organisationally separate, the LA could not function as a ‘true 
commissioner of services’ (PCT Board member) as its organisational structure positions the 
same people as both providers and commissioners.  
 For TS interviewees and those involved directly in commissioning, an intransigent culture of 
service provision within the LA, underpinned by an ideological antipathy to outsourcing from 
elected members was understood as a significant barrier to commissioning.  One 
interviewee described a tension between recognition within the Cabinet that the Council 
should be working towards becoming a commissioning organisation and the ‘struggle’ that 
elected members had ‘with the philosophy of commissioning’ and the fact that ‘they come 
from a strong history of providing services’ (TS Board member). Several interviewees 
suggested that this was a reflection of the fact that they were, and always had been, a 
Labour-led LA, and that Cabinet members were ‘politically and emotionally tied to keeping 
services in-house’ (DPH).  
The reticence to develop as a commissioning CT was clearly at odds with what some Board 
members wanted, in particular representatives from the TS and those who had been 
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involved with developing the original vision for the pathfinder.  TS interviewees expressed 
considerable frustration in relation to the lack of commissioning activity carried out through 
the CYPTB. The dissonance between a desire by these members for the CT to take on a 
strong commissioning role and the resistance to this by the LA was described as having set 
back rather than fostered a shared sense of purpose and direction.  
For commissioners this reticence was similarly experienced as a source of frustration. With 
the LA not happy to ‘lose control’ and allow mainstream services to be subject to 
contestability and possible outsourcing,   they felt they were only able to ‘tinker on the 
edges’ and be responsible for ‘the additional stuff rather than the heart of children’s services’ 
(Senior Commissioning Manager).  
6.10 An evolution rather than a revolution  
Despite the LAs reluctance to embrace joint commissioning this was described as an evolving 
picture with some optimism expressed as to it having a greater future role.  One of the 
facilitating factors identified by the DJC was the 2008 external review of CT arrangements 
and joint commissioning. She described how the process of going through the review had 
‘challenged all the key people across the PCT and the council and changed people’s 
perceptions’. As a cathartic experience that allowed grievances to be discussed, she felt that 
the report written by the consultants was less important than the process itself, which had 
‘bought on the change that needed to happen’. 
 The DJC was identified by other interviewees as a key agent in fighting the case for 
commissioning. Acting as a ‘policy entrepreneur’ (Kingdon 1995) who ‘lived, breathed and 
dreamed commissioning’ (TS Provider) she was also positioned as a conduit of partnership. 
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While the downside of this was that she was identified as the ‘partnership person’ with 
responsibility for ‘partnership work’ paradoxically understood to reside with her rather than 
everyone, she also emerged as someone who had successfully built bridges between people 
helping to erode former relationships of mistrust. One interviewee described the DCS as 
having ‘moved his position absolutely and completely to her point of view over the year’ (LA 
Board member) so that he was more enthusiastic about commissioning than previously.   
The external review had recommended that investment in joint commissioning should 
continue, underpinned by strengthened governance arrangements for the CT. In response to 
this the DCS explained that he had ‘reconfigured the CT and made sure the most senior 
people are attending it on a regular basis’. Strategic links to the LSP had also been 
strengthened by replacing the external Chair with the lead member for Children and Young 
People and ensuring the agenda was ‘much more focused around the LAA’ (DCS).  
In some respects joint commissioning in Downton appeared to have been considerably well 
advanced when compared to the national evidence of the progress of CTs in developing a 
commissioning function (Audit Commission 2008). At the time of fieldwork the DPJC 
incorporated a participation officer, a team of five Senior Commissioning Managers and a 
nine-strong procurement team responsible for the development of service specifications, 
contracting, performance and financial management.  
The Team had been given the strategic lead over a portfolio of area-based grants. As a 
deprived borough Downton received all the funding streams intended to relieve or tackle 
issues relating to relative deprivation. Pulling these funding streams together and trying to 
ensure they were spent in a strategic and coherent way was described as a ‘big issue’ for the 
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borough. This meant they had been given a policy and service development role with a 
strategic lead for parenting support, ‘Think Family’, the LA targets on child poverty, elements 
of the Working Neighbourhoods Fund  and, the former Children’s Fund converted to a 
‘preventative budget’.  
In total the DPJC had direct control of approximately £8 million of largely grant-based 
funding focused primarily on specialised or targeted services rather than generic or universal 
provision. However, in common with the majority of other LA areas (Audit Commission 2008, 
UEA/NCB 2007), there had been little redirection of funding across sectors or services. This 
reflected the observation made by some interviewees that partners were more concerned to 
work in the interests of their own organisations giving priority to their core functions and the 
delivery of statutory responsibilities.  
 6.11 Summary  
Drawing principally on interview data but also on documentary evidence this chapter has 
constructed an account of the development of joint commissioning activity in reference to 
its broader organizational and political context.  In so doing it has identified a number of 
organisational and institutional barriers to the implementation of joint commissioning 
through CT arrangements. The importance of local histories and experiences of partnership 
working and the constraints imposed by past service failures and top-down pressure to 
achieve service-specific change have been highlighted.   
 The climate of uncertainty and organisational change in which the CT pathfinder emerged 
was identified by participants to have had a number of important impacts on the way both 
the CYPTB and its operational arm the DPJC and were to evolve and be perceived. Changes in 
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leadership and poor performance alongside substantial structural changes to both the LA 
and PCT were described as militating against the development of trust between partners as 
a foundation for integrated commissioning. Hence, whilst there had been considerable 
investment in building a joint planning and commissioning infrastructure in Downton there 
had been limited delegation of authority and resources to these structures.  
Achieving a sense of common purpose proved difficult in the context of mandated 
‘partnership’ working and sat in tension with the need for failing services to attend to a set 
of organisationally specific targets for improvement.  
Early confusion as to the respective roles and responsibilities of the CT pathfinder and the LA 
alongside opaque lines of accountability had compounded relationships of mistrust and 
weakened the capacity of partnership structures to function as sites for decision making and 
change.  
The frustrations of partnership working were a repeated theme in interviewees’ accounts. 
This was particularly true for those from the TS who identified unwillingness amongst LA 
officers and elected members to relinquish decision making power over priority setting and 
resource control as impeding the implementation of a joint commissioning strategy. The LA’s 
more ‘traditional’ orientation towards service delivery rather than ‘place shaping’ was also 
implicated as a barrier to commissioning beyond peripheral service areas funded through 
area-based grants and traditionally seen as better delivered through the TS.  
Place-shaping implied profound change to the traditional roles of the LA and some 
stakeholders had clearly made considerable efforts to resist such radical change.  Local 
decision-makers had aligned themselves around different ways of constructing or 
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interpreting the same policy directive, contingent in part upon their own interests and 
positions. Those who felt the CT and its commissioning role represented a threat to existing 
power relations and structural arrangements for the allocation of resources had constructed 
a counter-narrative around the CTPT as threatening, demonising the people within it as 
resource grabbing and empire building.  LA officers had developed strategies of resistance to 
the CT commissioning agenda including non-attendance at meetings but had, more 
forcefully, used their positional power to veto pooled budget arrangements and block the 
implementation of a previously agreed commissioning strategy.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONSTRUCTING COMMISSIONING 
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter looks at how research participants within the case study constructed meaning 
around commissioning drawing from different policy and political discourses to make sense 
of, or justify, their different positions and actions. The chapter builds on the previous one by 
moving beyond the strategic context for implementing commissioning to explore the 
experiences of commissioned providers.  
It addresses the overarching research question that asks how joint commissioning is 
conceptualised and developed as a tool for identifying and delivering priority outcomes, with 
a particular focus on the following:  
 How do different stakeholders understand the role commissioning might, or might 
not, play in delivering better outcomes for children?  
 What discourses and themes do they draw on to make the case for or against 
commissioning?   
It considers how participants’ understandings of commissioning in theory compared to lived 
experiences identifying a disparity between idealised constructions versus events in practice. 
Interviewees made appeal to different ‘logics of accountability’ in making the case either for 
or against commissioning as a mechanism for coordinating public service provision. The 
chapter thus reflects the themes of accountability and governance introduced in chapters 2 
and 3.   
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The chapter is structured into four sections according to ‘stakeholder’ status. The first 
section considers the views and experiences of the five Senior Commissioning Managers 
(SCM), and their manager the DJC.  
The second stakeholder group includes seven interviewees from five different TS 
organisations all commissioned by the DPJC to provide services to children and young people.   
These organisations reflected the diverse nature of the sector and included: a recently de-
commissioned social enterprise with charitable status; the local branch of a national 
children’s charity; the local branch of a national Christian charity; a local franchise of a 
national charity delivering sexual health services and a local community based trust. Two of 
these organisations had been contracted through LA funding, one through both LA and PCT 
funding and the fourth exclusively through PCT monies.  
The third section explores the experiences of three statutory health service providers 
commissioned through the DPJC and under contract to the PCT. The final section considers 
the views of a group of strategic commissioning sceptics, representing different 
organisations but all members of the CYPTB.  
While each of the stakeholder groups expressed some broadly similar views and experiences 
there were also differences within, as well as between, the groups which are explored.   
7.2 Commissioners accounts  
7.2.1 Delivering accountability through evidence-based decision making   
All five SCMs and the DJC were keen to present a view of commissioning that reflected the 
staged, cyclical process presented in policy documents, briefings and guidance (e.g. HM 
187 
 
Government 2006), and depicted in their own Business Plan (2009) and Joint Commissioning 
Strategy (2007). In contrast to this, they complained that commissioning was commonly 
misunderstood, being typically and mistakenly conflated with procurement or contracting 
and themselves wrongly identified as ‘the people who do contracts’.  One interviewee 
suggested that this reflected an outdated view of commissioning stemming from the 
development of social care markets in the 1990s, an ‘historical thing of contract managers in 
social care’ (SCM: Procurement). They attempted to rectify this, explaining that 
‘commissioning is totally different to purchasing and contracting’ and identifying their role as 
one of ‘bringing about change’ and making ‘some real improvements to services’ (SCM: 
Teenage Pregnancy).   
The case for this potentially transformative role for commissioning was based on the 
expressed belief that it would deliver service improvements by being needs led, evidence-
based and focused on outcomes as opposed to outputs. Members of the DPJC described a 
‘commissioning cycle’ that encompassed a process of rational decision making driven by 
child-centred outcomes. Positioning themselves as ‘knowledge brokers’(Freeman 2007), 
they described themselves as collecting and sifting evidence from a range of sources to 
arrive at honest, open and negotiated  judgements about where and how best to target 
resources. In so doing their accounts could be understood to accord value to the traditional 
Weberian bureaucratic ideals of administrator neutrality and transparency (Du Gay 2005).   
In a statement that mirrored the language of contemporaneous guidance (e.g. HM 
Government 2006) one interviewee summarised commissioning as a process that:    
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 ‘…starts with an understanding of need, it’s done with an outcomes focus. When 
you get to the other part of the commissioning cycle well that’s when you look at 
what services are currently provided ,at whether those services are able to meet 
those needs, assess the evidence for who can best provide this service and what 
needs to change’ (SCM: Teenage Pregnancy)  
This account of the ‘commissioning cycle’ clearly resonates with the staged approach to 
policy making whereby a rational input of evidence is understood to facilitate a form of non-
politicised decision making. The statement makes a number of assumptions, not only about 
the possibility of arriving at an objective definition of ‘need’ but also about the possibility of 
producing evidence of ‘what works’.  It also, by implication, locates failure to meet defined 
objectives with commissioned services.   
Whilst all commissioners produced accounts of commissioning that reflected this evidence-
based, staged approach some recognised and described a dissonance between this as an 
ideal and what was possible in practice. One interviewee described commissioning as ‘a 
process of negotiation’ between ‘existing priorities, community priorities, political priorities 
and government priorities’ that  involved a set of ‘decisions or judgements about the 
importance of that data relevant to other bits of data’  (SCM: Grant-based Programmes). He 
made reference to incidents when priorities identified by elected members had taken 
precedence over professional judgements arguing nonetheless that negotiation on the basis 
of evidence was what ‘we try to pursue in principle’ even though ‘we might not be there yet’.  
One way of resolving the tension between the evidence-based ideal and the need to 
negotiate between differently defined priorities was to locate commissioners outside the 
arena of political decision making.  Hence members of the DPJC described themselves as the 
‘operational arm’ of the CYPTB who did not ‘directly influence through a decision making 
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function’. Instead their role was to provide ‘intelligence and information to the Board’ (SCM: 
Procurement) on which others could choose to act.  Hence the CYPTB was described as 
setting the parameters for commissioners to operate within as ‘advisors’ whose ‘job is to say 
this is the range of options to deliver the outcomes’ while executive teams and politicians 
were ‘the ultimate adjudicators’  who  ‘decide in terms of value for money,  the people they 
are accountable to’(DJC). These commissioners thus positioned themselves ‘facilitators of a 
process’ (SCM: Grant-based Programmes) taking information to the Board and putting into 
action decisions taken there.  In so doing they articulated the possibility of commissioning 
processes (and hence themselves as commissioners) as reinstating some of the traditional 
values of a bureaucratic ethos: an adherence to particular standards of procedure (as 
described by the commissioning cycle) and impersonal non-politicised action (Du Gay 2000).  
With the exception of the procurement manager respondents showed a degree of 
reluctance and, at times embarrassment, in referring to the market management role 
prescribed for commissioners, preferring instead to engage with the more, apparently, 
acceptable lexicon of ‘partnership’.  Thus, as well as being  rational,  commissioning was 
simultaneously  represented as a democratic, inclusive process; a drawing together of 
information from all sources to present a comprehensive picture of need  based  ‘on the 
views of service users, service providers and whatever information, evidence you’ve got of 
what works’  (SCM: Teenage Pregnancy)  
Whilst clearly recognising that decision making took place within a political context and 
could never be entirely ‘rational’, commissioning was nonetheless presented as a potential 
mechanism for enhancing rationality and reducing abuses of political and discretionary 
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power. Respondents were able to provide examples of decision making that they felt had 
been driven by political motives. These included, for example, a recent decision to use grant 
money to fund the provision of cheaper school meals for all primary school children. This 
was described as a Cabinet decision driven by particular members to enhance their 
popularity but making no sense in terms of the available evidence on school dinner uptake 
or alternative proposals made by colleagues in public health.  
There was also a sense of frustration expressed by commissioning managers from a Health 
Services background that elected members were able to override decisions made by the 
CYPTB:  ‘I call it the animal farm. I understand the accountable body route but absolutely 
everything has to go through Cabinet approval which may, or may not, be the same as the 
partnership decision’ (SCM: Procurement). This interviewee was expressing exasperation 
that central-local political lines of accountability took precedence over local partnership 
decisions which to her made a mockery of the CYPTB as a site for shared decision making 
and accountability.  
Despite taking issue with hierarchical lines of accountability several commissioners 
presented themselves as ‘good bureaucrats’, public servants implementing rather than 
making policy. One interviewee described himself and his colleagues as ‘agents of the 
government’ who were ‘there to respond’ (SCM: Grant-based Programmes) to a set of 
government defined priorities.  Overall they appeared to accept rather than challenge the 
policy priorities handed down to them through ECM, Think Family and other initiatives 
relevant to children and families. Whilst expressing irritation and frustration with the 
limitations of the target setting regime they nevertheless welcomed the headline policy 
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objectives as resonating with their own broadly altruistic goals and values. All interviewees 
made frequent reference  to NL’s stated policy intentions including  ‘making the best use of 
resources’ to achieve ‘better outcomes for children and young people’, reorienting services 
‘downstream’ to prevent ‘negative outcomes’,  ‘engaging with children and young people’ in 
designing services  and working to promote ‘good enough parenting’ and ‘positive 
aspirations’.  
The language of collaboration and ‘better outcomes’ was used to argue for a reduced role for 
the LA in delivering children’s services in an idealised pursuit of collective altruistic objectives:  
‘We are all in the same game together for the same ends aren’t we? Improving outcomes for 
children and young people in Downton and working together to achieve that’ (SCM: Teenage 
Pregnancy). This was particularly the case for youth services which were still largely held ‘in-
house’. Commissioners with a remit for targeted youth support and teenage pregnancy felt 
these sorts of services would be better delivered through the TS.  The troubled history of 
service delivery within the LA and a perception that the TS were better placed to meet the 
needs of more marginalised young people were arguments made in favour of a more mixed 
economy of provision.  
Respondents making the case for the greater involvement of the TS typically drew on 
contemporaneous policy representations of the sector as more able to deliver needs-led 
‘localised’ services that ‘know what the kids in their area need’. They were juxtaposed with 
the LA who was represented as insensitive and formulaic, so that the TS were identified as 
‘more sensitive than a centralised service that is provided traditionally along the youth club 
side of things according to a formula’ (DJC).   
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The need to keep ‘clear water’ between a commissioning and providing function was 
reiterated in a number of accounts, justifying the existence of the specialised commissioning 
function offered by the DPJC. The LA was identified as keen to retain its service delivery 
function and recent decisions to bring some key areas of youth provision back ‘in-house’ 
meant both commissioners and TS providers saw them as having ‘vested interests’.  
Commissioning was identified as a means of promoting fair, unbiased and evidence-based 
decision making and ensuring that services were needs rather than service led.  Through 
delivering transparency in decision making and the possibility of making services 
accountable for outcomes they made the case for commissioning as a form of governance 
that combined elements of bureaucratic fair play with the management of a mixed economy 
of welfare.   
7.2.2 The commissioner /provider relationship  
The relationship between commissioner and provider was positioned as critical by all 
commentators on the commissioning process. In discussing this commissioners articulated a 
tension between developing a ‘close relationship’ or ‘partnership’ between provider and 
commissioner whilst ensuring impartiality and the equal treatment of potentially competing 
providers. Their accounts of day to day relationships with providers presented ways of 
bending the rigidity implied by the above accounts of detached decision making 
paradoxically antithetical to an expressed ideal of bureaucratic neutrality.  
A relationship of collaboration between provider and commissioners, of ‘completely 
engaging  with people who are providing services’ (DJC), was understood as necessary to 
ensure the former’s ‘on the ground intelligence’ and professional  ‘expertise’ was 
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complemented by the broader strategic outlook of the latter.  Those within the team 
described themselves as having access to a broader spectrum of evidence than service 
providers enabling the development of a more holistic vision that went beyond the providers’ 
‘close up view’ hence better qualifying them to make strategic judgements. This  ability to 
stand back and make more informed judgements was described by one interviewee as 
rooted in her ‘helicopter vision’ that enabled her to see ‘the wider picture that service 
providers wouldn’t have an idea of’ (SCM: Children’s NHS Services).    
They described commissioning as ‘more involved, more engaged’ contrasting this with the 
older, more adversarial, ‘cold’ approach of purchasing that involves doing ‘a head count and 
then sending the figures off’. Instead commissioning was characterised by a closeness of 
relationship between provider and purchaser as well as ‘a genuine in-depth understanding of 
needs’ (SCM: Procurement).   
For some commissioners a critical ingredient in this relationship was a shared professional 
background with providers. This was specifically the case with the two health service 
commissioners who described their clinical backgrounds as a vital component in developing 
relationships of mutual respect and trust with providers. One described herself as ‘quite 
approachable as a commissioner’ on account of the fact that she had ‘come up from the 
ranks over the years and having been a nurse and an operational manager of teenage 
pregnancy and sexual health services’ (SCM: Teenage Pregnancy).   
For this interviewee the requirement to have a local Teenage Pregnancy Board was 
identified as having facilitated more inclusive ways of identifying local needs and strategies 
for meeting them. This was endorsed by the testimonies of TS providers who described 
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relationships of local collaboration between providers and commissioners of sexual health 
services that involved consultation and planning ‘outside committee type structures’,  
corresponding more closely  to the idea of  networked governance albeit with a power 
imbalance between sectors.  
7.2.3 Delivering managerial accountability 
The language of inclusion and relational contracting however sat in tension with a 
managerial discourse around efficiency and value for money.  The notion of partnership was 
contradicted by other ways in which commissioners constructed the relationship between 
providers and themselves as performance managers and the principal-agent fears they 
expressed.  In their accounts of commissioning in practice there was evidence of a set of 
dilemmas played out between the ideal of collaborative contracting and achieving 
managerial accountability through cost savings and meeting targets. Members of the DPJC 
frequently drew on the discourse of NPM to depict commissioning as a tool for increasing 
efficiency and contract management as the principal mechanism for ‘agent control’. For 
example, the Procurement Manager explained that they were ‘rigorous in our financial 
management, really ruthless and interrogating to understand the value for money angle’ 
while a SCM explained how they required ‘evidence of expenditure, they can’t just tell us, 
they have to produce evidence, because we’ve got to make sure that the money we have got 
is being used effectively (SCM: Grant-based Programmes).  
Whilst commissioners talked the language of inclusion and cooperation and in some 
instances had clearly achieved relationships of mutual trust and cooperation with providers, 
there were other situations where this had either broken down in the face of 
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decommissioning or had never been the case.  Commissioned TS organisations were all 
dependant to varying degrees on funding from the statutory sector and the balance of 
power in determining priorities clearly lay with commissioners.  Whilst the broad objective 
of ‘better outcomes for children and young people’ may have been shared how this could be 
achieved and who should be prioritised were sometimes contested and congruence of lower 
order objectives was not always possible. In these situations commissioners made recourse 
to the language of targets and evidence-based decision making to explain and justify 
decommissioning decisions.  
Hence the Procurement Manager explained that one organisation had not had their contract 
renewed on the basis that they were spending too long working with families and not 
achieving output targets. In another example the SCM for Teenage Pregnancy described how 
she had recently de-commissioned a service provided by a local TS organisation working with 
South Asian young women who despite   ‘doing some really valuable work’ were not ‘helping 
me meet my targets’. Although previously identified as a target group ‘new data’ on teenage 
conceptions, combined with ‘no evidence that the work they are doing impacts on teenage 
pregnancy’ meant their service was no longer ‘a high priority’.   
7.2.4 Maintaining and extending commissioner influence  
Despite describing a relationship of collaboration with providers some commissioners 
complained that they were still only commissioning ‘on the edges of children’s services’ 
which limited their scope of influence in how services were delivered. They described 
creative strategies for extending this influence, and hence their own power base, for 
example by ‘giving them members of staff who sit within their organisation’ or developing 
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‘partnership agreements’ that ensured service monitoring information was passed to 
commissioners.  In situations where they had lost control of budgets and hence contracts 
some described tactics and incentives to ensure providers continued to deliver what they 
wanted allowing them to maintain a degree of managerial power:   ‘to try keep 
commissioning control I offered them a little bit of resource development monies and asked 
them to report on what they were doing, yet I wasn’t commissioning their work anymore’ 
(SCM: Grant-based Programmes)  
While some commissioners described themselves as ‘change agents’ and commissioning as a 
mechanism for ‘evolving services’ they recognised that this was limited by the marginal 
elements of funding over which they had control. Members of the DPJC felt they should be 
accorded a greater role, with budgetary responsibility for ‘bigger contracts’ and more 
extensive areas of children’s services provision. The DJC felt they needed to be more 
proactive in making the case for commissioning arguing that there was a need to educate 
different stakeholders about its capacity to reform service provision ‘We have is a 
responsibility as a team to be more out there and stop being defensive, to get out there and 
be evangelistic persuading everyone else of the value of commissioning’.  
As a tool for improving delivery they argued that commissioning should be extended to 
include universal mainstream provision as well as specialist targeted services. Hence, for 
example, the DJC argued that the LA should ‘move in a more commissioning type direction 
around schools’ in order for them to ‘be more effective’. In her account this was because 
commissioning involved challenging providers which in turn she identified as a mechanism 
for improvement. Whilst the LA was responsible for the performance of schools it ‘has no 
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way of changing what goes on except intervening when it goes into special measures’. She 
argued that a commissioning approach through challenging and applying implicit sanctions 
could drive improvement with the  suggestion that commissioning type activity was 
potentially able to deliver the ‘whole cultural shift’ needed to improve educational 
achievement in schools.  
7.2.5 Managing the market 
The DJC’s argument in favour of commissioning as a mechanism for delivering service 
improvements through  challenging providers  resonates with Grace et al’s (2007) definition 
of ‘challenge’ as a broad concept within which contestability and competition are subsumed. 
However, the use of contestability and competition were only referred to obliquely by 
commissioners and the notion of ‘market management’ was the one ‘stage’ in the 
commissioning cycle that they were reluctant to engage with. With the exception of the 
Procurement Manager, commissioners alluded only briefly and theoretically to markets, 
contestability and the use of competition between providers. The commissioner for 
children’s NHS services, for example, discussed the possibility of going to a neighbouring PCT 
if the health visiting service did not ‘deliver against outcomes’ while simultaneously 
admitting that they were not currently contracted against outcomes and that the local 
service was their ‘preferred provider’.  
The Procurement Manager, however, discussed at some length the desirability of a more 
extensive TS market in children’s services and was an advocate of capacity building amongst 
smaller TSOs to promote their business and financial management skills and facilitate their 
competitiveness.  She described the need to ‘generate a vibrant provider market from small 
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providers’ in order to give commissioners more choice with respect to meeting the needs of 
marginalised young people. At the same time she described the LA as the main provider of 
targeted youth services and explained that ‘the direction of travel has been to pull services 
in-house’ and that this sat at odds with direction from central government to build the 
capacity of the TS.  She also made several points about the way current rules and contract 
regulations whilst designed to deliver fairness actually meant the market was so managed as 
to rule out engagement of smaller TSOs. In particular she stressed how risky it was for 
smaller organisations to invest in developing services to deliver against short term contracts 
that might not be renewed in light of shifting priorities. Nonetheless she discussed having 
de-commissioned smaller organisations because ‘they had done the task we set them, given 
us the information and we wanted to move on from there’.  
In summary, commissioning was identified by these stakeholders as a mechanism for 
enhancing the rationality of local policy making through reference to the staged 
commissioning ‘cycle’ described in policy guidance. As a rational, disinterested but 
simultaneously inclusive process for co-ordinating service provision commissioning was 
understood to offer an alternative to existing hierarchies and imperfect markets that were 
seen as compromised by vested interests and conflict between statutory and TS providers.   
However there were tensions between the ideal of evidence-based decision making and 
collaborative contractual relationships and a concern with delivering managerial 
accountability.  
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7.3 Third Sector providers   
This section provides an account of how TS providers understood and experienced 
commissioning. Previous experiences of tendering and contracting through the LA had left 
some providers cynical about the transparency and fairness of local decision-making. One 
provider contracted through the PCT, however, reported positive experiences.   TS providers 
argued in favour of commissioning as a fairer mechanism for determining who should 
provide public services identifying themselves as best placed to deliver to more marginalised 
groups and communities.    
7.3.1 Advocating for commissioning  
While TS experiences as commissioned services were diverse common themes did emerge. 
Despite mixed experiences of commissioning in practice, TS providers presented themselves 
as strong advocates of commissioning in principle. Their accounts suggested that it held the 
potential to deliver a promise of enhanced democracy and better outcomes by challenging 
bureaucratic LA systems of service delivery.  With the exception of one participant 
contracted almost solely through the PCT, TS providers drew on familiar pejorative accounts 
of bureaucratic modes of governance to make the case for a greater mixed economy of 
welfare and an enhanced role for commissioning as the coordinator of this process.  They 
discussed inefficiency and poor practice in the LA where it was felt that bureaucratic 
inflexibility and a lack of vision had led to poor performance in a number of service areas, in 
particular children’s social care and the youth service. They described LA managers as 
disempowered by outmoded systems and rules so that even where they might want to ‘get 
rid of poor performing staff… their hands are tied because of the system’.  By way of contrast 
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their organisations were variously described as less bureaucratic, more flexible and better 
placed to respond to local and marginalised communities.   
The statutory children’s services agenda was identified as heavily driven by the centre and 
the pattern of local resource allocation understood to reflect centrally identified priorities. 
Both the LA and the PCT were represented as kowtowing to centralised targets and the 
requirements of audit and inspection regimes so that ‘They look over their shoulder at what 
others are doing, they look up to government and what they want them to do and out of that 
they produce a plan’.  
Education in particular was identified as the dominant sector with educational achievement 
and attainment figures being the basis for much local planning and priority setting disputing 
the notion of more inclusive needs led agenda. The power to set the local policy agenda was 
described as top-down,  residing within both bureaucratic and professional interest groups 
and in particular with those from a background in education. This was described as a barrier 
to developing services from a neighbourhood perspective in particular the preventative 
services delivered through Sure Start Children’s Centres and Extended Schools which some 
TS providers felt would be better delivered through their own organisations.    
Unlike their statutory sector colleagues who were more likely to articulate concerns related 
to hierarchical and managerial accountability, TS providers more closely identified 
themselves as working for, and accountable to, children, young people and communities:  ‘I 
am working for the sake of young people who are homeless or young people who are trying 
to support themselves…or supporting parents who feel isolated’. They described their 
organisations as needs-led and their priorities determined from the bottom-up. The 
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presenting needs of communities were identified as coming first ‘irrespective of what the 
Local Authority thinks its priorities are’. Where they saw their priorities merge whilst they 
‘might have a meeting of minds’ they were not ‘going to fulfil the Local Authorities’ strategic 
objectives for the sake of it’.   
One exception was the TS provider on a PCT contract to deliver sexual health services and 
outreach. His organisation had evolved to become almost exclusively dependent on PCT 
funding over the previous thirteen years. During this time its work had been brought in line 
with PCT defined priorities with programmes of work and staff recruited according to PCT 
requirements. As a manager working in an increasingly competitive environment he showed 
a willingness to engage with a managerial discourse of performance targets and efficiency 
positioning himself as ahead of the game in terms of data management and more than able 
to meet contractual requirements. In comparison to other TS providers involved in the case 
study this interviewee appeared to have pragmatically accepted the absorption of his 
organisation into the domain of the public sector and did not challenge the imperatives of 
working to PCT defined objectives and targets.    
7.3.2 Vested interests and political whims  
Local experience of decision making had shaped TS concerns about existing mechanisms for 
governance and accountability. In their accounts of recent decisions to bring services ‘in-
house’ they appeared ambiguous about the ability of local members to deliver democratic 
accountability. At the same time they described the LA as unable to act as a true service 
commissioner because of ‘too many vested interests’ connected to their unwillingness to 
relinquish their provider role.   Commissioning was identified as a possible mechanism for 
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removing in-house provider bias by taking resource decisions away from statutory sector 
providers and establishing ‘clear water’ between the latter and a set of independent 
commissioners.  This was described as currently compromised by existing LA organisational 
arrangements that rendered the distinction between a providing and commissioning 
function unclear. Like commissioners they principally showed frustration with LA domination 
over the provision of youth services; a situation unlikely to change as:  
The same person that was sitting on the commissioning board was the head 
of the youth service. There is no way he is going to give up any money and 
he’s sitting making the decisions about some fringe monies that we couldn’t 
have’.  
Invoking the imagery of an ossified, centrist, top-down bureaucracy, providers described 
elected members and LA officers as acting to expand their own domains of power and 
control, putting their interests before those of children and young people. By way of 
contrast, a commissioning approach that offered the TS the opportunity to compete on a 
‘level playing field’ was described as a tool for delivering ‘better quality services at lower 
cost’. For TS commissioning advocates the LA reticence to embrace commissioning was 
viewed as an ideological rejection of market-type reforms to service provision, with one 
interviewee describing  the decision to bring foster care back in-house as a ‘Stalinist thing to 
do’. These providers articulated a ‘Third Way’ discourse promoting a pragmatic mix of state 
and market as the best way of delivering welfare and stressing the idea that ‘what matters is 
what works’ rather than who provides it:    
 They object to spending money outside. What they are doing is re-building a 
children’s services state monopoly. What they are not doing is building an 
effective agency that analyses need and buys in services whether in-house or 
external that delivers what is needed’  
203 
 
Within the Borough a recent critical case in point had been the decision to bring the 
Connexions service ‘in-house’. The decision had come under intense criticism from a number 
of interviewees from both the DPJC and the TS seen as a demonstration of how the LA had 
resisted market-style reforms and preferred decision making based on political objectives:  
 ‘It was based on a political whim that really had nothing to do with the Children 
and Young People’s Partnership and they had no knowledge, weren’t consulted 
and was of course driven by a political agenda’.   
Furthermore the political nature of the decision taken by Cabinet members had given rise to 
a considerable degree of cynicism about the ability of formal partnership arrangements to 
deliver transparency and public accountability. The potential for commissioning to provide 
an evidence-based and detached process for coordinating service delivery was articulated by 
these interviewees. Like commissioners they represented it as ‘a more transparent, open 
and objective way of trying to achieve something’ than current processes for allocating 
resources.   
However there were different opinions about the degree to which commissioning might 
entail a form of ‘democratic deficit’. One interviewee expressed some discomfort about 
commissioning potentially displacing politically legitimate hierarchical lines of accountability 
through locally elected councillors, ‘you’ve got local councillors that have been voted there 
and these commissioners haven’t been voted there,’   reflecting the complexity of working in 
the context of overlapping regimes of governance.     
The case for commissioning was expressed in much stronger neo-liberal terms by one TS 
provider who, whilst in favour of a system of publicly-funded welfare, championed the 
extension of a competitive market in children’s services as a mechanism for driving quality 
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and ensuring user needs are put before providers. His accounts gave strong endorsement to 
a business ethos in welfare delivery prioritising the market over other forms of governance 
so that: ‘In principle I think it [the market] should be everything. Because you need to have 
real markers that push people into trying to do the best they possibly can for children’. 
Somewhat apologetically, as if wary of appearing overly neo-liberal, he championed the case 
for a system similar to that in the US suggesting that a market-based approach conferred 
flexibility, promoted better provision and hence was the preferred mechanism for delivering 
accountability to service users:  
‘Sorry but I sometimes think the American model of how to deliver social 
care has huge advantages. Essentially county and state agencies know what 
they want and if they’re not getting it they switch over. You can’t do that in 
house. Sometimes these things concentrate the mind they shouldn’t but 
that’s life’.  
However, there was less willingness among other providers to unreservedly accept the 
principle of managerial and market-based governance. Some expressed a strong anti-
managerial sentiment alongside the idea that commissioning risked becoming ‘over-cooked’ 
by excessive bureaucracy. They drew attention to the resource costs associated with 
meeting the demands of managerial accountability in the context of contracting out. A 
common theme expressed by provider advocates of commissioning was that it should not be 
complicated or over-managed but instead be a collaborative endeavour that ensured the 
delivery of high quality services underpinned by ‘a value base’ that put the needs of children, 
families and communities first. This was linked to a sense of horizontal accountability 
between commissioners and providers as peers in a negotiated process of priority setting 
and service planning.  In contrast to the traditional bureaucratic principle of separation of 
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personal value from the duty of office this interviewee called for an approach to 
commissioning that was founded on passion, personal values and vision:  
What you want to do is work with people who have a genuine interest. Not 
just a load of people who are good at putting tenders together  so that 
you’ve got an industry of people that just know the rules. You want to get 
down to people who are really passionate about delivering something and 
working with them, saying these people are really good how can we work 
with them to make it better’   
Wastell et al (2010) coin the term ‘Svejkism’ to refer to the use of derision to expose 
managerial power as based on absurd rules thus facilitating a form of passive resistance it. 
With a degree of ‘Svejkism’ this interviewee rejected the more neo-liberal components of 
commissioning establishing his own personal ethic of working from a value-base. Like his 
commissioner colleagues he was more comfortable with the discourse of partnership than 
markets arguing the case for a form of relational contracting that was based on strong 
collaborative relationships but that took a grounded rather than managerial approach.   
7.3.3 Grace and favour, done deals and beauty contests 
 The vision of a transparent and objective commissioning process articulated by providers 
had much in common with that given by commissioners. Like theirs however it reflected the 
policy guidance on commissioning rather than lived experience. TS providers were all able to 
describe a set of real world scenarios that suggested the version of commissioning 
advocated existed as a normative construction rather than a lived reality. Having given 
examples of partnership decisions being overridden by local politicians they suggested that 
past experiences of gaining contracts had been based on ‘grace and favour’ and ‘who you 
know’ so that   ‘If you don’t do commissioning I have to go around chatting up politicians or 
use a different approach with the PCT’.   
206 
 
Paradoxically this was a situation that favoured this particular respondent. He described 
himself as a ‘lifeish’ person, by which he meant he felt relationships between people were 
more important than procedure. He described how he actively networked with decision 
makers in order to win contracts and funding for his organisation. Representing the world as 
functioning through the development of personal influence he described decision making as 
concentrated in the hands of the few explaining the need to influence key players in order to 
get on:  
‘In Downton like anywhere there are only about half a dozen people who 
make decisions. We’ve got 78 councillors in Downton only 6 make any 
decisions all the rest just follow. So if you want anything to happen 
politically you have to make sure you can influence those six people who 
make the decisions and it’s the same in the PCT. Half a dozen people, so 
finding those people, winning them over, building a relationship with them’    
Six of the seven TS interviewees gave accounts of occasions when contracts had been 
awarded apparently without due regard to formal process and mechanisms, describing  
situations when rules had been bent or broken and certain providers favoured over others. 
Hence TS interviewees described occasions when projects had been handed over to 
preferred or trusted providers without a formal tendering process being followed. 
One interviewee gave an example of how this had worked in his favour describing how he 
had been approached by the LA to take over from a failing organisation that had been 
contracted to deliver an outreach family support service:     
‘If you looked at [Name of project] it was delivered by [name of TSO] funded 
by the LA and it was a basket case locally so they asked me if I could do 
anything. So I took them over, that didn’t go to a tender I just went and 
trouble shooted’.   
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In a second incident he described how he had been awarded the contract to develop a Sure 
Start Children’s Centre so that ‘even though I went through a bit of a beauty contest at the 
beginning, I only got that because I was local and they trusted me’.  
In these examples personal relationships and informal processes for deciding on resource 
allocation had clearly stood in place of fair and open competition. Whilst this provider had 
benefited from this other providers described feeling angry by what they felt were abuses of 
LA power.  Their experiences had led to a degree of scepticism about the process of 
commissioning in practice, leading one interviewee to ask whether commissioning ‘is a fair 
and reasonable process or just a tool to justify what they were going to do anyway’. He 
described what he had clearly experienced as a very negative example of contracting when 
the LA had invited tenders for a family advice centre. After submitting an application a 
chance conversation with another provider had revealed that this organisation ‘knew that 
they were going to get the money’, so that the contract was a ‘done deal, it was already 
sorted. It was a commissioning process by name but not in reality’.  
Another interviewee described how the CT pathfinder had put out a tender for a TS 
organisation to employ a local ‘Children’s Commissioner’ that was ‘impossible to deliver with 
the money available’. Despite a number of prospective providers offering suggestions for 
how this could be delivered differently this interviewee felt the ‘CT sort of used it as a 
process to justify an alternative course of action’. A further example was given of a tender 
put out for the management of what was described as a ‘commercially unsustainable nursery’ 
that had previously been subsidised through the former Neighbourhood Nurseries Initiative 
and Sure Start but was now expected to run independently.  
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In these examples the principles of competition and contestability had been compromised. 
Faulty commissioning processes had clearly been experienced as, not only unfair, but also 
time-consuming and administratively burdensome especially given that some tenders turned 
out to be ‘not really viable’. Nonetheless TS providers still emerged as champions of 
commissioning precisely because, if administered with due regard to the principles of fair 
and open competition, it was understood as a potential mechanism for strengthening their 
role in delivering public services.   
The experiences of the TS provider contracted solely through the PCT were couched in 
more positive terms.  He felt that he was working in a more open and competitive 
‘market’ type environment in which the active development of positive relationships 
with commissioners was nonetheless critical so that ‘developing and maintaining the 
relationship with commissioners is a key part of my role’. Part of the reason behind this 
was the need to be able to adapt his service in line with commissioner expectations 
and demands and establish himself as a trusted provider.  He distanced himself from 
his TS peers who he represented as thinking that they were ‘there by divine right and 
by being there through divine right they can ask for special treatment’. He explained 
that this was not what he expected and established his credentials as a professional in 
a way that implied an acceptance of a more business-like relationship between the two 
sectors that should involve compromise:  
 I have always tried to understand where the commissioners are coming from, 
understand the limitations that are imposed on public expenditure. We do a 
professional job and my approach is to present that to commissioners. Yes we’ve 
had disappointments in the past but that’s life. What is important is to develop 
the relationships so that you can iron those things out’.  
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He was also extremely positive about the collaborative processes and forums that had been 
developed over time to allow providers to help shape services in new directions explaining 
that ‘Downton have been incredibly responsive and amenable to taking on new ideas’. In the 
highly specific and well- funded context of teenage pregnancy there had been time to set up 
and maintain local partnership forums that had enabled this form of collaborative 
relationship to be established.  However, collaboration had also been facilitated by a 
relationship of mutual dependence that had grown up over the thirteen years that his 
organisation had been under contract to the PCT to deliver a service the NHS had been 
traditionally poor at. In this his situation was not dissimilar to other TS organisations that 
similarly enjoyed historical funding relationships as preferred and trusted providers.  
In summary, TS providers emerged as strong advocates of a commissioning process that 
reflected the model described by policy guidance. This was because it was understood as 
representing a fairer and more transparent way of identifying providers and allocating 
resources than current systems. With the exception of one provider contracted through the 
PCT these stakeholders complained that current practices favoured in-house providers or 
worked on a system of ‘grace and favour’ characterised by informal and non-competitive 
practices.  
7.4 NHS providers 
This stakeholder group included three NHS providers, one of whom also sat on the CYPTB. 
Although commissioned through the DPJC they experienced commissioning in the context of 
the statutory organisational separation of provider and purchaser functions in the NHS.   
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7.4.1 World class commissioning isn’t world class  
Whilst the three NHS providers commissioned by the DPJC under PCT contracts had different 
experiences of commissioning they shared a common frustration that the process was 
‘contacts driven rather than outcome focused’. For these providers commissioning was 
experienced as an often inflexible and prescriptive contracting process that was: ‘not 
outcome focused in terms of children and families and what’s best for them it’s driven by 
contacts, by face to face’. Thus, contrary to the argument that commissioning would deliver 
more responsive and needs led services, these providers suggested that a primary concern 
with evidencing efficiency and cost-effectiveness compromised their ability to deliver flexible 
and needs led provision.   
The system of contracting on the basis of outputs, defined as ‘face to face’ contacts, 
presented a particular problem for the Head of Children’s Community Health Services 
(HCCHS) who described it as militating against delivering user-led services. As the manager 
of a health visiting service in an almost uniformly deprived LA she explained that contracting 
by contacts did not take due account of the need for crisis intervention or the sort of 
intensive support required by some families in the borough. This, she explained, made her 
service qualitatively different to other services and was therefore difficult to cost:  ‘because 
families go into crisis. You could cost the service out by saying on average a Health Visitor or 
school nurse might do six face to faces but if a family goes into crisis that will drop to one’ 
(HCCHS).   
Being contracted on a face to face basis was also described as posing limitations on the 
capacity of her staff to contribute to a wider preventative agenda and work in more 
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developmental and holistic ways with other providers:  ‘My main worry is that the climate 
we are working in is such that the partnership working and the inequalities in public health 
aren’t part of commissioning’.  She explained that outcomes for children and families are 
complex and therefore not reducible to single interventions but require ‘multi-agency joined 
up working’ not recognised by the current PCT contracting culture whereby services are 
contracted on an individualised output basis:   
‘I have to tell my staff don’t work in a children’s centre, don’t do that 
because we don’t get paid for it we only get paid for face to face. Where is 
the point in going to a meeting about domestic violence if we’re not going 
to get paid for it? That sounds really harsh but it’s the reality. We get paid 
for contacts’  
With a contracting system concerned with outputs rather than outcomes, this meant that 
the type of data they spent time collecting was principally concerned with demonstrating 
managerial accountability rather than evidence of service effectiveness.   All three providers 
suggested that this form of single service accountability worked against producing 
meaningful evidence of how services jointly contributed to population based outcomes in 
particular those that required input at different levels. These providers were concerned that 
accountability to children and families for outcomes was compromised by accountability for 
outputs:  
It’s whether or not you’re only measuring the outcome based on us as a service or 
if you are taking it to include the wider inequalities. Like obesity, one service alone 
isn’t going to get a reduction in obesity. It’s due to lots of things so yes we might 
do one thing as a service but someone else will do something else so it’s looking 
at other children’s services.  (Director of Women and Children’s services)  
As the next chapter explores these providers valued professional knowledge and ‘on the 
ground intelligence’ over other forms of evidence, presenting this as more immediate and 
relevant than the information supplied by public health or through administrative systems of 
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data collection. The information informing commissioning decisions was seen as out of touch 
and too generalised to provide an adequate basis on which to make assessments of need so 
that ‘world class commissioning just isn’t world class at the moment’.  Although there was a 
general acceptance that it was necessary to ‘get the datamatics right’ reporting and 
monitoring systems were experienced as administratively burdensome and  very time 
consuming to the point of detracting attention from working with families. Inputting service 
data was described as something ‘some staff won’t do because they’ll prioritise going to see 
a client’. However, for the service manager tasked with evidencing outputs it was reluctantly 
acknowledged to be ‘as important to put that stuff on the computer as it is to go out and see 
a client… because we are now in a more business like climate (HCCHS).  
7.4.2 Commissioner/provider Relationships   
Despite experiencing commissioners in general as having a greater degree of power over 
determining priorities and establishing the criteria for performance accountability, NHS 
providers described individual relationships with commissioners as constructive and 
collaborative.  The constraints placed on providers by the system of contracting were 
understood as institutional, the product of a set of systems and legal requirements outside 
the control of individual commissioners. Accounts given by providers suggested that 
relationships with individuals from the DPJC were indeed characterised by the form of 
relational contracting described by commissioners themselves. Providers highlighted the 
importance of communication and dialogue and the development of trust with 
commissioners. Above all they stressed the importance of commissioner knowledge of their 
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service and ‘meaningful dialogue’ as the critical foundation on which ‘flexible’ and 
‘productive’ relationships had been built.     
However, there was also a cautionary note struck with the suggestion that more positive 
commissioning experiences rested on a variant of what Edwards et al (2008) refer to as ‘hero 
practitioners’; critical individuals upon whom the success or survival of particular services or 
practices  depends. The DJC and both PCT commissioners on her team were identified as 
having in-depth knowledge of the service areas they were responsible for due to their being 
clinically trained with extensive practice based experience. Removing these key individuals 
from the commissioning equation was identified as potentially problematic with formal 
systems not adequate on their own to ensure that the contracting process would proceed 
with due regard to provider perspectives:  
 ‘[SCM: Children/NHS] has been fantastic because she knows the service but you 
could have a children’s commissioner that doesn’t understand and children’s 
services are complex. So [Name] started to come to the meetings where we were 
looking at the service specification and it was complex to try to bottom it out. But 
she is one person if she left, well. I don’t think we’ve got commissioning right yet’.  
Whilst relationships between joint commissioning managers and NHS providers were 
described in positive terms and service level agreements had clearly been developed in a 
climate of mutual collaboration there was a frustration expressed about the lack of ‘time out 
to do some blue sky thinking’ and renegotiate contracts on the basis of care pathways or 
user outcomes. Both providers and commissioners were aware of the limitations of current 
contracting conventions but had not, thus far, had time to rethink them and orientate them 
more towards outcomes.  
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In summary, NHS providers principally identified a set of problems associated with current 
NHS commissioning processes. Their accounts suggested that the managerial forms of 
accountability associated with commissioning against outputs were of little internal value 
and furthermore compromised the ability of their services to respond flexibly to 
professionally identified client needs and the broader preventative agenda. Despite positive 
relationships with individual commissioners institutional contracting practices were 
experienced as unhelpful and undermining to professionally defined priorities.  
7.5 Strategic commissioning sceptics   
This section brings together the accounts of small group of strategic stakeholders who sat on 
the CYPTB and expressed scepticism about the importance of commissioning as a process for 
improving services. Three of these participants were senior officers in the LA, one was the 
DPH and the fifth the former independent Chair of the CYPTB.    
As the previous chapter established, the idea of developing as a commissioning organisation 
was described as ‘an alien concept in the Local Authority…where the providers are the people 
who determine what is provided’. What commissioning advocates suggested was that as an 
institution the LA did not understand or accept the concept of a commissioner/provider 
divide or the possibility of anything approaching an internal ‘quasi-market’.  On the other 
hand the idea of ‘functional matching’, the principle that the TS might be better suited to the 
delivery of certain services was observed to be widely accepted in theory so that, for 
example ‘the idea that a very small locally based club can actually deliver more effective 
services to the kids in that area is very widely accepted’ (DPC). However it was also observed 
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that the LA would not perceive this as commissioning but would instead ‘see it as the old 
fashioned grant –type giving to voluntary sector organisations’.   
This interviewee was explicitly raising the question of what is understood by the term 
commissioning suggesting that the LA had got it wrong. Commissioners were keen to claim 
their understanding as the correct one and suggested that it was a misplaced fear of 
commissioning borne out of ignorance that was at the root of a LA resistance to it. As the 
previous chapter discussed, the DJC had identified the DCS as impeding the development of 
her directorate’s commissioning role claiming that this was in part borne out of a 
misunderstanding.  Yet he, like others, was keen to point out that commissioning means 
different things to different people: ‘One of the problems with commissioning is that the 
language around it is very loose. Some people talk about it as if it were procurement, some 
as if it were a competitive tendering process or privatisation and contestability’. In many 
ways the definition he then gave of commissioning was similar to that of members of the 
DPJC, so that, although expressed in jargon-free language, it echoed the model of staged 
decision making presented by guidance:   
 I think it can be brought down to some quite simple questions: What do people 
need, and how do we know that?  What have we got, is what we’ve got any good, 
and if not how are we going to change that?’ (DCS)  
However he was clearly sceptical of the degree to which the development of a competitive 
children’s services market could solve existing problems of service delivery. He identified a 
limited transformative role for commissioning arguing that the entrenched problems within 
children’s social care were not amenable to market type solutions. Instead he suggested that 
strong leadership and investment in workforce development was necessary to ‘loosen some 
216 
 
major blockages’ in the LA and facilitate changes in ‘some very old-fashioned work place 
attitudes’, positioning commissioning as just ‘one of the possible tools in the bag’ to help 
deliver improvement.   
This was a position supported by both the Chair and the DPH who argued that change 
needed to happen through a variety of processes and that commissioning was only of 
marginal relevance to service improvement. The Chair emerged as fairly scathing in his 
account of commissioning suggesting it was confused with planning, the term being used too 
broadly to make sense. Furthermore he positioned strategic commissioning as an outmoded 
policy directive from which ‘the world has moved on’. He suggested that ‘at the time the CT 
was set up commissioning might have been a good process to drive through service reform’ 
but that its relevance had since diminished. This was put more strongly by the Head of 
Extended Schools who argued that ‘joint commissioning is a tin of beans not worth the 
money’.  In his account commissioning had no role to play in school improvement and had 
‘absolutely no relevance to the extended schools agenda’.  
The DCS also challenged the perception that the LA was institutionally averse to 
commissioning, pointing out that many of its back office functions had been contracted out 
to large private sector organisations. Instead he described the council as part of a ‘mixed 
economy, providing services where it makes sense to do so either because of value for money 
and efficiency or because there is a political or moral imperative’ and going to alternative 
providers where this made pragmatic sense.  
In discussing the role of the LA in coordinating a mixed economy of welfare he was keen to 
distinguish between this and the organisational and managerial separation of commissioners 
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and providers as in the NHS. He suggested that most Cabinet members would not welcome 
this within the LA. He expressed a range of concerns about what he described as this ‘pure 
commissioning model’ suggesting that the associated transaction costs would compromise 
efficiency ‘as there are costs associated with a sharp commissioner provider distinction 
because you often end up with a doubling of function in some ways unless you are very smart 
about it’ 
One of his chief concerns hinged around issues of accountability. Unlike commissioning 
advocates his account gave a strong defence of existing systems of political and hierarchical 
lines of accountability. He expressed support for some of the recent decisions taken that had 
been held up by others as examples of abuses of political power, arguing that: ‘Sometimes 
decisions are made of the basis of political viability, expediency, developing voter allegiance. 
But politics is the way we resolve major public contested policy issues in democracy isn’t it?’  
He suggested that the LA would want to maintain control of core services identifying 
safeguarding and child protection as ‘fundamental to the council’ and argued that the ethical 
barriers to commissioning external providers were set too high in this service area:   
 I wouldn’t contract out safeguarding for example.  I certainly wouldn’t contract 
that out to a for-profit organisation. It seems to be at best morally dubious to be 
doing child protection on the basis of being about trying to generate a profit. It 
would lead to all kinds of perverse incentives and behaviours’. 
Previous experience with an under-performing TSO formerly contracted to deliver 
residential care for looked after children had left officers and members more reticent about 
contracting out-of-house and a recent proposal for a social work practice pilot was described 
as a ‘bridge too far’ for many within the LA. 
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This interviewee was keen to point out that contracting services away from the statutory 
sector presented a set of challenges to managerial and political forms of accountability. 
Given that the LA are ultimately held to account for meeting performance targets and 
ensuring safeguarding he argued that it was in their best interests to maintain control of 
delivery in order to meet statutory obligations: ‘I think on key areas we want to be careful 
that the council would have the degree of control necessary over its statutory responsibilities’.   
However, he also expressed a set of tensions between being a public servant accountable 
through centrally determined targets and elected members and being critically sceptical of 
the more managerial aspects of this. In his defence of more politically motivated decisions 
he presented a justification of these as ‘meeting key targets and priorities’ whilst at other 
times arguing that it was conceptually misguided to hold public services to account over 
issues they had very little real control over: ‘I think senior civil servants realise that it’s 
bloody difficult to hold a LA to account for infant mortality. How am I supposed to stop 
consanguinity?’ This comment reflects the invidious position of responsibility without power 
placed on all DCSs who, while accountable to all ECM targets, only have a managerial remit 
for the social care and education functions of the LA.  
As a professional with a background in teaching the DCS presented himself as a critically 
reflective practitioner showing a readiness to challenge centrally determined policy. He was 
critical of the concept of evidence-based policy and the rational model of decision making 
presented by commissioning arguing that experiential professional knowledge was as, if not 
more, important than administrative and performance based data. Unlike commissioners 
who suggested that they were able to engage with provider knowledge and negotiate 
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between different perspectives he identified the organisational separation of commissioners 
and providers as a major flaw in commissioning as a process:   
‘I don’t think it works. You lose the vital insight into what you actually need to 
deliver. In pure commissioning models the provider is pushed out of the process 
and the needs analysis so that you end up trying to make decisions on a restricted 
set of information’.  
These observations begin to pick up on the use of evidence in decision making which is the 
theme for the next chapter. They also, however, make the case for both hierarchical and 
professional lines of accountability that together were used to justify a more cautious 
approach to the role of commissioning and an expanded market in children’s services.  
7.6 Summary 
This chapter has explored the different ways in which interviewees framed understandings 
of the role commissioning might play in managing and co-ordinating the delivery of 
children’s services.   Implied in the accounts and experiences of different stakeholders were 
a range of interpretations of commissioning from grant giving, to managing a quasi –market, 
to the whole process of strategic planning and the management of a mixed economy of 
welfare.  Interviewees made frequent appeal to different ethics of accountability in making 
the case for or against commissioning as a mechanism of governance for the delivery of 
children’s services.  
Commissioners represented themselves as ‘honest brokers’ appealing to the rhetoric of an 
evidence-based staged approach to local policy making as represented in official guidance 
and replicated in their own policy documents. In so doing they asserted the importance of 
disinterested, a-political decision making coupled with hierarchical and managerial 
accountability.  
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Commissioner accounts also reflected a number of tensions between the form of rational 
democratic accountability implied by the idea of commissioning as negotiated judgement   
and the political imperative of delivering managerial accountability.   Hence they also drew 
on managerial discourses of efficiency describing commissioning as a process for delivering 
value for money. Whilst there was evidence of the development of relational contracting 
between some providers and commissioners some TS providers produced accounts of 
commissioning that sat in tension with this more idealised position.  
TS providers drew on NL discourses of modernisation to produce accounts of themselves as 
delivering better outcomes through flexible, user-orientated services. In so doing they 
depicted their organisations in opposition to the LA who they described as stuck in outdated 
bureaucratic systems of delivery that sometimes put children and families in second place to 
their own interests. However, their different accounts showed evidence of tensions between 
working from a strong values base that rejects managerial constraints in favour of a form of 
personal accountability, whilst at the same time advocating for a commissioning approach 
that entails ‘separating the wheat from the chaff’ through the implementation of 
competitive markets and formal systems of accountability to protect the system from the 
vested interests of in-house providers.   
NHS providers also appealed to the NL rhetoric of flexible outcome-focused needs led 
provision to make the case against the system of output focused commissioning that they 
currently experienced. While they had good positive relationships with commissioners these 
were understood as a function of the personal characteristics of individuals who, while 
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appreciating the problems inherent in current managerially oriented systems, lacked the 
power to change them.   
Commissioning sceptics articulated similar objections to out-sourcing to those reported in 
other studies. These included negative experiences of externalising (Grace et al 2007), 
ethical barriers to losing provider control of safeguarding and child protection (PWC 2004) 
and the costs associated with contracting and creating an organisational separation of 
provider and commissioner function. As the organisation hierarchically accountable for the 
achievement of national targets the DCS described the LA as reluctant to relinquish control 
of certain areas of ‘core’ provision. Furthermore commissioning was identified as having a 
limited role to play in improving services with an appeal made to the role of professional 
over manager knowledge in defining how services should be provided.   
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 CHAPTER EIGHT: BROKERING EVIDENCE TO DO 
COMMISSIONING 
8.1 Introduction  
Previous chapters described how interviewees identified strategic decision making as 
influenced, in part, by political motives and organisational interests rather than in reference 
to an evidence base. Commissioners and providers, whilst recognising that the rationality 
implied by the ‘commissioning cycle’ was compromised by the organisational and political 
environment, nonetheless argued that it could, and should, increase the objectivity of 
strategic priority setting and service planning through promoting an evidence-based 
approach to decision making.  
This chapter therefore moves on to this  second analytical theme, exploring  the way 
evidence was gathered, understood and used by commissioners, strategic decision makers 
and service providers. It is concerned with the question: What are the conceptual and 
methodological challenges presented by the requirement to take evidenced, outcome-based 
approach to planning and commissioning services?  As well as the following sub-questions:  
 How are national policy objectives with an emphasis on centrally determined targets, 
evidence-based policy and practice translated into local policy and service 
development? 
 What role do different forms of evidence play in the process of priority setting, needs 
analysis and subsequent commissioning strategies?  
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 How do commissioners and providers identify and evidence effective strategies and 
interventions understood to lead to the successful achievement of desired 
outcomes?  
The chapter starts with what is conventionally understood as the first ‘stage’ of the 
commissioning ‘cycle’ and considers how centrally determined priorities and performance 
targets were translated at the local level, primarily in reference to quantitative and 
administrative information.  The chapter then moves round the cycle to explore the use of 
evidence in refining understandings of need and targeting provision. The role of provider 
knowledge in interpreting centrally defined policy problems and developing locally 
appropriate service responses is then considered, before examining how the views of 
children and young people informed the commissioning process. The final sections of the 
chapter complete the ‘cycle’ by considering the challenges faced by local policy actors in 
producing evidence of ‘what works’ and hence realising outcome-based commissioning.      
8.2 Translating centrally determined priorities at the local level  
8.2.1 Identifying priorities:  the role of quantitative and administrative data 
In Downton the process for agreeing local priorities with the DCSF was via an ‘Annual 
Strategic Review’ meeting held with the former Local Government Office. These were then 
required by the Children Act 2004 to be set out in documentary terms in the local CYPP.  At 
the time of fieldwork The Apprentices, Skills, Children and Learning Act 2009 (DCSF 2009) 
had just placed a statutory obligation on CT Boards to develop and monitor the CYPP. As 
discussed in chapter 3 this was intended to be the ‘single, strategic, overarching plan’ for all 
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children’s and young people’s services setting out the LA’s ‘overarching vision’ and ‘strategic 
priorities’.  
One point of analysis is to discern the instrumental role played by evidence in informing 
priorities for strategic commissioning and service delivery. Another is to understand the role 
played by the documents within which it was presented.  Freeman (2006) argues that as well 
as communicating information, documents play an important role in establishing and 
perpetuating particular vocabularies and ‘ways of thinking’ about the issues and problems 
they are concerned with. As collective productions they serve to coordinate behaviours and 
responses to the issues they are concerned with. The CYPP is a local policy document, 
providing a medium for a shared local interpretation and communication of government 
policy which, in published form, provides a public statement of intent and an authoritative 
reference point for partner agencies. Produced collectively through a complex set of 
processes described as involving ‘a lot of toing and froing across the partnership’,  the CYPP 
can be understood as the product of numberless consultations, former meetings, discussions 
and drafts that meant interviewees found it hard to identify concrete moments of decision 
making so that it ‘sort of just comes together’.  
The Downton CYPP (2009-2012) provided a summary of progress towards meeting strategic 
objectives and described current priorities. This formed a ‘refreshed’ version of the 2007-
2010 plan which gave more detailed description of planned services activity and 
commitments.   Given the nature of the national indicator set described in chapter 4 it is not 
surprising that statistical data and the language of quantification featured strongly in the 
case made for local priority setting. Hence, local priorities as presented in the CYPP were 
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principally framed as either: service outputs; the statutory education targets; or the 
reduction in negative outcomes (for example obesity, teenage pregnancy) at population 
level as defined by national indicators. High level ‘outcomes’ were mapped against national 
indicators with targets for achievement and current performance benchmarked against 
statistical neighbour comparators where available. Lower order indicators were variously 
expressed as service outputs, increased uptake in services or participation in defined 
activities. The influence of the outcome of inspection was evident with actions identified to 
help meet targets described in reference to the recommendations made in the previous JAR 
report.   
 The CYPP was cross-referenced, in accordance with national guidance, to the Joint Strategic 
Needs Assessment (JSNA). Relying solely on quantitative data, despite referring to ‘data 
triangulation’, the JSNA  drew on a range of local and national databases   (including from 
the Office of National Statistics and the National Centre for Health Outcomes), as well as 
census data to produce a demographic and epidemiological profile of children in Downton. 
These in turn referred back to the CYPP, likewise cross referenced to relevant national 
indicators and local stretch targets.The documents thus spoke to each other, with the JSNA 
providing an authoratative justification in statistical terms for the priorities laid out in the 
CYPP.  In summary it was fundamentally through reference to numerically-based evidence 
that social problems, represented as local priorities for action, were identified and 
described.  
Having recourse to numbers appeared to give confidence to strategic planners and 
commissioners that they were working on the ‘right things’. Needs analysis was described as 
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proceeding from the appropriate application of good quality quantitative data benchmarked 
against other LA areas to give a comparative measure so that ‘needs are relative to an 
acceptable level of health, educational attainment’ (SCM). With high level priorities 
identified in reference to statistical data, the process of needs assessment was often 
identified by strategic planners as straightforward involving a straight reading of ‘what the 
data is telling us’. Quantitative measures appeared to confer authority and were often taken 
as unequivocal proof that something represented a priority problem to be dealt with:  
We don’t dispute government priorities; we have to demonstrate that is what we 
are working on.  We won’t disagree for example that childhood obesity has 
increased, that Downton’s breast-feeding rates are low – no one would disagree – 
I mean certain things are accepted aren’t they? (SCM: Sure Start Children’s 
Centres)  
The previous chapter explored how some commissioners identified themselves as ‘good 
bureaucrats’ demonstrating a pragmatic acceptance that broad strategic priorities were  
guided in part by nationally driven targets and in part by the outcome of key government 
inspection regimes (JAR and Ofsted). Identified in reference to statistical information that 
benchmarks Downton against other areas nationally they were accepted as ‘self-evident’ by 
commissioners and not fundamentally open to question. For some interviewees priorities 
were considered so self-evident that they were frequently described as ‘no-brainers’. For 
commissioners national priorities were felt to dovetail with local priorities as indicated by 
the logic of national statistical benchmarking:  
Our priorities are NEETS, teenage pregnancy and offending, and then at the other 
end of the scale things like breast feeding, things around obesity. They are 
national priorities but they are Downton priorities as well following needs 
analyses and comparison’ (SCM: Children’s NHS Services)  
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Miller (1994) argues that the ‘calculative technologies’ of bureaucratic accountability 
facilitate an appearance of disinterested, objective decision making. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, for commissioners as good bureaucrats the recourse to statistics and 
targets allowed them to impersonalise the process of making decisions about funding 
allocation and service decommissioning.   As the public statement of what CT partners had 
collectively identified as their priorities for children, the CYPP provided the point of 
reference for allocation of funding and a form of upwards accountability. Providers 
discussed how any reports or application for funding had to be linked into the ‘CYPP and LAA 
targets. Nothing should happen if it’s not part of the LAA so we need to be aware of it’ (TS 
Provider). The CYPP was described by one interviewee as ‘a context, a document that 
justifies. It doesn’t create’ explaining that local delivery plans must be made to ‘fit’ with its 
stated priorities before funding could be granted:    
 ‘When we give money to co-ops they have to write a business plan and within 
that there are 10 items that they must account for. Those 10 items are embedded 
in the CYPP and the LAA so in other words the money needs to be attached to 
those’ (Head of Service: Extended Schools) 
With funding tied to CYPP priorities, even the TS interviewees who showed cynicism about 
the degree to which government priorities framed local understandings often made recourse 
to them in justifying their own programmes of delivery.  One TS provider who disputed the 
validity of statutory determined priorities nevertheless described one of his most successful 
programmes as supporting teenage mothers to access education and employment 
opportunities.  Another TS provider begrudgingly conceded that ‘in fairness there is 
something intuitive – intuitively parenting support is needed’ effectively lending his support 
to this as an emerging government policy priority. Popular government proffered solutions 
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to identified issues also seemed to be reproduced in respondents’ narratives and accepted 
as established fact. For example all interviewees with some stake in teenage pregnancy 
identified ‘raising aspirations’ as critical, suggesting that not only had teenage pregnancy 
become institutionalised as a problem but also ‘raising aspirations’ as a solution. In this 
example ‘raising aspirations’ also represented a response that providers perceived as 
doable. Thus, whilst they identified that teenage pregnancy was correlated with structural 
factors, there was a pragmatic acceptance that it was easier to respond at the level of 
individual behaviour change.  
In some accounts however, a degree of subversion was evident in the way the language of 
targets and government defined priorities was used to create a ‘fit’ between these and 
provider identified needs. Exhibiting  a degree of entrepreneurial subversion, one TS  
participant explained how ‘about reinventing yourself around the key themes, learning the 
buzz words, making sure you slip those things in, in the right paragraph’. He described how 
he would adapt what he said he was doing in order to make it look as though ‘you are 
playing  to the governments agenda but still keeping to what you believe in and what is 
needed locally’. For this interviewee, while the CYPP conferred authority, it was an authority 
that could and should be subverted in order to ensure services were adapted to the 
presenting needs of local communities.  
With resource decisions tied to government defined priorities a lack of relevant targets for 
specific areas of provision could also be a problem for providers. One NHS provider felt that 
the relative lack of health targets prescribed through the national indicator set marginalised 
the role of health services in the broader ECM agenda. She explained how she would 
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welcome a specific set of outcome indicators for her area of provision as without them 
‘there is nothing for them to measure us on’ and no lever to draw down funding:  
 ‘It would be very useful if there were some very specific indicators because then 
we would be jumping up and down and banging on the Trust doors to say look we 
not achieving this, this is why we’re not - do something about it please. Because 
there aren’t those targets it’s very difficult I think.  In education there are, you’ve 
either got your GCSE attainments in your district or you haven’t. Five year olds are 
all at foundation level or whatever – there aren’t for health’ (Director of Women’s 
and Child Health)  
A related problem was the way changing targets could move funding away from one area to 
another helping to marginalise some groups’ needs in relation to others. For example, the 
SCM with responsibility for child health described a shift in funding away from young 
people’s involvement in sport towards adults explaining that ‘the reason for that is because 
the targets and indicators are asking for something else’. This had meant that previously 
funded projects, even though considered successful and pertinent to obesity targets, had 
had to be de-commissioned.  
In other areas of provision however both commissioners and providers had used priority 
targets as a way of securing funding for already well-funded work.  The SCM for teenage 
pregnancy, for example, explained how she had embedded teenage pregnancy in alternative 
funding streams, securing funding for projects by writing proposals in such a way as to 
indicate they would help meet other targets such as reducing the numbers of young people 
‘not in  employment or training’. The downside of this however was the need to work with 
older young people and show commitment to meeting shorter term goals or ‘quick wins’ 
making the case for early intervention with younger children more difficult.   
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8.1.2 Getting behind the target  
While in large part the majority of interviewees accepted the authority of statistical data in 
justifying strategic priorities, they also questioned the wisdom of target setting and national 
systems of measuring performance.  Interviewees at both strategic and provider levels felt 
that government was overly ‘obsessed with counting things’,  describing the things they 
were required or had decided to measure as poor proxies for what they were trying to 
achieve:  
‘To quote targets for the positive activities for young people what does that 
require us to do? All sorts of things: recording numbers of young people accessing 
things; numbers of young people achieving an accredited qualification. That 
doesn’t make them better young people more able to cope with life’ (DJC)  
Interviewees expressed considerable frustration at the need to provide evidence for the 
purposes of accountability with criticism levelled against both an over emphasis on 
measuring outputs and the processes of government inspection referred to as ‘getting the 
fat pig weighed’ with the observation that ‘the pig gets weighed a lot’(DCS). The DJC 
expressed the view that there was a danger in letting the LAA become the ‘driving force’ 
behind planning. Allowing this to happen, she explained, meant targets and their associated 
indicators became the focus of attention, leading commissioners and providers to 
concentrate solely on interventions directly related to targets thereby distorting service 
delivery. She suggested this militated against developing more nuanced interpretations of 
what might contribute towards better long term outcomes for children and families:   
‘There is an issue of getting sucked into those targets. So just looking at 
breast feeding rates for instance, but that’s not what it’s about. A good 
start to life is exactly what it says on the tin, it’s what are the factors we’ve 
got to build in to a whole programme of activity that will give children the 
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best possible start to life? And some of the most significant things don’t 
even feature in the targets’ 
This interviewee argued that it was important to get ‘the story behind the target’ asserting 
that a focus on quantifiable targets distorted understandings of the nature of the problems 
that services were trying to impact on. This was understood to lead services to focus on 
strategies that were too simply linked to existing targets while not giving consideration to 
additional factors that might be more important but for which there was no top-down 
directive to measure or quantify. She argued that there was ‘a lot of rhetoric at the centre 
about using evidence’ but that ‘what happens is we count things’. This observation was 
related more broadly to the question of how social problems are defined and understood. 
What her comments suggested was that the government focus on evidence for 
accountability rather than evidence of effectiveness (Sanderson 2002) had come to mean 
that they were better at measuring problems than understanding them.  
Interviewees revealed varying understandings of the nature of the issues they were tasked 
with addressing. Some articulated a faith in the possibility of an objective approach to 
understanding and meeting need ‘You need a rational approach, a rational way of 
demonstrating that what you identify is a need, so we place a lot of emphasis of quantitative 
information’ (SCM: Grant-based programmes), whilst others emerged more strongly as 
social constructionists describing priorities as socially and politically defined and historically 
contingent. In their accounts issues that may have always existed as social fact were 
recognised as having, only recently, been constructed as social problems. For example, one 
interviewee discussing teenage parenthood argued that ‘there have always been teenage 
fathers, but what is different now, is how as a society we choose to deal with it’ whilst 
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another suggested that although there ‘have always been bad or poor parents we  are just 
coming round to doing something about it now. It’s on the governments agenda, Ed Balls has 
decided it’s important’ (TS provider).  
Those who articulated these sorts of understandings were less likely to suggest change could 
be wrought by direct service interventions. These interviewees felt that some contemporary 
priority issues like teenage pregnancy, obesity and smoking were not always amenable to 
service intervention, locating them within Schon’s (1983) ‘swampy lowlands’ for which they 
felt there were no straightforward responses. This also meant that meeting targets was not 
necessarily in the power of those people accountable for them, which as discussed in more 
detail below, led them to question the logic of a dependence on quantitative performance 
data at the other end of the commissioning or local policy ‘cycle’.  
To summarise, this section has examined the role of quantitative data at the priority setting 
‘stage’ of commissioning. Social epidemiological information coupled with statistical 
benchmarking served to authoritatively establish and naturalise centrally defined priorities, 
serving as the point of reference for resource allocation. However, despite broadly accepting 
government defined objectives, interviewees critically appraised the culture of target 
setting. These were identified as distorting attention away from developing understandings 
of the nature of social problems and effective practice in favour of producing evidence for 
accountability.  A lack of targets could also be problematic as this meant it was difficult to 
fund alternative areas of provision that providers identified as important.  
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8.2 Comparing outcomes, need analysis and targeting  
The logic of priority setting through reference to quantifiable measures and benchmarking 
helped ensure the predominance of quantitative data in the formal processes of assessing 
need for targeting purposes.  As discussed above the Downton JSNA placed sole emphasis on 
quantitative data despite referring to ‘data triangulation’ from multiple sources.  
Recomendations for improving data collection and analysis were made referring to social 
epidemiology or risk factor analysis to identify  ‘at risk mothers’ and risk factors predictive of  
involvement in crime, teenage pregnancy and poor educational achievement. Community 
and user engagement in the JSNA was limited to the involvement of youth groups in data 
collection rather than as part of a process of assessing felt needs or identifying strategies for 
meeting them and there was no sense either of intelligence gathered from service providers.   
The DPJC described itself as having a strategic role in ‘the co-ordination of analysis of need’ 
(Business Plan 2009-12).However needs assessment at this level was described as ‘fairly 
sporadic’ in nature and, where it had been carried out, was not often employed to redirect 
or target services. Need analysis thus sometimes appeared to be a process of going through 
a set of required motions rather than forming an integral part of a wider strategic approach 
to planning.  
The capacity for conducting in-depth needs analysis was described by commissioners as 
limited by both a lack of dedicated resources and importance afforded to it at a more senior 
strategic level. Nonetheless when tasked with producing the first CYPP in 2006 the 
Directorate had carried out an initial piece of need assessment work. The 2007-2010 CYPP 
thus included a chapter on needs analysis making reference to a separate Needs Analysis 
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report commissioned from the LA’s dedicated research unit.   This report brought together 
socio-demographic data, performance data, and qualitative evidence from consultations 
with children and young people. The major part of the document drew on a ‘Neighbourhood 
Needs Analysis’ that provided a composite indicator of need for each of the five ECM 
outcomes across the boroughs 81 neighbourhoods. These were then combined with 
performance data to identify five neighbourhoods where ‘children and young people might 
be at risk of not achieving their full potential’ enabling them to ‘consider where targeted 
interventions might be appropriate’.  Given that there were very high levels of deprivation in 
most of the 81 neighbourhoods the selection of five represented a somewhat arbitrary cut 
off point, raising the question of targeting in areas of almost uniform need.   
Interview data revealed that this work had not been updated or repeated when 
responsibility for the CYPP was passed to the Performance Management function of the LA. 
Furthermore it was difficult to discern what practical use, if any, had been made of the 
original assessment as nobody was able to identify any reorientation of existing initiatives or 
commissioning of new work focused on the identified neighbourhoods.  
This was also the case for the children’s services mapping work that had been commissioned 
by the DPJC using nationally developed software endorsed by the DCSF. This piece of work 
had been enormously time-consuming, involving several months of dedicated consultant 
time and a considerable time commitment from service providers. Nonetheless, according to 
the commissioner who had led the piece of work, it had remained unutilised at a strategic 
level, disappearing into what he described as ‘an information vacuum’.   
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More detailed need assessment had been carried out for some specified areas of service 
delivery to support themed targeting on the basis of emerging government priorities. In 
reference specifically to services commissioned through the DPJC there had been recent 
needs assessments to inform the design and delivery of the teenage pregnancy strategy, 
targeted youth support, teenage health strategy, support to young carers, and family 
support work. Where priorities were understood in terms of negative outcomes, for example 
teenage pregnancy or youth offending, then needs assessment were focused on risk factor 
analysis. Negative outcome data was used to highlight ‘problem groups’ so that the key 
focus was on who should be targeted for intervention rather than on ‘getting behind the 
target’ (DJC). For teenage pregnancy national evidence on risk factors, supported by some 
local risk factor analysis, had informed a tighter targeting strategy leading to a reorientation 
of commissioned service provision towards ‘vulnerable young people’ including looked after 
children, care leavers and young people in Pupil Referral Units. A focus on risk however, also 
appeared to support oversimplified conclusions about cause and effect so that if two 
variables were correlated, for example poor educational achievement and teenage 
pregnancy, there was an assumed direct causal relationship between the two.   
The Directorate had also commissioned Public Health to conduct an epidemiological needs 
profile of young people to support the development of the targeted youth support strategy.  
The report generated provided some generalised demographic profiling and attempted to 
collate a range of available data under the ECM five outcome areas in order to develop local 
indices of geographically based risk.   
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Hughes and Fielding (2006) identify a broad range of problems in the use of statistical data 
for targeting purposes by Children’s Fund Partnerships. These include ‘concept validity’, or 
whether a statistical measure is ‘fit for purpose’, the use of highly aggregated data for fine 
tuned targeting and a focus on areas with high levels of negative outcomes rather than high 
levels of risk factors for those outcomes. An analysis of the Downton report suggests many 
of these problems had been encountered here and that it had been compiled by somebody 
with a lack of understanding of an appropriate application of relevant statistical data. Hence 
much of the data drawn on was indicative of very high levels of need, out of date, or related 
to adults and so appeared to have been employed solely on the basis of availability. The 
result was that a set of inappropriate indicators had been chosen such as hospital 
admissions for chronic illness and rates of alcohol related adult deaths, which appeared to 
make little sense given that the document was intended to inform early intervention 
targeted youth support. Furthermore there had been no attempt to ‘weight’ indicators in 
order to place emphasis on the identified objectives of the targeted youth support 
programme. The disparate and very broad nature of the data presented, alongside its 
marginal relevance to the ECM outcomes or early intervention, suggested that the 
complexities of risk factor analysis had not been fully understood.  The contrast between the 
quality of this piece of work and the work done on teenage pregnancy indicated varying 
levels of analytical skill amongst those tasked with data analysis and problems of capacity at 
a local level.  
Both the neighbourhood needs analysis and the JSNA could also be subject to more critical 
appraisal in terms of the appropriateness of data and indicators employed. For example, 
chosen indicators in the CYPP generally provided reasonable proxies, but not all data had 
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been collected at the same time, some being drawn from the 2001 census, some from the 
2004 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) and some from undated locally available data 
sources. As this information had not been updated since it was first produced some of it was 
almost ten years out of date at the time of fieldwork. Chosen statistical measures were also, 
without exception, negatively correlated. For example, low birth weight, young smokers and 
teenage conception were grouped as a proxy for ‘Staying healthy’, whilst young offenders, 
crimes brought to justice and school exclusions were included under ‘making a positive 
contribution’. ‘Enjoy and achieve’ indicators related exclusively to the National Indicators for 
school-based achievement.  
In this context, with the sole exception of the teenage pregnancy strategy, it was unclear 
what role quantitative data had played in refining understandings of need that had already 
been established by centralised targets. Interview data suggested an ambiguous set of 
attitudes towards the perceived relevance of quantitative data despite their dominant place 
in more formal processes of need assessment. It was not at all clear either, what purpose the 
JSNA had lent to planning being too broadly based to inform targeting or to provide data rich 
enough to inform service delivery priorities and responses.  Hence the JSNA was described 
by one interviewee as ‘fairly redundant’ as a tool for planning and commissioning and it was 
generally felt by interviewees to be too broad and non-specific to be of any instrumental 
use. Described as ‘not data rich at all’ by NHS providers they felt it did not give them 
adequate, up to date or sensitive enough information to support planning.  
The failures of the JSNA were described as reflecting a broader problem of the adequacy of 
intelligence coming from public health and the integration of commissioning with needs 
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assessment. One provider described child level public health data generally as weak, out of 
date and inadequate. She suggested that Health Visitors and other public health nurses 
would be better placed than commissioners to determine need and ‘pick up information 
empirically’ as they were ‘trained on health needs analysis’  but that the pressures of  
meeting client need limited their capacity to do this.  Reflecting on the rhetoric of policy 
guidance on world class commissioning compared to her experience in practice she 
suggested that ‘If world class commissioning is about looking at what the needs are and then 
putting work out to tender for us to apply to it needs to have a lot more evidence to inform it. 
I don’t think commissioning is world class’ (HCCHS).   
As a universal service expected to respond to presenting needs, changes in local 
demographics, not represented in available public health data, put new and unrecognised 
pressures on her service. One example she gave was of newly arrived Romany communities 
from Eastern Europe amongst whom teenage parenthood was the norm but in a UK context 
put particular demands on health visitors. She described need as empirically determined by 
providers but not always reflected in either the public health data collected or in the 
strategic priorities described in the CYPP. A particular concern was high levels of domestic 
violence for which her service dealt with over 100 referrals a week but that had not been 
costed in to her contract with commissioners. As discussed in the previous chapter the 
convention of commissioning against contacts based on past histories of performance and 
benchmarking against ‘peer trusts’ were identified as institutional barriers to developing 
needs led contracting.   
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This provider also identified historical and institutionalised patterns of service delivery as a 
barrier to developing more targeted or needs-led services. Discussing the need to refocus 
the health visiting service towards higher levels of need she suggested that established  ways 
of organising delivery led  people to resist change, restricting  flexibility to move staff to 
areas where need was greatest. With staffing numbers based on historically determined 
levels of need there was also resistance from commissioners to increase funding for 
additional capacity.  
As a strategy to ensure case loads are more manageable she had done some work scoring 
neighbourhoods against the IMD to inform service realignment but described this initiative 
as provider rather than commissioner driven. However, reflecting the above problem of 
geographical targeting in areas of almost universal deprivation, the exercise had identified 
all but a small number of neighbourhoods as priorities similarly underscoring the difficulty of 
making prevention and early intervention a reality for universal services in areas of high 
deprivation.  
However, it was not only providers, but also commissioners, that complained that the 
statistical data they relied on was often out of date. Hence, for example, statistics on 
teenage pregnancy were always two years behind, making it difficult to identify where 
interventions might be having an impact or where attention may need to be refocused. 
Interviewees were also aware that these statistics could just be evidence of a general trend 
and not related to an intervention, highlighting the problem of demonstrating causal 
relationships and long term impacts.   
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One provider described the strength of his information system as providing accurate ‘real 
time information’ contrasting this with the LA, where, with the exception of that compiled by 
education, he said data was relatively poor. The DHP described data collected by education 
as detailed enough to allow for direct targeting of individuals. However, despite data sharing 
protocols being agreed, information was not in fact shared between agencies to facilitate 
the development of more targeted multi-agency provision.  
For other interviewees the problems of data management related to too much rather than 
too little data. One strategic decision maker suggested that planning was ‘more evidence-
based than it’s ever been’ but that the amount of data collected for monitoring and 
performance purposes was either superfluous to requirement or not analysed with sufficient 
sophistication to enable its effective application. One SCM described a lack of capacity in 
data management locally so that what was collected was not used to its full potential:   
‘What is lacking in that analysis of the data is an understanding of what all 
this data that we have is actually telling us. We’re drowning in data. The 
data that we have around teenage pregnancy or NEETS or educational 
attainment all exists and it gets updated so you could use it to start 
discovering trends. But it becomes an on-going process what we do with 
that mass of data’  
What this quote suggests is that strategic decision makers recognised that they were 
constrained by their capacity to absorb or make judgements about information collected. It 
also suggests that while considerable effort was put into collecting data far less was 
orientated towards developing strategies for its utilisation.  
For some providers the experience of collecting data for little apparent practical purpose 
was expressed as a source of frustration. For example, some TS providers described 
collecting a ‘huge amount’ of service monitoring data complaining that it was not then used 
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systematically or strategically by commissioners to inform planning or evolve service 
responses and that furthermore it was of little internal value. They also pointed out that LA 
in-house providers were not subject to the same scrutiny suggesting that data was collected 
for the ‘wrong purposes’. Providers with NHS contracts complained that while the 
contracting culture had placed an emphasis on ‘getting the datametrics right’, that which 
was required was concerned primarily with cost and volume and not evidencing changing 
needs or impact. Like TS providers they saw this as reflecting an information bias towards 
evidence for managerial accountability over evidence of effectiveness.  
In summary, at the strategic level attempts were made to conduct local risk factor analyses 
to inform the targeting of particular interventions. However the complexities of this were 
poorly understood and work carried out of little practical use. Interviewees variously 
complained that there was either too much or too little data reflecting problems of 
timeliness, generality, and capacity. A lack of strategic commitment to the systematic and 
on-going processes of need assessment and service mapping meant that despite some 
extensive work done this had had little practical impact.  
8.3 The role of provider evidence and experiential knowledge   
The previous sections demonstrate that quantitative data predominated in the more formal 
public processes of priority setting and need assessment. However, interviewees clearly 
questioned the assumption that it held a monopoly on useful evidence. In many ways they 
had an ambiguous relationship with it, using it when required to validate particular decisions 
as ‘a straightforward response to what the data was telling us’, but in other situations 
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challenging its limitations or validity and justifying alternative interpretations that ‘require a 
professional judgement call’ (DCS).   
Providers showed an ability to collect quantitative service data and use it to demonstrate 
they were meeting contractual agreements and to secure funding. However, both they and 
strategic decision makers stressed the importance of grounded or situated knowledge and 
much of the ‘evidence’ they worked with on a day to day level was derived from direct 
experience.   The previous chapter discussed how both commissioners and providers 
highlighted the importance of provider knowledge in identifying local need priorities and 
responses to these. It was in reference to this that many argued for a close relationship 
between commissioners and providers on the basis that the experiential knowledge of the 
latter complemented the strategic vision of the former.  Conversely, other interviewees used 
a similar argument to make the case against commissioning, suggesting that the creation of 
an organisational divide between commissioners and providers risked excluding the latter’s 
grounded knowledge. In the following quote the DCS sums up a case for tapping into ‘local 
knowledge’, the mundane everyday expertise of providers (Yanow 2004), which he 
suggested was in danger of being overlooked by commissioners:  
‘So you’ve got lots of needs analysis, lots of data, lots of intelligence derived from 
that data which is absolutely necessary but is it sufficient? I always argue that 
actually what you want fed into that to triangulate that is other sorts of 
information that providers have. What they have is really people turning up at 
their door wanting certain services. There is a source of evidence there about 
what real people need from services that I just think it is foolish to ignore, and 
that’s what commissioning is in danger of doing’. (DCS)  
This emphasis on the importance of provider knowledge was clearly endorsed by providers 
from both the statutory sector and the TS. They described themselves as the most important 
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source of knowledge of local communities and service users, having direct experience of 
their needs and better insight into what would ‘work’ at a local level. TS providers working 
closely with local communities described identifying need priorities as ‘intuitive’ and a 
matter for ‘commonsense’ with the ‘evidence on the ground’.  In so doing they articulated  a 
strong sense of accountability to local people suggesting that  service planning should start 
‘where people are at’ meaning that it should take account first and foremost of the 
expressed needs of local communities rather than that defined by professionals or identified 
through recourse to statistics.  
These providers were working in areas characterised by uniform deprivation with families 
experiencing complex and multiple needs and they saw themselves as having direct 
experience of these unlike commissioners. They made the case for a greater degree of 
provider control of the delivery process presenting  commissioners as out of touch with the 
character of local communities as  ‘they don’t have local knowledge, they go to meetings 
they don’t meet real people on the estates’. One TS provider suggested that formal processes 
of intelligence gathering were made too complex by overly bureaucratic systems.  He argued 
that empirical observation rather than sophisticated systems of data gathering were more 
important so that what was required was for commissioner ‘to get up off their arse, get out 
round the patch, get under the skin of things and ask what’s really needed’.  
They also described how need might be identified as an integral part of delivering a service 
and that a presenting issue might mask the ‘real problem’. One provider gave the example of 
some work his organisation had been commissioned to carry out with young men exhibiting 
violent and disruptive behaviour.  Whilst difficult behaviours, including school truancy, and 
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general anti-social behaviour, had been identified by other services as ‘problems’ and a 
cause for local concern he drew attention to the need to search for underlying or 
precipitating causes. He described how through ‘trial and error we found out that the real 
problem was domestic violence’, but that it was only after extended work that the project 
had been able to start dealing more directly with it.  In order to develop this work further he 
had sought to secure autonomy from commissioners by pursuing alternative funding 
sources. He had successfully gained funding from Comic Relief who he described as having 
facilitated the project in developing a critically reflective approach by supporting them with 
‘some really knowledgeable scrutiny’. He contrasted this with his experiences of working 
with commissioners, who, he suggested, were more interested in a narrower focus on 
monitoring outputs and value for money than with developing understandings of effective 
practice.  
8.3.1 Weighing up the evidence   
Commissioners consistently described the relationship between themselves and providers as 
critical. Those of a more rationalist orientation saw the relationship between service data 
and provider evidence in terms of the latter supplementing the former where there were 
information gaps. Providers were understood to have complementary forms of knowledge 
to commissioners suggesting a form of symbiotic relationship between the two. One 
described the need to manage different kinds of information or knowledge as a process of 
negotiation between commissioners and providers:  
It’s not just quantitative data. Providers have a clear role in terms of helping you 
define what might work. What you are entering into with providers is an 
agreement. We say what we need and they say how they will provide it and we 
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need to say whether that seems to be the appropriate way, and it’s agreed 
through the contracting process. (SCM: Grant-based programmes)  
For this interviewee establishing what might be considered an appropriate service response 
to an identified problem was described as form of negotiated settlement (Barrett and Fudge 
1981) between the commissioner as the person in control of resources and the provider 
charged with implementation. The accounts of some providers provided corroborating 
evidence that the process of establishing service level agreements was one of collaboration 
and negotiation. However, as the previous chapter explored, others described commissioner 
identified programmes and projects as unfeasible and non-negotiable.    
 For other interviewees the act of bringing together different forms of evidence or 
knowledge was less a process of negotiation between commissioners and providers than 
between, what Freeman (2007: 488) describes as, ‘different ways of knowing’:   
‘If you look at key decisions about where resources are going to go they are 
informed by the coming together of different sorts of evidence. High level data 
analysis coupled with more on the ground stuff. It’s interesting, the way different 
sorts of evidence come together and I think commissioning is always going to be a 
bit like that. What is important is that you weigh up the evidence’ (DJC)  
Here the interviewee is positioning the commissioner as a kind of ‘knowledge broker’ or  
‘bricoleur’ (Levi-Strauss 1966), tasked with negotiating between more rationally scientific 
forms of knowledge and   the kind of experiential or situated knowledge described the TS 
providers in the section above. How they were expected to ‘weigh up the evidence’ was 
unclear, but here it was presented as an intuitive, rather than formalised, process.   
For commissioners who identified themselves as having close relationships with providers, it 
was the latter’s knowledge that emerged as important in enabling access to specific 
knowledge or understanding of the needs of groups of children and families. These 
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interviewees related how empirical information gleaned through contact with providers had 
helped them with both localised targeting and identifying the need for specific services. One 
commissioner identified informal networking with school nurses and teachers as more 
helpful than the formal risk assessment tool that they had developed in identifying young 
people who might benefit from targeted youth support because ‘they’ve got relationships 
with these young people so  they could tell you who they thought would be at risk’ (SCM: 
Teenage Pregnancy). She also described her most successful project as a welfare-rights 
advice service for teenage mothers, the need for which had been identified by health visitors 
concerned by the number of requests for emergency grants.  
The PCT commissioner similarly saw provider knowledge as paramount in establishing the 
detail of service level agreements. Describing commissioners as ‘divorced from the front-line’ 
she felt ‘providers should be left to provide’ with the proviso that monitoring standards were 
adhered to and they gave evidence of delivery by supplying output data. She also described 
her most successful piece of work as provider led in terms of them having identified a 
specific need and solution to that need.  
8.3.2 Connecting between the levels  
Despite the obvious good relationships that existed between some commissioners and 
providers, other providers complained of a lack of connectivity between strategic planning 
and decision making at CT Board level and the management and delivery of front line 
services. One head of service complained that knowledge of strategic decisions was not 
cascaded downwards so that ‘I end up picking up pieces of work or meeting people who say 
we can only do this with the agreement of the Children’s Trust Board when actually I haven’t 
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been party to that’. Others felt that their empirical knowledge of local needs was not 
systematically gathered or brought together effectively and made use of at a strategic level 
so that it tended ‘to stay in the head of the provider’. 
One TS provider described ‘the gulf between the delivery on the ground and the strategy’ as 
‘so big that the connectivity isn’t there’ suggesting that provider knowledge of need or 
effective intervention did not get back to commissioners.  This gap between provider 
knowledge and the evidence used to inform commissioning decisions sometimes meant that 
what TS providers had identified as important and effective pieces of work got overlooked, 
even where they dovetailed with commissioner priorities:   
In terms of the teenage project my priority and commitment will continue even if 
we have to fund it ourselves or from the lottery because it’s something we know 
works, it has been evaluated as one of our most successful groups in Downton. 
You would think it wouldn’t be difficult to find stable funding for it’ (TS provider)  
One statutory provider suggested that commissioners made, not just a selective use of 
evidence, but also selective demands for evidence. She described how commissioners could 
block or sit on evidence describing how she had spent ten years making the case for a multi-
agency centre designed to provide holistic services to children with disabilities. Despite 
providing evidence to support this restructuring of her service, including details of successful 
similar programmes in peer authorities, she explained that she had had to ‘badger the 
commissioners for years’ before finally getting funding.  
8.3.3 It won’t work here:  finding local solutions 
Some interviewees explicitly rejected a rationalist approach to policy formulation that 
assumes solutions to problems can be identified in terms of explicit theories of cause and 
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effect. This involved challenging the assumption that centrally determined universal 
solutions could be applied to instances of similar problems occurring in different contexts.  
What these interviewees articulated was a sense of the world as socially constructed,  
describing  social problems as temporarily and socially contingent and learning as situated in 
practice.  They argued that appropriate policy solutions required knowledge of local cultures 
and behaviours so that ‘what works’ in one place won’t necessarily work in another:   
‘It is socially aberrant now to be a middle-class cigarette smoker, it’s socially 
normative on the [name of estate, most of your friends would smoke. There’s no 
peer pressure to give up smoking somewhere like that. So policy makers turn to 
price levers. But actually the folk on [estate] aren’t that bloody daft they don’t go 
and spend £5.10p on a packet of fags from the local newsagents. They get them 
from the back of a van and these are the communities that are most deprived, 
that have become most excluded’. (DCS)  
This interviewee was beginning to locate the problems of smoking and other policy priorities 
more broadly within the context of social exclusion, suggesting that local policy makers 
needed to develop alternative, more nuanced conceptualisations of nationally identified 
‘problems’.  In so doing he was also questioning the role of the state in determining policy 
solutions arguing that problems needed locally developed responses because ‘what works in 
stopping people smoking or teenage pregnancy in Hackney isn’t going to work here. You’ve 
got to have local policies that are a bit more fine-grained than that’ For him provider 
experience was critical and he argued the case for a form of devolved decision making to 
those working directly with targeted groups to ensure needs are more appropriately met.   
Uitermark (2005) suggests that local policy actors with knowledge of particular 
neighbourhoods develop context-specific strategies for the design of locally appropriate 
responses to presenting issues and problems. In Downton community based providers 
stressed the importance of developing locally appropriate technologies whilst employing 
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dominant policy discourses around identified issues in order to justify alternative forms of 
intervention to those prescribed from the centre. One interviewee described the importance 
of developing a discursive alignment between his own interpretation of an issue and the 
strategic interests of commissioners by ‘making sure you use the right language learning the 
jargon’ whilst ‘listening to local people, asking how I make it work with this client group’    in 
order to deliver programmes ‘in a way that works while making the commissioners and the 
government think yeah that’s a sensible way of going about it’.   
A second   interviewee had worked on a local level with other providers and commissioners 
to reconceptualise the problem of anti-social behaviour bringing it into line with a broader 
agenda around family support and targeted youth work. He had worked to pull together 
funding from different priority themes across the LA. This had involved successfully 
negotiating with commissioners from the DPJC to align some of their family support funding 
with money from Community Safety. By so doing he had re-focused local responses to anti-
social behaviour away from, what he described as a largely punitive approach, towards more 
welfare-orientated goals.  Furthermore, by working from a community development 
perspective he sought to employ and train local people to deliver these programmes thus 
arguably delivering benefits in terms of local employment that were not rewarded because 
not recognised by the targets specified under family support or community safety:   
‘Money was there and that money was targeted on dump estates and a lot of the 
money was used for wardens on there and I argued the case that actually it isn’t 
giving people ASBOs or extra wardens .Why young people are offending is that, 
the issues are not having confidence, self-esteem not having good relationships 
that is what you have to bring back to those estates. I made the case. I got a lot of 
grief about my approach but it’s slowly coming together. To do that we took over 
a void house and employed youth workers and family workers, local people’ (TS 
provider)  
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What he and other interviewees were able to do was appropriate the language of the more 
narrowly defined targets set by government to justify these approaches. Hence when 
discussing the impacts of these interventions they typically reverted to the conventional 
mode of claiming success by describing them in terms of their contribution to national 
indicators:  
The attainment levels of that group of young people that we followed have risen 
we have proof of that. I’ve got proof that teenage pregnancy is coming down that 
reports to the neighbourhood wardens has come down, and  the number of young 
mums signing on for training has gone up’ (TS provider)  
The observation that local public sector workers are increasingly constrained by centrally 
determined policy whilst simultaneously told to consult with communities over local 
priorities and strategies has led Newman (2004: 27) to describe the ‘local’ as a ‘site of major 
tension between conflicting regimes of governance’.  Coote et al’s (2004) review of the use 
of evidence in delivering community based initiatives similarly reports tensions between the 
policy goals of ‘evidence-based practice’ with that of local determination.  Community-based 
providers identified tacit, or ‘local knowledge’, as more important than government 
proffered research evidence in designing programmes of intervention. This entailed a 
questioning of the relevance or validity in the local context of centrally prescribed 
interventions that had been evaluated as effective elsewhere. At the time of field work some 
highly specified evidence-based programmes were being rolled out as part of the ‘Think 
Family’ initiative including the Family Nurse Partnership and family support programme 
‘Triple P’. Downton had funding for both programmes and they had become part of the 
remit of the DPJC. However, they had received a mixed reception by providers and 
commissioners alike with both arguing the case for adapting the programmes to fit the local 
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context. Triple P was described as ‘over professionalised’ and one provider had trained local 
people as peer mentors to deliver a highly adapted programme that effectively meant it was 
no longer the ‘evidence-based’ programme  as originally developed and evaluated:  
‘Without getting too technical there is a programme called Triple P. It’s an 
Australian model that we’re told we should use which I don’t think would work 
here.  We need a more local model, so it’s about convincing the commissioners 
that what we need is a more home grown model so I’ve trained local peer 
mentors’. (TS provider)  
This interviewee was clearly sceptical of the evidence hierarchy that has supported the 
policy prescription of programmes like Triple P. Like the former interviewee, part of his 
justification for a rejection of evidence-based approaches was made in terms of working 
from a values rather than evidence base according to a philosophy of community 
development. He argued that it was important to proceed by ‘trusting people and getting 
local engagement’ based on the principle that ‘people have got their own answers’ 
Among Downton interviewees it was not just TS providers that disputed the contextual 
validity of evidence-based approaches. One consultant paediatrician questioned the wisdom 
of replicating interventions based on evidence of effectiveness elsewhere. Whilst she 
accepted the established efficacy of  single issue clinical procedures she argued that other 
more complex and multi-faceted interventions needed to be guided by tacit knowledge and 
local circumstances and furthermore that it may be very difficult to produce evidence of 
their success:  
‘You can just see that look if we did this a different way it might be cheaper or 
more efficient and that the child might be better off at the end of it and you can 
see that but you can’t prove it.  And sometimes there are policy documents that 
have those things, that sort of evidence but that you think are not going to work 
for your district for whatever reason. It may be written in a document somewhere 
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but you really don’t think that’s going to be the best way of doing it here’ 
(Consultant Paediatrician)   
Other interviewees felt there was a tendency ‘to run after bits of evidence’ and that some 
programmes were seized on despite indeterminate evidence that they would be locally 
effective. Some commissioners were resentful of being ‘told what to do by government’ 
questioning the degree to which what the centre endorsed as evidence based practice was 
indeed so. In particular they disputed whether programmes developed and evaluated in the 
US would work in the UK arguing the need for contextually specific evidence of 
effectiveness:  
One of the things I find most frustrating at the moment is the family nurse 
partnership. The Department of Health is setting up pilots to see if it will have the 
same impacts it had in the US and we are already on wave 3 and they are saying 
it will be rolled out. Hang on a minute we don’t know if it does work here or if it 
will be value for money. (DJC)  
Described by the DCS as ‘one of the last true scientists’, the DPH was the single interviewee 
to express frustration at this apparent rejection of evidence-based policy by local providers 
and commissioners. Exhibiting a faith in the possibility of a rational scientific approach to 
service design he described himself as ‘having pushed for an evidence-based approach for a 
number of years’. He was sceptical of the ability of providers to make judgements about the 
validity or applicability of evidence-based programmes. He suggested that working from 
‘unfounded assumptions about the nature of gold standard methods  of evaluation’   they 
showed an unreasonable resistance to the systematic implementation of evidence-based 
approaches due to institutional mindsets and a form of  professional jealousy or ‘a not in my 
backyard, not invented here mentality’ . In so doing he effectively discounted the validity of 
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contextual knowledge and the judgements made by providers about the local 
appropriateness of interventions developed elsewhere.  
In promoting an evidence-based approach this interviewee also drew attention to the 
‘sloppy use of evidence’ and suggested that ‘Government office talk of evidence based when 
they mean information based’. His complaint was that the predominant focus of attention 
was on quantifying identified ‘problems’ at the expense of evidencing effective practice 
through research. Thus, for example, in reference to teenage pregnancy he argued that 
although ‘there is plenty of information’ describing the scale of the issue and identifying who 
might be ‘at risk’  there was ‘relatively little of what you would describe as high level research 
evidence that tells you what to do’.  
8.3.4 Experimentation and risk-taking  
The degree of importance that the DPH accorded to scientifically derived knowledge was 
not, however, shared by other interviewees. One provider with a former background in 
teaching  suggested that ‘professionals outside medicine are tinkerers by nature’ describing 
himself and his colleagues as  reflective practitioners who learnt through trial and error  ‘we 
don’t think we can demonstrate a causal link, we have a go and see if it works’. He was not 
alone in making the case for ‘learning through doing’ and even some from clinical 
backgrounds expressed similar viewpoints. These interviewees suggested that where 
evidence was thin on the ground it was sometimes necessary to develop new approaches or 
services involving a degree of experimentation and risk taking without which progress and 
learning could be hampered.  This interviewee argued that proving something as successful 
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could not always start from an evidenced position but might proceed to one through a 
process of inductive learning:  
‘We couldn’t evidence it until we’d done it. I mean how can you show it’s 
better if you haven’t even done it? You can only say that your experience 
and common-sense suggest that it is going to be better. You can’t prove it 
until you’ve tried it out, learnt by trying it out’ (Director of Women and 
Children’s Services)  
This was a view echoed by the PCT commissioner who suggested the need to learn through 
‘mistakes as well as successes’ but that this would require ‘risk acceptance and investment’ 
in additional programmes of work as ‘you can’t stop delivering what’s already in  place’.  
However, while both commissioners and providers expressed the belief that it was 
important to innovate, some providers identified instances where they felt commissioner 
demands for up-front evidence of effectiveness had hampered their ability to try out 
approaches. This meant that the ‘risk acceptance and investment’ was left to the provider 
who had to develop new services without additional funding.  
Despite acknowledging the importance of knowledge developed by providers through 
practice however commissioners recognised that they lacked formal mechanisms for tapping 
into this and hence enhancing the capacity for  reflexive horizontal and vertical 
organisational learning:  
 If you are a learning mentor, a teacher, a social worker, your own experience tells 
you that this might work and that is an important element that is difficult to 
capture but nevertheless is an important way of moving services forward. That is 
something where we are not as sophisticated as perhaps we should be in terms of 
capturing that local intelligence that local understanding, belief of what might 
work. I think we are very poor at that, in capturing what an individual school 
nurse, health visitor or mentor may have trialled or tested that may have worked 
in a local school’ (SCM)  
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In summary, the above sections have explored the role of provider evidence and experiential 
knowledge in translating nationally defined policy objectives at the local level and identifying 
interventions to meet these. Commissioners consistently described provider knowledge as 
critical, sometimes as a supplement to other forms of evidence but more often in the 
context of defining ‘what would work’ on the basis of their knowledge of local communities 
and service users.  
The evidence presented provides examples of providers acting as ‘situated agents’ (Bevir 
2003), reinterpreting centrally defined objectives on the basis of their ‘local knowledge’ in 
order to develop responses that they felt were more likely to succeed with the marginalised 
communities within which they worked.  The use of discretion in these contexts has less 
resonance with the form of coping adaptation described by Lipsky (1980, 2010), or the 
exercise of ‘counter-agency’ as suggested by Prior (2009), than with Durose’s (2009) idea of 
‘civic entrepreneurialism’, involving a negotiated reconciliation between commissioner 
defined priorities and their own interpretations of what was important locally.  
In negotiating the tension between responding to locally identified needs and the goal of 
EBP many respondents gave implicit endorsement to Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) argument 
that it is important to ask ‘what works, for whom and in what contexts’. Some interviewees 
indicated that learning through experimentation and innovation was as important as 
learning from ‘best practice’, showing a critical impatience with coercion to implement 
centrally prescribed evidence-based interventions.  
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8.4 Involving children, young people, families and communities  
Chapter 4 discussed how, as well as provider evidence, commissioning is intended to give 
due regard to the views of service users and the wider community of children, young people 
and families with guidance giving prominence to their ‘active participation’ ‘at an increasing 
number of decision points’ in the commissioning process in order to help ‘focus on outcomes’ 
(HM Government 2006: 11).  
Downton’s CYPP provides evidence of what Borghi and van Berkel (2007) describe as a 
‘weak’ or passive form of participation entailing consultation with a highly formalised and 
established group the ‘Youth Parliament’ alongside various broad based community 
consultations to ensure pre-determined strategic priorities were endorsed by children and 
young people. Nonetheless, at this level there was a consensus amongst interviewees that 
the processes of engagement with children and young people had been good and that the 
intentions in Downton were sincere: ‘there are some good policies and they talk a good talk’.   
However, there was also a sense of pragmatic acceptance among strategic decision makers 
that the outcomes of consultation could only be acted on if they referred to issues that 
concurred with pre-established objectives and that the ability of organisations to respond 
beyond this was a function of institutional restraints. For example, in discussing the outcome 
of a recent consultation exercise, one interviewee reported that while children and young 
people had identified two key priorities; ‘feeling safe, bullying and harassment… that and it 
being a boring place to live’ the subsequent CYPP gave evidence of responding to the first 
but not to the second of these so that, ‘the Plan gives you no sense of how boring Downton is 
as a place to live’. Attending to this however was seen as outside the remit of the CT despite 
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‘enjoy and achieve’ being one of the five ECM outcomes: ‘I’m not sure if it is the job of the CT 
to make Downton a less boring place’. This interviewee then went on to further justify this 
position by explaining that:  
‘Organisations want to hear about issues if they think they can do 
something about it. But that’s true of any consultation process it seems to 
me, why should it be any different in this case to any other case? (LA Board 
member)  
Beyond this, consultation had been used in two pieces of needs analysis in order to gain 
more in depth understanding of the specific needs of identified target groups. These were a 
piece of work commissioned to look at young carers and a teenage health strategy 
consultation.  In these instances user evidence was intended to support continued funding 
of existing services and to suggest commissioning new services. However in the young 
carers’ example this had raised difficult issues in relation to services that were not 
commissioned by the DPJC. The consultation had revealed that many issues of concern for 
these young people were primarily in relation to adult care services, the provision of which 
the commissioning team had little influence over. As a result the consultation report had had 
little or no impact.   
Meaningful consultation and involvement demands time, resourcing and specialist skills 
(Spicer and Evans 2006; Tisdall and Davis 2004). At the time of fieldwork the team had a 
dedicated Participation Officer whose post was about to be made redundant as it was no 
longer considered a priority.  He had been tasked by PCT commissioners to develop children 
and young people’s involvement in the on-going reform and restructuring of local child 
health services. However he described this as a process of post-hoc consultation as ‘a lot of 
the decisions seem to have been made already’ reflecting other evidence on youth 
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participation that suggests it can be used tokenistically  or manipulated to legitimise adult 
agendas (Badham 2004; Hill et al 2004):  
I think they are doing it because it’s written down somewhere and it’s their 
duty but really they don’t even know what questions they want asked. I say 
ok you want me to involve children and young people, but how will what 
they say influence services? What changes will be made? No-one seems to 
be able to answer that’ (Participation Officer)  
Downton had also developed formalised structures for on-going dialogue with specific 
groups of service users including the ‘Teenage Pregnancy Shadow Board’ and ‘Looked after 
Children Board’.  Some interviewees suggested that while these showed evidence that 
Downton had worked hard to ensure young people’s voices were heard there was also a 
danger that existing forums had become institutionalised as bureaucratic mechanisms of 
endorsement. They suggested that while formal bodies ensured the ‘participation box gets 
ticked’ at a strategic level, there were levels of engagement that were missing, including how 
needs were understood and services designed and monitored. Several interviewees 
commented on the problems of achieving meaningful representation saying that there was a 
heavy reliance on existing active young people and that established groups were 
represented by ‘the same kids’ who had developed expertise in the formal processes of 
engagement. One member of the CYPTB  argued that there was a need to ‘renew and refresh 
participation as young people become old people’ while the Participation Officer commented 
that  ‘the teenage pregnancy board have been at it for years’ because ‘it ’s much easier to 
stick with who you know’.  
Beyond priority setting however two commissioners had built up considerable experience in 
developing participative approaches and expressed a strong commitment to the principle of 
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user involvement. They had employed various strategies during commissioning and service 
development to inform service design and acceptability. The teenage pregnancy 
commissioner, for example had used ‘mystery shoppers’ to pick up detail about the delivery 
of sexual health services, and another had carried out some extensive child and family 
consultation in developing new family contact centres.  The former had also engaged young 
people in some of the bureaucratic processes of writing service specifications and reviewing 
contracts and had tried to embed user consultation by writing it into contractual agreements 
with providers.  
Other commissioners and providers justified their comparative failure to actively engage 
with children and young people by questioning the degree to which user evidence could and 
should be used. These interviewees argued that  service users were ‘not informed 
consumers’ having no comparative experience by which to judge the quality or effectiveness 
of the services they used. The Head of Extended Schools for example, suggested that user 
consultation was meaningless as ‘people don’t know what is available to them, they can’t 
identify what they might have as they don’t know what the choice is’. Furthermore he felt 
that although schools were required to consult as part of good practice it was only done 
‘because it is a politically correct thing to do’.  
Some interviewees suggested that because of low expectations service users were unlikely 
to be critical of the services they received even where these might be of poor quality. This 
interviewee reported that although their service user surveys always gave positive feedback:   
‘Our centre could be rubbish compared to what happened somewhere else 
but they wouldn’t know that. The same thing is true for schools. I think 
we’ve got poor nursery provision in mainstream schools for children who 
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have got disabilities but parents don’t complain they don’t know any 
different’ (Consultant Paediatrician)  
What her comment highlights is that despite the rhetoric of user ‘choice’ many users simply 
do not have ‘choice in the market’  and certainly cannot can develop ‘market experience’ by 
which to judge the quality of the services they do receive.  Nonetheless this does not mean 
that they will not have opinions and the use of surveys may not be the most appropriate tool 
for eliciting user views and in particular children’s views.  
Some commissioners felt it was more important to tap into ‘frontline experience’ arguing 
that provider knowledge should be used as a proxy for user voice.  They suggested that 
‘whilst it is vitally important to have service users engaged’ they could only ever speak for 
themselves, and that their views were individual and not representative of a broader 
population.   By way of contrast, they suggested, practitioners were able to collate the 
experience of multiple users and to see the impact of service improvements so that: It’s 
about utilising frontline experience as an overview because they have the ability to step back 
and have that overview that the individual parent doesn’t’ (SCM: Children’s NHS Services).   
One provider however felt that pressures on their time limited the degree to which they 
could meaningfully engage with users disputing the contention that they were best placed to 
speak for others. Another argued that it was important not to assume that providers know 
what young people need and to resist reinterpreting what they said. However, he 
pragmatically pointed out that young people might say things that contradict provider 
experience so that consultation would always involve a degree of negotiated settlement or 
compromise around what was asked for and what was expedient.  
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The DCS on the other hand described elected members rather than providers as important 
advocates of the views of communities and service users suggesting this helped ensure a 
form of democratic accountability while using this as a justification for endorsing member-
driven decisions:  
 ‘From an elective members perspective there is the on the ground evidence 
of being not a service provider but a ward member and an elected 
representative knowing people and talking to them. We shouldn’t ignore 
that. I actually think it is a very valuable part of the decision making 
process, is a part of the democratic process’ (DCS)  
In summary, the degree to which children and young people were enabled to influence 
strategic priority setting appeared to be highly circumscribed. Despite the existence of a set 
of formalised participation groups the accounts given by interviewees suggested that, at a 
strategic level, decision makers were more likely to pay attention to issues that supported 
the status quo, using consultation to endorse pre-determined decisions and ignoring issues 
that failed to dove-tail with existing priorities. Rather than acting as opportunities for power 
sharing, as suggested by policy rhetoric, consultation exercises had instead served to 
reproduce relationships of power and could be used to ‘mobilise bias’ (Bachrach and Baratz 
1962, 1963). However, some commissioners did demonstrate an ideological and practical 
commitment to the principle of user participation and had developed a variety of strategies 
to engage young people in decision making and service design.  
8.5 Evidencing effectiveness:  the problematic nature of outcome based 
accountability  
Evaluation is presented as the final stage in the commissioning cycle, intended to provide 
evidence for continuing with a chosen strategy, revising it or terminating it through the 
process of de-commissioning (HM Government 2006). At this stage however, performance 
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information, or evidence for accountability took precedence over alternative methods of 
evaluation.   
8.5.1 Conceptualising outcomes 
The twin problems of defining and measuring outcomes were clearly recognised by 
interviewees but this did not prevent many expressing enthusiasm for the principle of 
outcome-based accountability, described by one commissioner as making ‘blinding sense’. 
However, although declaring a commitment to commissioning against outcomes, they 
expressed conceptual difficulties in distinguishing these from outputs and performance 
indicators, a problem compounded by national monitoring systems and the ways 
performance has been traditionally managed and measured.  
The previous chapter discussed the problem of the institutionally fixed process of 
contracting against service outputs or ‘face-to-face contacts’. Commissioners admitted that 
this was the basis on which they continued to draw up service level agreements and that 
established cultures of contracting worked against developing new ways of commissioning 
against outcomes. 
Members of the DPJC had received bespoke training on developing outcome-based 
commissioning at a local university and were able to draw on this to give theoretical 
accounts of what it might look like.  They discussed the need to start with ‘high level 
outcomes’ working back to determine how that ‘breaks down into service outcomes’ and 
how ‘each activity contributes to each outcome’. However, this was understood to represent 
an ideal so that while they were ‘working towards outcome-based commissioning’ they had 
not quite ‘got to grips with what that means’.  Two members of the team had also attended 
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training on Friedman’s outcome-based accountability but said they had been unable to 
develop it due to a ‘lack of strategic buy-in’.   
Despite attending this training, a lack of conceptual clarity over the use and understanding 
of the terms ‘outcome’ ‘need’, ‘priority’, ‘target’ and ‘indicator’ was evident amongst 
commissioners and other interviewees and the terms were often used conterminously. 
Strategic priorities at national and local levels were most commonly couched in terms of a 
service output or the avoidance of a negative outcome.  Hence the conceptual starting point 
for identifying priorities lay with a set of problems rather than a set of desired outcomes. 
Existing outcome measures were described as ‘crude’ or lacking in sophistication not only in 
how they were expressed but also in how they might be measured or monitored. 
Interviewees felt that it was far more conceptually challenging to think in terms of 
outcomes, understood as positive changes in wellbeing as in Axford and Berry’s (2005) 
definition, rather than traditional quantifiable measures such as service uptake or teenage 
pregnancy rates.  Some interviewees discussed   how this was would require new ways of 
working and thinking about existing performance management systems challenging the  
assumption that hitting targets equated with improvements for children and linked to the 
argument that it was important to  ‘get behind the target’.  
Interviewees discussed the need to collect different sorts of outcome data but most found it 
hard to suggest what, resorting back to the language of existing outputs and targets.  Some 
providers and commissioners suggested alternative measures that are harder to quantify 
should be developed such as ‘happiness’, ‘quality of life’ or ‘greater stability through the life-
course’.  Members of the DPJC had fought to include ‘improved well-being’ and ‘increased 
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resilience’ as targets for the CYPP. However, as they had failed to operationalise these as 
measurable outcomes they had no conventional way of evidencing whether they had been 
achieved or not. Another provider raised the issue of developing outcomes for whole 
families rather than individual children stressing the point that child outcomes are often 
linked to what happens in families. She also suggested that services should be commissioned 
against outcomes for families that are a cause for concern, following the logic of service 
pathways, rather than against general outcomes for families that are doing well.  
 Working towards outcome-based commissioning appeared to be easier for some services 
than for others. For example, small, well defined preventative services that had been 
commissioned from a ‘clean sheet’ through the Children’s Fund were described as outcome 
focused while more complex, long-established statutory services were proving far more 
challenging:  
Well I think some of our preventative services, we are gathering evidence of 
impact and outcomes in those services, we have specified the nature of outcome 
we are looking for and the type of evidence we want to see. But for CAMHS, well I 
don’t want to carry on about the CAMHS stuff because that is going to be the 
most challenging for us in relation to outcomes’ (SCM)   
For these services outcomes appeared to be virtual, ‘not written down’ rather than concrete, 
existing as a ‘blue-print in our heads of what we want’. However, even for those described as 
outcome based, the emphasis was on more straightforward quantifiable measures with a 
recognition that for much of the evidence gathered was  statistical and neighbourhood 
based and therefore difficult to relate back to specific interventions.  
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8.5.2 Measuring outcomes: limits to statistical data and the problem of attribution  
This brings us more closely to the second question that both commissioners and providers 
struggled with, the question of how to measure outcomes.  Some interviewees raised doubts 
about the degree to which statistical and performance data was sufficient in demonstrating 
the impact of an intervention, identifying both methodological and conceptual limits to the 
use of quantitative data as evidence of effectiveness.  Methodological problems included the 
use of benchmarking against so-called ‘peer neighbourhoods’. For example, one provider 
challenged the practical possibilities of finding a suitable ‘like-for-like’ area against which her 
work with children with disabilities could possibly be compared because: ‘there aren’t 
national benchmarks that are sophisticated enough even if you could identify a district 
exactly the same as Downton which is impossible anyway because of levels of social 
deprivation etc’  
Others included the problem of statistical trend data not being timely and the difficulty of 
collecting longitudinal data to demonstrate the long term impacts of prevention and early 
intervention. Longer term indicators of success were described as overlooked because of 
contractual and political imperatives to demonstrate short term goals and ‘quick wins’. For 
example, one TS provider explained that commissioners only required him to report first 
contacts in his sexual health clinic but that, while these were important, ‘so are the longer 
term contacts, the relationships. We don’t want them coming once for emergency 
contraception. We want to start them on a longer lasting method; we want them coming 
back to us’. Another raised the issue of how intense programmes focused on small numbers 
of people would fail to impact on population outcomes in a statistically significant way. He 
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argued for the need to invest more broadly with larger populations raising the debate of 
universal versus targeted provision.  
However what most interviewees questioned was the possibility of establishing causal links 
between interventions and quantifiable outcomes at the level of populations, challenging 
the ability of performance data to provide insight into the impacts of services and 
programmes. Interviewees recognised that given the complexity of contributory factors to 
negative outcomes there could be no simple causal connection between a service or policy 
intervention and the achievement of positive outcomes. In evaluation terms this is described 
as the ‘problem of attribution’, a problem clearly recognised by both providers and 
commissioners. This recognition was summed up by the following interviewee who 
suggested there were a myriad of potential contextual variables, falling outside the domain 
of service intervention, which might impact on teenage pregnancy rates:  
 ‘The trickiest thing is not seeing if the performance indicators are moving its 
knowing if what we’ve done is making any difference to those. An example 
yesterday we had the teenage pregnancy stats. Across the country in 2007 
teenage pregnancy rose by 2.6% and in Downton it dropped by 15% which is 
probably not that many conceptions actually. It may not be many more than the 
percentage. What’s that the result of? It could be as a result of our work it could 
be a statistical blip, it could be 15 less young women got legless over the course of 
that year and didn’t have unprotected sex over the course of that year. Could be 
anything, totally random reasons, could be a butterfly taking off in the Amazon 
jungle. I don’t know. Establishing causal relationships between what we do and 
the outcomes is really hard’ (DCS)  
This interviewee favoured a re-focus on alternative forms of evidencing and understanding. 
He also argued that the complex problems and their associated population outcomes, that 
LA’s were held accountable to, were a function of structural and cultural factors beyond the 
reach of service interventions and, that failing to impact on them statistically did not 
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necessarily mean they were not doing ‘good work’.  He challenged the theoretical 
practicality of outcome-based accountability suggesting that services should be judged in 
reference to lower order indicators of success for which he was managerially accountable:    
That takes us to a key issue about measurement. One of the key challenges for 
DCS’s is that we are increasingly being held to account for performance measures 
at a population level;  the infant mortality rate, the teenage pregnancy rate, 
we’re not being held responsible for outcomes that directly relate to our inputs. 
They’re not service measures and that’s really hard (DCS)  
Another interviewee made a similar point, illustrating this again in reference to teenage 
pregnancy. She argued that it was ‘enormously challenging’ for Downton to impact on high 
levels of teenage pregnancy and expressed frustration at working to centrally defined 
targets that she described as impossible to meet. Like the DCS, she suggested that some of 
the most significant factors underpinning teenage pregnancy were those things least 
amenable to intervention so that whilst ‘there is some fantastic work going on here around 
teenage pregnancy,  huge commitment, lots of resources, and evidence of great practice’, 
Downton would require ‘a huge cultural shift to make a difference’. This meant, that in terms 
of their accountability to central government, they would ‘always be a red,  we will be  red 
next year because we are so far behind our target , we aren’t going to met our 2010 target  
unless we give mass sterilisation’ (DJC).   
The challenge of determining the effects of a particular intervention or service in isolation 
from other influences and factors was recognised as especially difficult where multiple 
initiatives were focused on a particular priority and where multi-agency interventions were 
designed to deliver complex solutions to ‘joined up’ problems. There was an 
acknowledgement that outcome-based commissioning would require better understandings 
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of the links between problems, interventions and impact with a concomitant need to 
develop in-depth knowledge of service specific effectiveness. However, as previous sections 
have established, this was where knowledge deficits were felt to be greatest, because ‘we 
only count what we do…what we don’t do is search for the impact of a particular initiative’  
One NHS provider discussed this in reference to childhood obesity describing the ‘weighing 
and measuring’ as ‘the easy bit’ but determining the specific contribution made by individual 
interventions to broad based population outcomes as ‘very difficult’. She argued that this 
meant some outcomes could only be described in service process or output terms but linked 
to a theory of why they were important but that it was this that was most difficult to 
achieve.  
Another provider discussed the issue of attributing impacts to individual services when a 
young person might have contact with multiple agencies. For him this raised the problem of 
interagency communication and confidentiality as ‘once a young person has moved on we 
don’t know what has happened to them unless they choose to re-engage with us’.  A 
commissioner made the point that it was impossible to evidence service impacts on a young 
person as it was ‘not like a gold standard piece of research where people are isolated. 
Outcomes could be attributable to unknown influences such as the influence of a family 
member’. The commissioner for teenage pregnancy also raised the problem of evidencing 
the non-occurrence of a negative outcome saying she could not ‘demonstrate whether 
targeted girls would have got pregnant or not’.   
However it was not just in reference to multi-agency interventions that interviewees 
foresaw problems in evidencing. The consultant paediatrician highlighted the limitations of a 
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rationalist approach to evidencing complex single service interventions. She discussed how 
the kinds of therapeutic interventions she put in place for children with disabilities were 
difficult to evidence in accordance with the logic of deductive reason:  
‘A lot of them are extremely difficult to do other than as a service outcome 
because children usually get better. Most children who come to hospital 
appointments or get admitted will get better regardless even if you did nothing 
just sat and watched them. Whether they get better in one day, three weeks 
maybe dependant on how you treating them but it may be that the underlying 
condition is such that whatever you did wouldn’t make any difference. So it’s 
incredibly difficult to look at something that you can prove that you’ve altered 
because of what you’ve done to that child’ (Consultant Paediatrician)  
Several others highlighted the difficulties incumbent upon providers in measuring the impact 
of their service on longer term outcomes. One provider described this as ‘a really kind of 
time process’ making the point that sometimes the results of an intervention are not in 
evidence for a long time. He illustrated his point with a story of a chance encounter with a 
young person, several years after they had been in contact with his service who with 
hindsight, was able to reflect positively on the difference it had made to his life. He 
acknowledged that evidencing long-term outcomes would require sophisticated ways of 
monitoring across extended  time frames but suggested these would be better at capturing 
outcomes conceptualised as positive changes such as ‘settled in the next stage of life’ or  
‘leading a more constructive life’.  
8.5.3 Holding to account and fudging the outcomes  
Despite these well acknowledged problems commissioners expressed the aspiration to 
develop outcome based commissioning while continuing to contract on the basis of service 
outputs and contacts. For some providers the collection of service monitoring data was 
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described as a worthwhile activity helping them to refine their service and to provide 
evidence to funders that they were reaching target groups. The SCM with responsibility for 
procurement described capacity building for the TS principally in terms of ensuring they had 
service monitoring systems in place and, while the process ‘of introducing a strict 
management regime’ was one small providers often found irksome, they soon saw that by 
being able to ‘demonstrate the value of what they are doing they are much more likely to get 
money in the future’. For this commissioner, service outputs were the principal form of 
evidence she relied on to demonstrate ‘value for money’ conflating successful outcomes 
with evidence of service uptake and through-put.  
Despite her confidence, some providers described current systems of performance 
management as burdensome, saying that the demands of data collection got in the way of 
service delivery. One provider complained that contract monitoring had become over an 
over-complicated ‘industry’, a meaningless bureaucratic process that was a poor tool for 
precipitating service improvement. The broad point he was making was that holding people 
to account for outputs or even outcomes does not actually support or facilitate the process 
of them achieving them.  This was reiterated by an NHS provider who complained that the 
policy focus was on ‘world class commissioning’ as the ‘driver for better outcomes’ at the 
expense of a complementary, but more pertinent , focus on ‘world-class providing’.  
One TS provider suggested that established systems of contract management would be easy 
to manipulate or even subvert:  
‘It’s easy to fudge all those outcomes anyway. If I wanted to cheat, the system is 
fairly easy to cheat if I wanted to. The contract managers are not that bright you 
can pull the wool over their eyes they’re not that bright at all...’     
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This provider was able to highlight selective empirical indicators relating to NL’s policy 
priorities, such as attainment levels and teenage pregnancy, in order to demonstrate the 
worth of his programmes to those with resource allocation powers.  Other TS providers also 
described measuring the outcome to suit the funder. Rather than ‘fudging’ the outcomes 
they described being selective about what evidence to look for and record, making it ‘fit’ 
with the objectives of the funding stream and hence criteria for funding. In this way their 
actions were in line with Lipsky’s (1980) observation that SLBs can accommodate themselves 
to targets and output measures and ‘subvert efforts’ of bureaucratic control through the 
manipulation of performance information.   
8.5.4 Evaluation  
These providers had all commissioned external evaluations for some of their programmes to 
give richer qualitative information regarding effectiveness including user testimonies and 
evidence of longer term outcomes. They described themselves as good at collecting output 
information but that they needed to be ‘smarter at outcomes’ saying this required a 
research approach in addition to what was possible through routine monitoring. The 
evaluation evidence they produced was not information that had been asked for by 
commissioners among whom evaluation was described as difficult, costly and time 
consuming. Without a budget for evaluation commissioners pointed out that they had to 
rely on less rigorous forms of information gathering including provider assessment of 
efficacy but, more significantly, performance management information.  
Where evaluation had been used by commissioners it was most often to provide evidence 
for a form of backward justification to support initiatives that they have already decided 
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were worthwhile. Hence, for example, one provider had run a pilot project at the suggestion 
of a commissioner who had built in a short term evaluation for the sole purpose of providing 
the justification for funding it in the longer term.   
8.6 Summary  
This chapter has explored how commissioners, strategic decision makers, and providers 
drew on different forms of evidence to make policy at a local level.  Whilst commissioners 
and most providers were advocates of outcome based commissioning, the degree to which 
they believed in the possibility of an objective and rational process of evidence-based 
planning varied, reflecting a spectrum of orientations about the validity of different forms of 
knowledge or ways of knowing the world. Rather than proceeding through a logical, staged 
cycle of rational decision making the commissioning process was revealed as a more ad-hoc 
and incremental process involving a piecing together  of diverse evidence sources within the 
context of a set of managerial and resource constraints.  
In establishing priority outcomes, the compilation of quantitative data following the logic of 
benchmarking predominated and recourse  to statistical measures of the scale of centrally 
defined ‘problems’ appeared to help naturalise these as priorities for local action. 
Performance targets and national indicators acting as measurable representations of social 
problems privileged quantitative forms of evidence at this ‘stage’ of the commissioning 
process.    
Local policy actors however recognised that national targets and indicators acted as 
distortions or simplifications of the complex problems they were tasked with addressing. 
Furthermore by directing funding towards particular service interventions at the expense of 
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alternative areas of need, meant that it was difficult to draw attention to more marginalised 
issues.  
With a remit for needs analysis the DPJC had commissioned a number of focused pieces of 
work to help inform the targeting rationale for some specified areas of children’s service 
provision. This work had principally involved mapping areas of need by building composite 
indicators of risk that relied partly on national data sets and partly on administrative and 
performance data. The quality of this work was not consistent and gave evidence of a poor 
understanding of the complexities of risk factor analysis despite being promoted by public 
health through the JSNA.   
While needs analysis and service mapping had been carried out there was little evidence 
that they had been employed to inform the strategic targeting or commissioning of services. 
Some commissioners suggested that this reflected a lack of high level strategic commitment 
to the use of this type of evidence. Other interviewees complained that available data was 
too broad to inform fine tuned understandings of changing local need, or suggested that the 
instrumental use of available data was constrained by the limited capacity of planners to 
absorb or make judgements about it.   
A focus on measuring and providing evidence for accountability was generally recognised to 
work at the expense of producing evidence of effectiveness. However in identifying service 
responses to deliver outcomes most interviewees highlighted the importance of provider’s 
‘situated’ knowledge, making scant reference to more formalised research evidence.  
The accounts of some TS providers indicated that they had engaged in processes of 
negotiation with strategic decision makers in order to reconcile central defined objectives 
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with local needs and concerns.  They described how they had developed ways of responding 
to community needs based on their ‘local knowledge’ reinterpreting and adapting the 
evidence-based programmes that they were charged with implementing that exposed a 
tension between implementing EBP and delivering community governance.  
Quantitative evidence predominated not only at the priority setting, but also evaluative 
‘stage’, of the commissioning ‘cycle’ where evidence for accountability, principally framed as 
managerial targets and outputs, rather than outcomes, prefigured.  However it was not clear 
how this information was utilised to inform funding decisions or redesign services.  
While commissioners and providers welcomed the principle of outcome-based 
commissioning they described considerable conceptual and practical struggles with 
achieving this. Establishing outcome-based commissioning was identified as particularly 
problematic in reference to complex problems requiring multi-agency input where 
relationships of cause and effect are difficult to determine.  Interviewees felt that 
commissioning on the basis of outcomes was better suited to those situations where there 
are more clearly identifiable links between service input and outcome. Where the links 
between inputs and outcomes are complex, poorly understood, or unknown,   a different 
form of policy learning was indicated. Providers suggested that tapping in to local contextual 
knowledge and learning through experimentation and risk should take precedent over 
providing evidence relating to the achievement of targets.  
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CHAPTER NINE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
9.1 Introduction  
This final chapter presents a discussion of the research findings highlighting how these 
contribute to understandings of the implementation of joint commissioning and the use of 
evidence to inform local decision making. Within this discussion reference is made back to 
the literature and policy context explored in chapters 2-4.  
The chapter begins with a summary of the key findings that provide answers to the research 
questions detailed in chapter 1. Subsequent sections discuss these findings. The first makes 
reference to the analytical theme concerned with the organisational and policy context   
within which commissioning was interpreted and developed locally. The second explores the 
conceptual and methodological challenges presented by the requirement to take an 
evidenced, outcome-based approach to planning and commissioning services.  
The chapter concludes with a brief exploration of the research findings in reference to the 
contemporary policy environment.   
9.2 Summary of findings  
Chapter 6 identified three broad sets of contextual conditions from which barriers to the 
development of joint commissioning were seen to emerge: a history of interagency conflict 
and low trust relationships; a tendency to retreat to organisational ‘silos’ in the face of 
service failures and structural re-organisation; and an LA reluctance to relinquish service 
provision and move towards ‘place-shaping’. In addition, changing national messages about 
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the role of CTs and the breadth of discretion afforded to CT pathfinders, meant differently 
situated policy implementers, framed alternative understandings of its function. These 
differences gave rise to a set of enduring tensions around what was considered the 
legitimate remit of the CT with the result that it was accorded a marginal, rather than central 
role in shaping the changes that ECM sought to achieve.  
Facilitating factors included being involved in the process of an externally commissioned 
review of joint partnership and commissioning arrangements which had affirmed the need 
to recognise and structurally embed the ‘jointness’ of arrangements between the PCT and 
LA.    Also important were the appointment of a new DCS and the growing relationship of 
trust and mutual understanding between himself and the DJC who, as a ‘policy 
entrepreneur’ (Kingdon 1995) and ‘partnership reticulist’ (Challis et al 1998), had achieved 
some success in establishing the case for a joint commissioning approach.   
 Chapter 7 explored the various ways in which commissioning was interpreted, experienced, 
and championed as a means of for coordinating public service delivery and delivering better 
outcomes for children and young people.  
Commissioning was understood by commissioners and TS providers to offer a mechanism for 
opening up the failings of hierarchal  systems of service delivery by facilitating a form of a-
politicised decision making, and ‘levelling the playing field’ between the statutory and third 
sectors. TS providers drew on pejorative, neo-liberal discourses of a corrupted and self-
interested public sector to make the case for a greater role for markets in challenging what 
they identified as an LA monopoly of service provision.  
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The importance of close collaborative relationships between commissioners and providers 
was stressed. However, this sat in tension with managerial concerns of meeting targets and 
delivering cost effectiveness and the need to maintain a separation between provider and 
commissioner in the interests of fair competition. This was described as compromised by the 
absence of an organisational division of these functions within the LA so that ‘vested 
interests’ were seen to influence decisions related to potential outsourcing. TS providers’ 
experiences of commissioning varied but interviewees gave accounts of rule bending with 
respect to formal commissioning processes. These included putting out tenders for unviable 
projects and a reliance on informal mechanisms and historical funding relationships that 
compromised the principles of competition and contestability.   
TS providers were managerially accountable through contracts but stressed the primacy of 
‘participatory accountability’ (Hill and Hupe 2007). These different logics of accountability 
sat in tension with each other, sometimes initiating ‘subversive’ responses.   
NHS providers suggested that the demands of managerial accountability and the process of 
contracting on the basis of outputs had limited their ability to deliver needs-led services and 
to contribute to the broader preventative and partnership agendas.  
Within the LA the idea of functional matching rather than competition was seen as a more 
acceptable basis for contracting out to the TS. Previous negative experiences of outsourcing, 
high transaction costs, ethical barriers to relinquishing control of specific areas of delivery, 
and challenges to political and statutory accountability were all presented as arguments 
against a greater role for commissioning.  
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Chapter 8 explored how strategic decision makers, commissioners and providers engaged 
with different evidence sources to make decisions about outcome priorities, targeting and 
designing interventions.  
Different forms of evidence were privileged at various ‘stages’ of the local policy or 
commissioning ‘cycle’. At the priority setting ‘stage’   quantitative evidence predominated 
despite recognition of its limitations and the need to look ‘behind the target’.    
A lack of strategic commitment to a coherent and on-going process of gathering, analysing 
and utilising appropriate data coupled with a deficit of local skill and capacity meant that 
evidence was not consistently and usefully applied in making decisions about need priorities 
and targeting.   
Interviewees articulated the importance of providers’ ‘local knowledge’ in identifying needs 
and in determining what might ‘work’. The latter sat in tension with the policy goal of 
evidence-based practice as providers reformulated prescribed programmes to ‘fit’ their 
readings of the local context. Provider knowledge was not systematically tapped into but 
relied on informal relationships between commissioners and providers entailing recognition 
of a need for better horizontal and vertical, reflective learning.  
Interviewees expressed a range of conceptual and methodological problems in defining and 
measuring outcomes. This meant that evidence for accountability, couched primarily as 
service outputs, dominated over evidence of effectiveness at the evaluation ‘stage’ of the 
commissioning process. Where providers had collated alternative service monitoring and 
evaluation data they reported that this not used by commissioners to inform service design. 
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This also meant that the TS was limited in its capacity to demonstrate an advantage over 
other sectors in delivering better outcomes or accessing more marginalised groups.   
The following section discusses the research findings related to the first analytical theme: 
the key organizational and policy factors influencing the local interpretation and 
development of commissioning.   
9.3 Implementing commissioning: the policy and local organisational context  
The discourse of ‘partnership’ implies collective objectives, mutual advantage and a 
willingness to share power (Newman 2000). However the experience of developing joint 
commissioning in the context of CT arrangements did not fit this idealised construction. 
Instead it served to expose the contradictions inherent in NL’s project of harnessing the 
benefits of networked governance through imposed ‘partnership’ coupled with top-down 
mechanisms of managerial control (Rhodes 2000).   
Accomplishing ‘successful’ partnership has been equated with breaking down historic 
barriers to inter-organisational collaboration, and identified as contingent upon the 
development and maintenance of relationships of trust (Audit Commission 1998; Hudson 
and Hardy 2002). In Downton, however, not only were recent histories of collaboration 
characterised by conflict and low trust but as the CF pathfinder evolved, ambiguities 
surrounding its role and accountability served to entrench existing relationships of mutual 
suspicion.  
Institutional factors that acted as barriers to developing trust included non- coterminous 
boundaries between the PCTs and LA, a barrier identified by other studies of partnership 
working (Cameron and Lart 2003). However it was the enduring problems of ‘failed’ LA 
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children’s services and the resultant organisational instability and changes in key leadership 
personnel that emerged as critical impediments to achieving an integrated approach to 
commissioning.     
Establishing a sense of common purpose proved difficult when ‘partnership’ had been 
imposed vertically and sat in tension with the need for poor performing services to attend to 
a set of organisationally specific targets for improvement identified by contemporaneous 
audit and inspection reports. Added to this, the 35 targets negotiated from the national 
indicator set (CLG/HM Government 2008), and for which Downton LA was statutorily 
accountable, were, in the main, effectively structured around discrete organisational 
responsibilities with only a minority making reference to cross-cutting policy goals.  These 
vertical lines of accountability, together with claims to exclusive organisational competence 
to deal with specific areas of service provision, were identified as pulling against the 
integration of organisational objectives. This, together with the relative autonomy afforded 
to schools in developing extended services, helped to marginalise the role of the CT and 
render the development of joint commissioning peripheral to the ‘core business’ of partner 
organisations.   
Although the DPJC had brought together commissioners from both the PCT and the LA there 
was little that could be described as ‘joint’ about the way they commissioned services. The 
reticence of the LA and the PCT to pool budgets and delegate responsibility to the joint team 
to commission of behalf of both agencies reflected the different structural relationships of 
accountability that each organisation has to their respective government departments. 
These findings are not new but, on the contrary, reflect the enduring nature of the very 
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problems of ‘bureaucratic failure’ (Le Grand et al 1999) that, with its integrative focus, ECM 
had set out to resolve.    
Problems with establishing a joint commissioning function did not only reflect a lack of 
coherence between different ‘policy streams’ (Kingdon 1995). The conflict between 
partnership as mode of governance and the imposition of potential competition implied by 
the commissioning function of the CT pathfinder also produced tensions that acted as a 
barrier to embedding joint commissioning arrangements.  
The CTPT evolved as a distinct operational unit that was to eventually become the DPJC.  In 
its early days the CTPT became conflated with the CT pathfinder and positioned as ‘empire 
building’ and ‘resource grabbing’; behaviours identified as corrosive rather than building of 
trust. Cultural anthropologists have drawn attention to the ‘dangers’ of transgressing 
structural, organisational and conceptual ‘boundaries’ (Douglas 1966) and the threat this 
poses to established order.  Transgressing the organisational borders of the PCT and the LA, 
rendered the status of the CTPT ambiguous, and there was a perception that it members 
were guilty of disregarding the rules and norms governing either organisation, in particular 
with respect to accountability.   Ambiguity surrounding the role and function of the CT 
pathfinder together with a lack of commitment to it by senior LA officers, together 
entrenched its marginalisation from the central concerns of ‘partner’ organisations.  
The experience of developing joint commissioning highlights the need to take account of the 
relationship between different strategic interests, and the balance of power between those 
implementing and affected by policy (Barrett 2004). The construction of a negative narrative 
around the commissioning CT pathfinder can be understood to reflect the challenge it 
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represented to established patterns of resource control and service provision. NL policy 
introduced a place shaping rather than providing role for LAs on the basis that increased 
competition and contestability would help deliver service improvements, greater choice, 
cost effectiveness and better outcomes (CLG 2006). The TS in particular was championed as 
offering more needs-led responsive services better placed to meet the needs of marginalised 
children, young people and families. Establishing a commissioning role for the CT implied an 
extended role for markets and increased competition between ‘partner’ agencies and 
endowed the formal partnership with the power to make decisions that had implications for 
the agencies represented. As the dominant provider of children’s services this implied a 
potential loss of LA control for some areas of provision, most significantly their youth 
services.  Thus, while TS representatives on the CYPTB were clear advocates of joint 
commissioning, their LA partners were less enthusiastic and the CYPTB emerged as a site of 
competition and conflict rather than collaboration and ‘synergistic gain’ (Huxham 1996).  
The narrative accounts of TS interviewees suggested that the development of joint 
commissioning was beleaguered by LA defensiveness over control of resources and an 
unwillingness to relinquish their role in service delivery, so that ‘vested interests’ served to 
replicate historical patterns of delivery.  Lowndes and Skelcher (2001: 313) suggest that the 
challenge for formal partnerships as an ‘organisational form’ is to ‘manage the interaction of 
different modes of governance’ which might generate competition as well as collaboration. 
In Downton the tension between achieving collaboration and integration in the face of 
competition was not readily accommodated by the LA as the lead agency in the partnership. 
As the key provider of children’s services the LA showed an unwillingness to accept a 
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broader role for commissioning, resisting further outsourcing beyond ‘marginal’ areas of 
provision, and vetoing pooled budget arrangements.  
In theory markets are intended to improve services by challenging poorly performing 
services and decommissioning those that fail all together (Grace et al 2007).  Arguably the 
establishment of a commissioning function for the CT represented a form of challenge to 
existing in-house providers theoretically offering an impetus to drive up the quality of their 
provision in the face of potential competition from other sectors. However in Downton, in 
common with other LAs (Audit Commission 2008; Phillips et al 2010) there was no evidence 
that mainstream provision had been held open to competition as commissioning guidance 
suggested it should (HM Government 2006). Instead there had been recent cases of reverse 
contracting whereby both failed and successful services had been brought back in- house. It 
was beyond the scope of this study to determine whether or not this was on the basis that 
outsourcing had stimulated in-house improvements. What was clear, however, was that in-
house providers were identified by TS providers as abusing their decision making powers in 
order to maintain their monopoly provider status contributing to the latter’s feelings of 
alienation from the ‘partnership’ agenda of the CT.  
Where commissioning was ‘allowed’ evidence suggested that, in common with other studies 
(Martikke 2009; Martikke and Moxham 2010; Packwood 2007), informal networking and 
historical funding relationships sometimes prevailed over formal competitive contractual 
processes. Networks are understood to ameliorate the problems produced by markets by 
offering collaborative advantage and lower transaction costs (Huxham 1996; Steane and 
Walker 2000). In Downton there was most evidence of the ideal-type of networked 
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relationship between commissioners and trusted providers who had well established 
funding relationships and where there was acceptance that the provider had the right 
‘functional attributes’  to deliver the particular service and hence did not sit in potential 
competition with the statutory sector. Here interaction was reportedly characterised by 
mutual understanding and respect and had facilitated more flexible and responsive 
approaches that engaged with provider knowledge allowing small projects to be identified 
and funded.  
The downside of this is that providers not party to such relationships might experience them 
as exclusionary and antithetical to   the principle of competition. A dependence on informal 
relationships also risks narrowing the market, which as Martikke and Moxham (2010) 
suggest, might exclude providers better placed to meet ‘niche’ needs or those of 
marginalised communities.  
The implication is that there is a need to balance the advantages of networked relationships 
with the transparency of more formal arrangements. This is what providers were effectively 
championing when they appealed for a commissioning approach founded on shared values 
and vision that adhered to formal rules whilst avoiding excessive bureaucracy. 
Conceptualised thus, commissioning was presented as a fairer and more transparent process 
of decision making, delivering accountability on a number of levels.  
Chapter 2 discussed the complexity of ‘holding to account’ in the context of overlapping 
regimes of governance, understanding accountability as a social and cultural process not just 
‘rooted in formal systems and rules’ (Newman 2004).  In advocating for, or against 
commissioning, stakeholders drew on different discourses of accountability to justify certain 
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positions or courses of action. The expectation that commissioners act as ‘knowledge 
brokers’, negotiating between a rational use of performance data and ‘stakeholder’ evidence 
implies a need to reconcile potentially conflicting  lines of participatory, professional and 
managerial accountability.  
A discourse of ‘participatory accountability’ (Hill and Hupe 2007) to communities, children 
and young people was amplified by TS providers to legitimate an extended role for 
themselves in delivering public services while simultaneously justifying the revision of 
centrally defined priorities and subverting managerial efforts at top down control. NHS 
providers meanwhile expressed the primacy of their professional accountability to service 
users and represented the demands of managerial accountability as encroaching on their 
capacity to deliver this.  
LA reluctance to externalise was primarily based on a desire to maintain control of particular 
areas of provision. This was due, in part, to negative experiences of out-sourcing which had 
engendered fears primarily couched in terms of a problem of accountability.  LA strategic 
policy makers highlighted the importance of managerial accountability for targets and 
outcomes over as a way of legitimating their control of the local policy process.  
Commissioners can be understood as working, not just within, but also between 
organisational boundaries in their encounters with providers. The implication of 
collaborative contractual relationships is that they are held to account, not only vertically, 
but also horizontally to providers as ‘co-producers’ of shared outcome priorities (Considine 
2002). For commissioners a tension was revealed between balancing the demands of ‘public-
administrative accountability’ (Hill and Hupe 2007) and bureaucratic ‘fair play’ while 
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establishing relationships of trust and co-production with providers. For example, adherence 
to standing financial instructions, as the formal set of mechanisms for checking discretionary 
decision making, was understood to deliver greater transparency, but it was also identified 
as cubing flexibility and the capacity for smaller TSO to be involved in tendering for larger 
contracts.   
The following section discusses the research findings related to the second analytical theme 
by considering some of the conceptual and methodological challenges presented by an 
evidenced approach to commissioning services. 
9.4 Evidence and the commissioning ‘cycle’  
Accomplishing the duel goals of vertical and horizontal accountability rests on the 
appropriate utilisation of ‘codified’, ‘expert’ knowledge generated by research and 
quantitative data, and its reconciliation with the ‘local knowledge’ of providers and the 
experiential knowledge of service users and communities. In highlighting the need to engage 
with multiple forms of evidence, commissioning guidance (HM Government 2006) suggested 
the possibility of resolving this ‘top-down/bottom-up’ tension.   
However, the ‘commissioning cycle’ makes a number of assumptions about the role of 
evidence in decision making. Just as at national level, where, as Duncan (2005) suggests, 
evidence forms only the ‘tip of the policy iceberg’, in Downton it was only one of many 
factors influencing local policy decision making. Political priorities, local councillors’ desire 
for re-election, limited resources and entrenched patterns of service provision all figured as 
influencing factors.  Achieving this resolution however, was also compromised by a set of 
methodological and conceptual challenges and institutionalised ‘information biases’.   
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Gough (1992) suggests that an approach to need assessment aimed at reconciling the 
tension between expertly defined ‘objective need’ with the recognition of the rights and 
abilities of communities to identify and express their own needs must enable conflicts of 
interest to be made explicit so that they can be resolved and common priorities established. 
However, in Downton there was scant reference to alternative forms of evidence at the level 
of strategic priority setting.  Despite making reference to ‘data triangulation’ the JSNA did 
not include the views of providers, or children and young people. Although formal processes 
of consultation had been carried out with regard to the CYPP these had been used to 
endorse previously identified priorities. Hence there appeared to be few opportunities for 
the discussion and negotiation of issues not defined as priorities by senior strategic decision 
makers. Issues raised that fell outside the arena of pre-determined priorities for action, were 
effectively side-lined through a form of ‘non-decision-making’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1963, 
1970). This echoes findings from studies of children’s participation that suggest that young 
people’s involvement in strategic decision making is largely confined to consultation and 
often manipulated to endorse adult defined agendas (Hill et al 2004; Kirby and Bryson 2002).  
Reference to quantitative ‘objective’ evidence with its assumption of fact/value, rational 
analysis/political distinction (Miller 1994; Morcol 2001) appeared to help naturalise centrally 
defined priorities, suggesting  the possibility of meeting the rhetorical ideal of transparent, 
rational and objective decision making and appealing to the bureaucratic ‘ethos of 
office’(Newman 2004)  articulated by some commissioners.  
Local policy documents framed strategic priorities as service outputs, the reduction of 
negative population-based outcomes and the statutory education targets reflecting the 
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requirement to provide upwards evidence of accountability to centrally defined objectives. 
High level priorities were thus framed as quantitative measures of social problems. With an 
appeal to the logic of statistical benchmarking against ‘peer neighbourhoods’ this meant that 
need was primarily understood in the conventional sense as ‘top down’, measurable and 
objective (Gough 1992), but also relative or ‘comparative’ (Bradshaw 1972) being 
understood by reference to those with similar characteristics. 
Downton had not established a strategically coherent approach to need analysis or targeting 
but instead proceeded on a somewhat ad-hoc basis restricted by resources and a lack of 
local capacity. Need analysis mostly depended on the ‘expert knowledge’ of public health 
professionals, who with their background in epidemiology, made sole recourse to 
quantitative methodologies.  
Demographic and area-based data had been drawn on to develop combined indices of need 
and identify neighbourhoods where children might be most likely to experience poor 
outcomes. Besides this, targeted needs analysis was most commonly conducted in response 
to new government defined priorities for action.  Where priorities were defined as negative 
outcomes some attempts at risk factor analysis had been made. This meant attention was 
focused on identifying ‘at risk’ groups rather than understanding the factors that might lay 
behind presenting problems.   
A focus on ‘at risk’ groups or individuals supports an approach that prioritises strategies 
aimed at individual behaviour change, underplaying the significance of structural 
determinants on poor outcomes (e.g. SETF 2007, 2008). There was some evidence of this in 
Downton where factors such as ‘low aspirations’ and ‘poor parenting’ were repeatedly 
289 
 
identified as central to the social problems they were trying to prevent. These presented as 
examples of a form of institutionalised thinking (Douglas 1987) that replicated and 
embedded a limited set of ideas discouraging more critical analysis. Thus, while participants 
articulated the importance of material deprivation and social exclusion this had not resulted 
in needs analysis aimed at building understandings of possible barriers to achieving positive 
outcomes; the kind of need analysis that suggests a more qualitative approach that engages 
with the lived experiences of those to whom policy is directed.  
Some interviewees expressed the idea that many of the targets for which they were 
statutorily accountable, were so profoundly culturally and structurally rooted that they were 
unlikely to impact on them in any statistically significant way. One response to this was a 
paradoxical, selective use of evidence to support solutions that were amenable to service 
intervention resulting in the design of interventions aimed at individual behaviour change.  
However, other interviewees challenged being ‘held to account’ according to the logic of 
‘command and control’ policy making; the top-down approach discussed in chapter 2. 
Hence, despite a broad acceptance of government defined objectives and ECM priorities, 
these interviewees were critical of national target setting and their accountability for 
achieving population based outcomes for highly complex policy problems. They described 
the world as chaotic, with policy outcomes dependent on a set of complex and 
unpredictable variables existing in non-linear relationship to each other. This meant that 
simple relationships of cause and effect were often not possible to determine. They also 
raised concerns over the potentially distorting effect of orientating service responses 
towards things that can be measured, suggesting that these did not necessarily equate to 
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better outcomes for children. As targets and their measurement drew attention, and hence 
funding, to specific issues or groups this also meant that what was not measured was not a 
focus of concern meaning more important factors could remain hidden.  
What they were describing resonated closely with Chapman’s (2004) concept of ‘systems 
failure’. According to Chapman, systems failure is the inevitable result of a mechanistic and 
linear approach to policy making that focuses on managing the local implementation 
environment in order to secure policy goals through systems of rigid performance 
management and target setting. This involves the ‘reduction of complex problems into 
separate, rationally manageable components’ (Chapman 2004: 11) and promotes an 
evidence-based approach that ignores the importance of context dependent knowledge.  
Local policy actors recognised that they were not dealing with clear cut, task orientated 
goals, and that their activity was rarely measurable in any straightforward way. As Lipsky 
(1980, 2010) argues, this meant that accountability for their services should not take the 
simple form of counting. Taken at face value, outcome based accountability was thus seen to 
make ‘perfect sense’. Furthermore the ECM focus on outcomes was intended to move 
attention away from atomistic responses to social problems by establishing cross cutting 
policy local policy objectives.  
However, as discussed above, many of these were operationalised as targets that spoke to 
discrete areas of service provision and worked against the development of integrated 
approaches. Where targets were more clearly cross cutting both the LA and PCT had funded 
discrete elements of work where the logic of producing evidence for accountability implied 
the need to establish service specific contributions to population outcomes. In the absence 
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of a clearly articulated ‘theory of change’ this in turn often meant recourse to measuring 
service outputs.  
Interviewees demonstrated an awareness of the problems inherent in producing 
unequivocal evidence of ‘what works’, questioning the epistemological assumption of 
demonstrating ‘cause and effect’, and highlighting a range of problems in conceptualising 
and measuring outcomes. These included, amongst others: separating out the impact of a 
service intervention from that of other intervening variables; establishing the non-
occurrence of negative outcomes; and evidencing the impacts of services that might take 
many years to emerge. They also discussed the problem of demonstrating efficacy when 
there was very little concrete evidence of what an effective intervention might look like. In 
these situations they discussed the importance of learning through risk taking, innovation or 
experimental design. They highlighted the need for horizontal learning; to foster ‘world class 
providing as well as world class commissioning’ and ‘blue-sky thinking’ whilst suggesting that 
opportunities for doing this were limited by both time and contractual obligations that left 
risk taking to the provider.  
In this study both providers and commissioners asserted the importance of context 
dependent or ‘local knowledge’ in informing strategic decision-making and commissioning. 
This is the knowledge developed by practitioners in their day-to-day interactions with the 
families, children and young people who access their services and of the communities within 
which they work. It is what providers described as ‘evidence on the ground’ and what the 
DCS referred to as knowledge of ‘what real people need from services’.   However, despite 
stressing the importance of this knowledge source, the capacity of providers to inform the 
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early ‘shaping’ stages of priority setting or subsequent in-depth needs analysis and targeting 
was under-utilised.  Instead, both, as we have seen, made primary reference to quantitative 
data, even though this was widely considered inadequate or misapplied. The exclusion of 
local policy relevant knowledge left practitioners from both sectors describing a disjuncture 
between what they felt they knew about local communities and their presenting needs and 
the value placed on that knowledge by commissioners and decision makers.   
Yanow (2004: 19) suggests that a tendency for organisations to disregard or even disparage 
local knowledge may, in part, be located in ‘the politics of expertise and of science’, that 
accord the ‘expert’ knowledge, derived from academic and professional training, a higher 
status than the experiential ‘field knowledge’ of workers at the periphery of organisations. In 
Downton, the ‘problem’ of data management was not so much a problem of too much, or 
too little data, but of the importance afforded to different sources of information and the 
readiness of decision makers to learn from it.  The complex processes of data collection and 
risk analysis that predominated at the policy formulation stages of commissioning yielded 
data understood as   ‘objective’ or ‘scientific’ evidence of need, that on paper appeared to 
confer it with a greater legitimacy than that that might be available from providers.  Even 
still, this data was rarely incorporated into commissioning decisions.  
However this was not the full story, for even where practitioners had developed expertise in 
‘codifying’ their knowledge through relatively sophisticated data collection and analysis, 
commissioners were reportedly ‘not interested’. The apparent disregard of commissioners of 
provider knowledge at this level was not however, a function of their individual information 
biases, but of the hierarchical and managerial concern with evidencing cost-effectiveness. 
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Thus, for example, in the PCT, the institutionally established practice of commissioning 
against contacts meant this additional data was considered superfluous to requirement. 
Here, ‘evidence for accountability’, defined as accountability for outputs rather than 
outcomes, predominated.  
More commonly it was in the informal encounters between commissioners and providers 
that local knowledge was used to most effect. Here relationships were characterised by 
longevity and the development of mutual regard built on respect for each other’s 
professional or practice competence. The level at which local knowledge appeared most 
highly valued was where it was understood to inform the development of contextually 
relevant services responses, and commissioners frequently described their most successful 
projects as informed by local providers’ experiences of what might ‘work’.    
Lipsky’s (1980) thesis draws attention to the issue of ‘goal ambiguity’ and the role of front-
line agency in modifying intended policy outcomes at the point of implementation. Chapter 
8 gave evidence of both TS providers and strategic decision makers reinterpreting formal 
policy goals in line with their readings of what was needed locally.  Entrepreneurial TS 
providers showed the ability to draw on elements of NL policy rhetoric to engage in the 
selective appropriation of evidence to justify courses of action and decision making that 
allowed them to prioritise local goals. By reframing narrowly defined problems within a 
broader conceptualisation of exclusion and poverty, and aligning these with other agendas, 
they were able to develop more flexible strategies to overcome the limitations imposed by a 
centralising system of targets and government defined priorities.  
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In a limited number of cases they had negotiated these modified interpretations with 
commissioners and other strategic stakeholders. This process of negotiation had resonance 
with Durose’s (2009: 35) recasting of Lipsky’s (1980) discretionary policy making at the front 
line, from ‘coping’ to ‘responsive’ and  ‘entrepreneurial’  strategies for reconciling the 
different demands of local and hierarchical accountabilities. In other contexts, however, this 
was articulated in more subversive terms, with locally indentified priorities and outcomes 
discursively aligned with, or bent to ‘fit’, funding allocation criteria. In employing either 
strategy, these providers illustrated the ability to function within and across what Yanow 
(2004: 16) describes as different ‘knowledge sites’: that of their own area of practice 
expertise; the organisational context of this practice; the ‘extra-organisational’ or 
community context; and that of the statutory funding agencies to which commissioners 
belong.  
Both commissioners and providers questioned the validity of government claims to an 
‘evidence-base’ for the programmes they were expected to fund and implement. Identifying 
context as critical they questioned the appropriateness of implementing programmes of 
intervention that had been developed and evaluated elsewhere via ‘gold standard’ methods.  
Instead, they endorsed the idea of local solution finding, actively redesigning centrally 
prescribed evidence-based programmes in order to render them, contextually relevant 
according to their experience. In so doing, they effectively compromised their status as 
‘evidence-based’ in the original sense, and exposed a tension between the twin goals of EBP 
and local governance (Coote et al 2004; Newman 2004). However, it is important to stress 
that both local and ‘expert’ knowledge are important and should not be thought of as 
mutually exclusive. Interviewees in this study argued that local knowledge was important in 
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ensuring technical and professional knowledge was applied in a way that was appropriate to 
their service users and communities.  
Chapter 4 argued that evidence-based policy entails the assumption of value neutrality, 
ignoring the role played by values in formulating policy goals and responses (Morcol 
2001).  In revising centrally-defined policy goals and reformulating solutions some 
interviewees made explicit reference to values and the ethical and moral implications of 
their chosen strategies. They suggested that a ‘values-base’ was as important as ‘what 
works’ stressing the importance of a community development approach that worked 
from a strengths perspective and valued local people’s ability to identify and their own 
needs and solutions. This involved recognition of the relationship between power and 
knowledge endorsing a ‘phronetic’ approach to local policy learning (Flyvbjerg 2001) that 
asserts the primacy of context dependent knowledge with reference to ethics and values.  
Yanow’s (2004) suggestion that the sidelining of local knowledge is rooted in conflicting 
systems of knowing leads her to conclude that learning needs to involve seeing 
organisational life ‘multiculturally’ in the sense that it values different forms of knowledge.  
Because local knowledge is interactive and contextual it is hard to ‘codify’, manage and 
transfer and might be better thought of as ‘knowing-in-practice’.  This suggests the need for 
learning through the integration of different ways of knowing: Aristotle’s phronesis, or 
‘practical wisdom’ (Flyvbjerg 2001) as well as ‘episteme’ and ‘techne’ around which 
evidence-based approaches are framed (Parsons 2002).   
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9.5 Concluding thoughts 
In the opening chapter of this thesis it was observed that, despite being accorded a central 
role in improving outcomes for children and delivering efficiency, joint strategic 
commissioning in children’s services had been slow to embed. Not only do entrenched 
cultures of service provision and enduring tensions between partnership,  hierarchies and 
markets impede its development but the commissioning cycle fails to acknowledge the 
‘limits of steering in a world in which prediction and control is so difficult and in which 
'evidence' is so problematic’. (Parsons 2002: 51).   
This thesis has provided a micro-level analysis of the interactions between differently 
situated policy actors, both behind and on the front line, in the process of implementing 
joint commissioning in children’s services. It has not been concerned with evaluating the 
success or otherwise of this process or with passing judgement on whether commissioning 
has the capacity to deliver better outcomes for children as claimed. Rather, by working from 
a social constructionist perspective the objective has been to understand the meanings that 
commissioning has for differently situated policy actors, and how the relationship between 
these and their different strategic and goal interests, impact on policy outcomes. In 
exploring how evidence is used in the process of commissioning concern has been with the 
ways in which policy actors negotiate between different ‘ways of knowing’, and the 
relationship between this, and the managerial and organisational constraints within which 
they work.  
Challenges to the integration of children’s services are likely to endure and this study has 
attempted to illuminate some of the potential obstacles for commissioning in helping to 
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achieve this. Commissioning implies the co-existence of conflicting modes of governance 
that can set statutory and TS ‘partners’ in competition with each other. Enduring hierarchical 
lines of accountability and a tendency to revert to organisational silos together present 
obstacles to the emergence of networked relationships of collaboration and the 
establishment of shared goals.  
The resistance to commissioning as a tool of governance suggests it would be a mistake to 
assume there is complete consensus about its role in service improvement. The policy 
rhetoric is that commissioning, underpinned by contestability, is central to delivering better 
outcomes and improved efficiency. However, it is possible that the ideology of markets has 
not achieved the degree of cultural hegemony necessary to effect the complete suppression 
of dissent and policy challenge.  
 The outcome for joint commissioning could be understood as a form of Lindblom’s (1959) 
‘muddling through’, characterised by small adjustments to strategy and the alignment of 
some marginal budgets. These represent modest steps forward in establishing a central role 
for joint commissioning in delivering more efficient, effective needs led services as suggested 
by ECM and subsequent policy guidance.  
Evidence from this research indicates that it takes far longer than policy makers allow to 
effect organisational change, particularly where this challenges existing power relationships. 
The data for this thesis was collected prior to the election of the Coalition government in 
2010. Since then there have been considerable changes in the policy environment that are 
likely to impact on the development of joint strategic commissioning in children’s services.  
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These include the removal of the statutory guidance for CT in 2010 so that CTBs are no 
longer required to produce a CYPP. The policy direction for schools continues to be towards 
ever greater autonomy, although the intention to remove the statutory duty for schools and 
other educational establishments to cooperate was withdrawn from the Education Act (DfE 
2011a) at the eleventh hour. The development of health and well-being boards, NHS 
commissioning boards, GP commissioning consortia and the relocation of public health to 
LAs imply different lines of accountability for the achievement of policy outcomes, and new 
structural arrangements for commissioning.  GP consortia are unlikely to promote joint 
approaches between the NHS and LAs but re-housing public health within LAs has the 
potential to facilitate more integrated approaches to cross-cutting issues.  
The appeal to a logic of evidence based decision making at all stages of a rational 
commissioning ‘cycle’ suggests the possibility of pulling the local policy making out of the 
‘policy swamp’ (Schon 1983) and on to firmer ground. However, rather than acting as 
‘facilitators of rational deliberations’ (Torgerson 1997) commissioners could likewise be 
better described as ‘muddling through’. As policy implementers sitting ‘behind the front line’ 
commissioners negotiate policy across different domains. This requires them to integrate 
different ways of knowing which they accomplish with varying degrees of success and within 
the bounds of a set of managerial and organisational constraints. 
Commissioners and providers variously leaned towards more positivist or constructionist 
ways of seeing the world. Engaging in a form of ‘epistemological bricolage’ (Freeman 2007) 
they pieced together different forms of evidence, making ‘situated judgements’ (Prior 2009) 
about their relative value. These judgements were, in part, contingent upon their different 
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epistemological outlooks which provided conceptual justifications for the use, or rejection, 
of different forms of evidence in different contexts.   
However, they also reflect the instrumental purpose that evidence is expected to play. 
Overlapping regimes of governance imply multiple lines of accountability that demand 
different ‘action imperatives’ (Hill and Hupe 2007). This raises questions pertaining to the 
balance between achieving public-administrative accountability with community 
responsiveness.  Public-administrative accountability embodies a form of rational 
instrumentalism that ensures the predominance of quantitative over other forms of 
evidence and inhibits the capacity for learning. The horizontal and participatory 
accountability implied by networked and community governance favour a role for local 
knowledge in establishing priorities and designing contextually relevant solutions.  
The tension between control and autonomy in achieving policy outcomes endures with the 
Coalition government despite the localism and ‘Big Society’ policy initiatives. Together these 
suggest a future research agenda concerning how and whether their stated aspirations of 
enhanced participatory accountability is achieved and how this might impact on the role of 
alternative forms of evidence in informing the local policy process.  
The contemporary policy landscape is evolving and still unclear. In children’s services the 
Munro report (DfE 2011b) is not only significant but welcome, articulating  the case for a 
move from managerialism and the equation of ‘performance’ with conformance to 
performance targets, calling instead for the creation of a learning culture that supports both  
professional competence and discretion.  On the other hand the spectre of ‘payment by 
results’ (PBR) recreates the same problems and tensions as outcome-based commissioning, 
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shifting the blame for ‘policy failure’ to implementers. By linking the achievement of policy 
goals directly to resource allocation, PBR accords little sympathy to the idea of ‘goal conflict’ 
and is more likely to foster compliance in the interests of survival than innovation and policy 
deliberation.  
This study has afforded an insight into the role of situated agency in revising, resisting and 
negotiating policy, reflecting a values-conflict between professional and practice ethics and 
performance management imperatives. In so doing it suggests the need for closer academic 
attention on the role of ethics and values in the policy process and the relationship between 
them and ‘different ways of knowing’.  
It has been beyond the scope of this thesis to adequately explore the literature on 
organisational learning but findings would endorse a position that favours an alternative set 
of learning strategies to those implied by a narrow approach to what constitutes ‘evidence’.  
This includes support for the sort of reflective practice that Schon (1973, 1983) and 
Chapman (2004) advocate: learning through practice, experimentation and risk taking, with 
a readiness to modify practice. For commissioners this would include enhancing the capacity 
for reflexive learning about the use of evidence and resisting resort to command and control 
strategies over the local policy process. A good use of evidence, like successful governance, 
depends on the ‘mix’ (Rhodes 1997). Resolving the top-down/ bottom-up tension implies the 
need to value, not just technical, professional and ‘scientific’ knowledge, but also the local 
knowledge of front-line workers and communities.  
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APPENDIX 1: BRIEFING SHEET FOR RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS  
 
Who is conducting the research?  
Lucy Loveless: Institute of Applied Social Studies, University of Birmingham,B15 2TT 
What is the research about? 
The title of the research project is ‘Developing Evidenced Outcome-based Commissioning in 
Children’s Services’. This research is joint-funded by the Department for Children, Schools 
and Families (DCSF) and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and forms part of 
a PhD thesis at the University of Birmingham.  
The research takes a case study approach and involves qualitative or in-depth interviews 
with key strategic and service provider partners. The focus of the study is on the processes 
by which service planners and commissioners determine patterns of resource allocation and 
service provision to meet identified outcomes.  
 What will the interview involve?  
The interview will last approximately one hour. With your consent it will be recorded and 
subsequently transcribed.  
Questions will be centred on the following thematic areas: 
 Partnership structures and multi-agency working 
 Your experience of commissioning within Children’s Trust arrangements  
 Processes for identifying and defining priority outcomes and need  
 Use of evidence in determining service responses and evaluating effectiveness   
 Involving children and families in decision making  
It is likely that as different participants will have different roles and areas of expertise that 
you may not be able to discuss all the areas. This does not matter, as I am interested in your 
particular area of knowledge, and will just miss out the areas that you are not familiar with.  
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What about confidentiality?  
All interview data will be anonymised and treated as confidential. Participants’ identity will 
be protected through the use of ID codes or pseudonyms and anonymity ensured where 
direct quotes are used. Neither the Local Authority nor the organisation that you work for 
will be identified in subsequent reports.  
Interview recordings will be stored on a password protected non-networked PC that only the 
researcher has access to. At the end of the project original recordings will be destroyed so 
that only anonymised data remains.  
Your participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw from the interview at any 
stage or refuse to answer any particular questions. You can also withdraw your data from 
the research process at any point up to a month from time of interview.    
How will the research be used? 
Research findings will be submitted to the DCSF and published as part of a PhD thesis. They 
may be published elsewhere in future. By documenting and analysing the experiences of 
commissioning bodies involved in the complex processes demanded of them through new 
planning requirements this research aims to inform future approaches at the levels of local 
practice and national policy. 
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE COMMISSIONED 
SERVICES 
 
Reiterate issues related to confidentiality and anonymity. Confirm that participant is free to 
withdraw from the interview/research process.  
1. Introductory  
 Could you briefly describe your current role?  
What is your role in relation to the CYPTB/wider children’s trust arrangements? 
2. Structure and Governance  
How would you describe the function and role of the CYPTB? What would you say its main 
focus of activity is?   
Explore relationships between the Board and the smaller VCS providers – how far do 
larger/more established and favoured or trusted providers predominate?   
The government’s original intention was that CTs would bring ‘together services working 
with children under one organisational framework’ that would have a single planning and 
commissioning function – how far do you think that has happened within Downton?  
What have been the facilitating factors or barriers to this?  
Can you describe relationships between the key children’s service sectors in Downton?  
3. Commissioning  
What do you understand to be the role of the DPJC?  
What is the relationship between you/your service and the DPJC?  
Which services that you are involved in delivering have been or are currently commissioned 
through the DPJC? Are these new services or existing services that have been re-
commissioned?  
How do you expect this to change in future?  
What was the rationale(s) behind commissioning or re-commissioning these services?   
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Do you know what processes/evidence (documents?) were used to inform these 
commissioning decisions?   
What has been your experience of working with commissioners? What has been your 
experience of the contracting process?  
4. Identifying and prioritising outcomes  
Do you feel there is a difference in planning against outcome rather than need? How do you 
understand the relationship between need and outcome?   
How do you understand the difference between planning against outcomes as opposed to 
outputs or targets?   
Have there been discussions or developments around shared understandings of need? Has it 
been possible to develop shared understandings?  
Have you been involved in the JSNA/other strategic needs assessment processes?  
Can you explain by what process Downton’s (high level) priority outcomes for CYP have been 
arrived at?  How have you contributed towards that?  
What outcomes are expected from the services you are responsible for?  
What is your approach to needs assessment? Who uses your services – how do you target 
your services - what informs targeting decisions?   
Explore the balance between national versus locally determined priorities– how far do you 
think local discretion is ‘real’  - how far do national indicators dictate local priorities? 
Do you think that the need to meet national priorities conflicts with working to community 
priorities – explore strategies to overcome these conflicts    
How do you think different professional perspectives inform understandings – are different 
understandings accommodated – do particular understandings predominate? What about 
service providers? 
How are service users/children, families and communities involved in the process of need 
assessment? What are the mechanisms for this?  
5. Evidencing effective interventions to achieve priority outcomes  
Please describe in detail how one or two interventions you are involved in delivering have 
led to successful outcomes. How do you know they were successful? 
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How do you collect evidence of outcomes/impacts? What kinds of indicators do you use for 
measuring effectiveness – elicit narrative account  
How are monitoring and local performance management tools/ evaluation demonstrating 
outcomes?   
Are practices changing through looking at evidence of outcomes? Can you give an example? 
Do you make use of research and evaluation evidence – if so what and how?   
6. Review and learning  
How is evaluation used to inform future commissioning/decommissioning?  
Do you think evaluation evidence can be manipulated for political/other reasons?   
What are the systems for learning: from service providers/service users; learning between 
providers and between strategic stakeholders?   
7. Close  
Is there anything you would like to add that you think needs stressing or has not been 
covered?  
Thank you for taking part.  
Determine whether interviewee is interested to receive summary of results  
 
  
325 
 
APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE STRATEGIC 
STAKEHOLDERS/COMMISSIONERS 
 
Reiterate issues related to confidentiality and anonymity. Confirm that participant is free to 
withdraw from the interview/research process.  
1. Introductory  
 Could you briefly describe your role within the commissioning directorate?  
Could you briefly describe your role in relation to the CYPTB/wider children’s trust 
arrangements?  
2. Structure and Governance  
Could you describe briefly how current CT governance arrangements and partnership 
structures have evolved over time? Emergent sub-groups, executive group etc   
What is the main focus of the CYPTB at the moment? Is it a decision-making body? Where 
are decisions taken?  
Explore the nature of the CT/partnership.  Is it a ‘learning organisation’, open to change? Are 
there opportunities for debate – how is learning/debate facilitated across the Trust?  
Is there a level of trust between agencies and the different sectors? 
Could you describe briefly what you understand to be the function and role of the 
commissioning directorate? What is its relationship to the wider CT?   
What level of direct budgetary control/influence does the DCS have?  
What has been the Downton experience of pooling/aligning budgets? 
The government’s original intention was that CTs would bring ‘together services working 
with children under one organisational framework’ that would have a single planning and 
commissioning function – how far do you think that has happened within Downton? 
 What have been the facilitating factors or barriers to this? Are there any agencies not 
engaged with the process? How have GPs been involved? What about schools?  
To what extent do you think there is a shared vision for children and children’s services 
across sectors/agencies? 
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Can you describe partnership relationships between the key sectors? What are relationships 
between the VCS/LA /health like? Who are the dominant players?  
How far do think government guidance/policy has facilitated or impeded the process of 
partnership working within CT’s?  
3. Commissioning /markets and competition 
Do you think there is a shared understanding of commissioning across the CYPTB/CT?  
Can you give me a narrative account of how the commissioning strategy has been 
developed? 
How far do you think government guidance has been useful?   
Explore how the integrated service model/commissioning strategy and service review 
processes have been adopted  
How has experience of commissioning in other contexts contributed to understandings of 
children’s services commissioning- CF, health, adult services?  
Which services have been or are currently commissioned through the DPJC?  
Are these new services or existing services that have been re-commissioned?  
What was the rationale(s) behind commissioning or re-commissioning these services?   
What evidence has been used to inform these commissioning decisions?   
Can you describe the process by which services are commissioned?  
Explore the extent to which outsourcing has increased – which services have been 
outsourced?  
Has this formed part of a deliberate and explicitly developed policy?  How are services put 
out to tender?  
Do you think encouraging market contestability/developing alternative providers can deliver 
better outcomes – how and why? 
Do you think competition can improve service quality/outcomes for children and families? In 
which services? If not why not – what are the potential negatives of a market-based 
approach?  
How has the TS/private sector been involved in the process?  
Has competition been used to challenge in-house providers?  
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4.  Identifying and prioritising outcomes  
Can you explain by what process Downton’s priority outcomes for CYP have been arrived at?   
How do you understand the difference between planning against outcomes as opposed to 
outputs or targets?   
Do you feel there is a difference in planning against outcome first? How do you understand 
the relationship between need and outcome?   
Explore the balance between national versus locally determined priorities– how far do you 
think local discretion is ‘real’  - how far do national indicators dictate local priorities? 
Do you think that the need to meet national priorities conflicts with working to community 
priorities?  Explore strategies to overcome these conflicts    
How has the contractual process been developed to encourage an outcome-focused 
approach to service delivery – concrete examples of where this has happened?   
Explore experience of using the contractual process to ensure desirable outcomes are met – 
contracting against outcomes rather than outputs or targets.  
5.  Use of evidence to assess need  
Do you have a shared strategic approach to needs assessment – is it different across 
different service areas or themes?  
What has been your involvement in strategic needs assessment? Have you been involved in 
the JSNA? Elicit a narrative account.  
Explore the process of needs assessment: use of quantitative versus qualitative data – use of 
research evidence. Explore understandings of risk and resilience.   
How do you think different professional perspectives inform understandings – are different 
understandings accommodated – do particular understandings predominate? What about 
service providers? 
How are service users/children, families and communities involved in the process of need 
assessment? What are the mechanisms for this?  
 
6.  Evidencing effective interventions to achieve priority outcomes  
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Please describe in detail how one or two projects/programmes/interventions commissioned 
through the DPJC that have led to successful outcomes. How do you know they were 
successful? 
How are monitoring and local performance management tools/ evaluation demonstrating 
outcomes?  Are practices changing through looking at evidence of outcomes? Can you give 
an example? 
How are different partners involved in identifying effective strategies and processes to meet 
identified priority? How does this feed into commissioning process? Is there a shared 
strategic approach to this?  
What about use of research and evaluation evidence?   
7.  Review and learning  
What are the systems for learning: from service providers/service users; learning between 
providers and between strategic stakeholders?   
How is evaluation used to inform future commissioning/decommissioning?  
8. Close  
Is there anything you would like to add that you think needs stressing or has not been 
covered?  
Thank you.  
Determine whether interviewee is interested to receive summary of results  
 
 
 
 
